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ABSTRACT 
The Creativity of Nature: The Genesis of Schelling's 
Naturphilosophie 1115-1199 
by 
Ryan J. Foster 
The Naturphilosophie of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) has 
been neglected in the Anglophone world for over 200 years, but his detractors are wrong 
in insisting that his system represented a disguised mysticism and a rejection of empirical 
science. Although Schelling studied theology at the famous Tubingen seminary, he 
dedicated his life to philosophy by 1794, eventually turning to an intensive study of the 
natural sciences. By 1799, he had developed a systematic Naturphilosophie which 
harvested the discoveries of eighteenth century science in order to solve the philosophical 
problems left behind by Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Schelling 
relentlessly fought against the notion that nature is inert. Instead, he stressed its vibrancy, 
its activity, and ultimately its creativity. By reconstructing Schelling's intellectual 
development, we not only gain a new appreciation for his thought, but we also see 
aspects of his Naturphilosophie which are deeply sympathetic, and perhaps even useful in 
the twenty-first century. 
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Introduction: The Revival of the Young Schelling 
Any contemporary study of the philosophy of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-
1854) must answer an obvious question: why should anyone in the twenty-first century 
care about the often impenetrable and seemingly wildly metaphysical texts of the German 
Idealists?1 This question is especially difficult to answer in the English-speaking world, 
where metaphysical thinking itself has been thoroughly discredited.2 There is a general 
sense that the Idealists have very little to offer us today.3 For that reason, defenders of 
Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel often present them in sanitized forms, attempting either to 
isolate a helpful "non-metaphysical" kernel in their thought or to present their 
philosophies as sober advancements on Kant's transcendental philosophy. This is 
especially true in the cases of Hegel and Fichte, both of whom have received increasingly 
favorable treatment in English.4 Schelling's situation is somewhat more difficult than 
Kant's reputation, on the other hand, has not suffered nearly as much. Analytic philosophers are happy to 
see the sage from Konigsberg as a safe, healthy alternative to the descent into philosophical madness of the 
Idealists, who nevertheless, often with good reason, claimed to be following the "spirit" if not the "letter" 
of the Critical Philosophy. Fichte's invocation of the letter/spirit distinction was the most forceful. See 
Daniel Brazeale's "The Spirit of the Wissenschaftslehre" in The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy: 
Fichte, Schellingand Hegel, ed. Sally Sedgwick (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 171-198. 
2
 Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2002), 466. 
3
 Wayne M. Martin, Idealism and Objectivity: Understanding Fichte's Jena Project (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), 142. 
4
 Klaus Hartmann is the father of today's "non-metaphysical" interpretations of Hegel. See his "Taking the 
Transcendental Turn," The Review of Metaphysics (20) 1966: 223-249. Both Terry Pinkard and Tom 
Rockmore have contributed to this reading. See Rockmore's Hegel, Idealism, and Analytic Philosophy 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), Pinkard, Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of 
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that of his two contemporaries; his metaphysical commitments, especially after 1809, 
seem impossible to downplay, and his Naturphilosophie continues to be an object of 
ridicule for modern science.5 Nonetheless, there has been something of a "Schelling 
Revival" in the English-speaking world.6 This dissertation is intended as a contribution 
to that revival, particularly with respect to his early Naturphilosophie between 1797 and 
1799. Although several authors have already attempted to revive him in English, most 
Idealism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). A comprehensive collection of essays on the 
non-metaphysical Hegel, which also includes a bibliography of Klaus Hartmann's works, is Terry Pinkard, 
H. Tristram Engelhardt, eds., Hegel Reconsidered: Beyond Metaphysics and the Authoritarian State 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994). For recent attempts to portray Fichte as merely an 
epistemologist, see Frederick Neuhouser, Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), Wayne Martin, Idealism and Objectivity: Understanding Fichte's Jena Project, 
Robert Pippin, "Fichte's Alleged Subjective, Psychological, One-Sided Idealism," in The Reception of 
Kant's Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Sally Sedgwick, ed. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 147-170. Fichte scholars have a tendency to attack Schelling (and Hegel) in an 
attempt to distance them from their hero. Reinhard Lauth claims that "Schelling and Hegel, unlike Kant 
and Fichte, annihilated rational philosophy through itself, in a rigorously idealistic fashion, in the service of 
a fundamental irrationalism." Lauth, "Die Unterschiedzwischen der Naturphilosophie der 
Wissenschaftslehre und Schelling von zwei charakteristischen Ansatzpunkten des letzteren aus erlautert," 
in Natur und Subjektivitat: Zur Auseinandersetzung mit der Naturphilosophie desjungen Schelling. 
Referate, Voten, und Protokolle der II. Internationalen Schelling-Tagung Zurich, ed. Reinhard Heckmann, 
Hermann Krings, Rudolf W. Meyer (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1985), 224. Daniel Brazeale also 
levels false charges against Schelling's Naturphilosophie: "It is important to note, even if only in passing, 
the radical dissimilarity between Fichte's conception of a philosophy of nature and certain other projects 
that have gone by the same name. What is most striking about Fichte's concept of nature is how little he 
believed one can learn about nature from the a priori standpoint of philosophical reflection—which may 
explain why he himself showed so little interest in developing this branch of his system.. ..Fichte would 
appear to have far more in common with what we today call the philosophy of science than with the a priori 
Naturphilosophie of Schelling and Hegel." (Brazeale, "The Spirit of the Wissenschaftslehre" in The 
Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling.and Hegel, ed. Sally Sedgwick (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 179. The idea that Schelling's knowledge of nature was "a priori" will 
be discredited in this dissertation. 
5
 Ernst Mayr, perhaps the most important interpreter of die discipline of biology in the 20th Century, 
portrays Schelling's scientific theories as at best an overreaction to naive Newtonian mechanism, and at 
worst "ludicrous." Because Schelling and the Romantics were "essentialists" and embraced a speculative 
and "sterile" philosophy, they were "quite unable to develop a theory of common descent." Mayr, The 
Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1982), 387-389. The biggest problem with Mayr's approach to the history of 
biology is that, for Mayr, anything short of full-blown species change is dismissed as delusional 
"essentialism." This ignores the ways in which eighteenth century thinkers like Buffon, Diderot, and even 
Naturphilosophen like Schelling paved the way for a dynamic, temporalized view of nature. 
6
 Schelling was already being revived in Germany in the 1980s, at least with respect to his importance to 
modern biology and ecology. Unfortunately, the English-speaking world has lagged behind. Keith R. 
Peterson notes the recent "revival" in the introduction to Schelling's First Outline of a System of the 
Philosophy of Nature, trans. Keith R. Peterson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), xxxiii. 
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either avoid the subject of Naturphilosophie or are unwilling to give it the attention it 
deserves. 
The recent attempts to rehabilitate Schelling correspond to a general, though by 
no means precise, division of his philosophy. American scholars especially have turned 
to his later metaphysics and discovered a powerful critique of western philosophy, one 
that bears similarity to that advanced by Heidegger.7 Others have looked to his early 
Naturphilosophie and seen a building block in the development of Darwinian evolution 
or modern systems theory.8 German Schelling scholars have also returned to his 
Naturphilosophie, which they see as a forerunner of modern self-organization theory.9 
All of these perspectives have their merits, yet they are plagued by a common problem. 
In each case, Schelling is more or less portrayed as a forerunner (Vorlaufer), who 
contributed to a process of development culminating in Heidegger, Darwin, Prigogine, or 
7
 The most important book in this vein is Andrew Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: an 
Introduction, (London: Routledge, 1983). Both Dale Snow and Alan White have written broad treatments 
of Schelling's entire philosophical development which end up stressing the later works. See Snow's 
Schelling and the End of Idealism, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996) and White's 
Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). 
Incidentally, all three of these works gloss very quickly over the Naturphilosophie, demonstrating either an 
unwillingness or inability to deal with the complex scientific context of the time. Reinhard Zimmermann's 
Die Rekonstruktion von Raum, Zeit, und Materie: Moderne Implikationen Schellinger Naturphilosophie, 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1998) does not suffer from this problem, but Zimmerman also stresses the 
similarities between Schelling on the one hand and Sartre and Bloch on the other. 
8
 Robert Richards' excellent The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of 
Goethe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002) takes context very seriously. However, his narrative 
culminates in Darwin because of his longstanding argument with modern biologists regarding Darwin's 
supposed "mechanism" and lack of teleology. Joseph Esposito's Schelling's Idealism and Philosophy of 
Nature (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1977) ends with a discussion of American pragmatism, 
C.S. Peirce, and Systems Theory, and is also less historically-nuanced than Richards' account. 
9
 Marie-Luise Heuser-Kefiler has written extensively on Schelling's similarity to Ilya Prigogine, Hermann 
Haken, and modern self-organization theory. Unfortunately, her writings concentrate more on the latter 
than on Schelling himself and approach the entire subject within an ahistorical framework. See her Die 
Produktivitat der Natur: Schellings Naturphilosophie und das neue Paradigma der Selbstorganisation in 
den Naturwissenschaften (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1986) as well as Heuser-KeCler, Wilhelm G. 
Jacobs, eds., Schelling und die Selbstorganisation: Neue Forschungsperspektiven (Berlin: Duncker und 
Humblot, 1994). 
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whichever endpoint the author has selected. Ironically, these treatments condemn 
Schelling to the same role he was accorded in Hegel's system: a mere stepping stone. 
The failure of this approach leaves historians of Schelling in a difficult position. 
They must justify modern-day interest in Schelling as more than antiquarianism, without 
resorting to "sanitizing" his philosophy or presenting him merely as a precursor of some 
later intellectual movement. Fortunately, an accurate historical reconstruction of 
Schelling's development allows us simultaneously to understand him historically and to 
recognize the fruitful aspects of his thought in the present day. This dissertation will 
present Schelling on his own terms by using the methods of contextual intellectual 
history. These methods are indispensable if we are to apply his ideas to our own 
problems. After all, how can he be of assistance to us if we do not understand his world 
and the problems he faced in the late 1790s? While some of Schelling's solutions may 
strike the reader as ridiculous or utterly useless today, they are far outweighed by their 
insightful counterparts. Schelling's Naturphilosophie—which sees nature not as an 
object to be exploited, but as an intrinsically valuable counterpart to the human mind—is 
certainly relevant to a culture struggling with the ecological and bioethical dilemmas 
brought on by the ruthless exploitation of the earth's resources and our rapidly increasing 
capabilities for genetic manipulation. In the conclusion to this dissertation, I will discuss 
these issues further, but the bulk of the work will be historical. 
This dissertation has two main aims, the first of which is directed towards 
Anglophone readers. I intend to discredit the myth—still prevalent in the United States 
and Great Britain—that Schelling's Naturphilosophie was a rejection of empirical science 
and an attempt to investigate the natural world from a philosopher's desk. On the 
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contrary, not only was it empirically and philosophically informed, but it was part of 
what Schelling and his radical contemporaries saw as a thoroughgoing philosophical 
revolution aimed at changing every aspect of human knowledge. Schelling, Hegel, and 
Holderlin sketched out this ambitious project in the famous Oldest System Program of 
German Idealism, which united politics, epistemology, ethics, physics, and aesthetics. 
For them, Idealism and Naturphilosophie WQXQ the mental equivalent of the French 
Revolution, and this explains why an entire generation of college students could 
passionately read books which modern readers find almost indecipherable. For the young 
Schelling and his cadre of intellectual allies, philosophy was about action, and his 
Naturphilosophie was, in its own way, an attempt to carve out a space for human 
freedom, without which real, tangible revolution was impossible. Those new to 
Schelling's philosophy might see the juxtaposition of nature and human freedom as a 
puzzling one: but I will show how, in the wake of the Kantian philosophical revolution, 
the need to reconcile the two was absolutely critical. 
If the first aim of my dissertation is to "vitalize" Schelling's Naturphilosophie for 
the Anglophone reader, the second aim—oriented more towards specialists—is to 
reconstruct the path Schelling took to his first fully systematic work on Naturphilosophie, 
the First Outline of a System of Naturphilosophie (1799). How and why did an ambitious 
young philosopher, originally destined to be a Protestant pastor, create a system 
characterized by a deep interplay between empirical natural science and idealist 
philosophy? Why did he suddenly abandon transcendental philosophy in 1796 and 
devote himself to natural science? Why did he write two largely empirical works—The 
Ideas (1797) and On the World Soul (1798)—before finally giving his Naturphilosophie a 
6 
systematic form? And why did his Naturphilosophie, which at times seems ludicrous 
today, resonate so strongly with his contemporaries, including serious natural scientists? 
Neither of these are easy tasks. Both aims require an examination of three distinct 
but interrelated contexts, and very few Schelling scholars have the inclination to 
investigate all three. The least neglected of these contexts is the philosophical one. Very 
few treatments of Schelling neglect the influence of thinkers like Spinoza, Kant, Jacobi, 
Fichte, and Hegel, although some overemphasize one to the detriment of the others.10 
Thanks to Frederick Beiser's German Idealism, we now have an excellent account of this 
story in English. The second, somewhat more neglected context is biographical, and in 
this category I would also include the influence of several lesser known intellectuals, 
including Schelling's professors and friends at the Tubingen Stift. Robert Richards has 
brilliantly described Schelling's interactions with Goethe and the Jena circle, although the 
scope of his narrative prevented him from fully exploring Schelling's earlier influences. 
Still, the biographical context examined in this dissertation is often ignored even in 
outstanding German-language scholarship, and some of it is extremely helpful in 
understanding the choices Schelling made, both personally and philosophically. This 
brings us to the almost universally ignored context: eighteenth century natural science. 
Even Schelling scholars concerned explicitly with his Naturphilosophie gloss over this 
material, arguing that the empirical content of his works is almost irrelevant to his larger 
philosophical vision. I will argue that this is simply not true. While many of Schelling's 
chapters on light, heat, electricity, etc. are at best dated and at worst spectacularly wrong, 
his treatment of living nature is often insightful, reasonable, and prescient. But we must 
10
 Snow, for example, presents Jacobi as the most important influence on Schelling's early Idealism, a 
contention with which I strongly disagree. 
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understand the scientific context to see this. Schelling, like many of his generation, 
boldly called for an understanding of life based on physical yet non-mechanical 
principles. In that sense, his early Naturphilosophie is far more materialist than 
spiritualist. 
The chapters of this dissertation will sometimes jump back and forth between 
these several contexts, although they often intersect. In chapter 1,1 discuss Schelling's 
childhood and early education, paying special attention to the unique situation of 
Wurttemberg, Schelling's homeland, in the eighteenth century. Although I describe the 
ways in which Wurttemberg's traditions of political resistance and Pietist theosophy may 
have influenced the young Schelling, I do not believe, as some authors do, that Swabian 
traditions determined Schelling's entire career. Rather, I show that Schelling was both 
shaped by and revolted against his native culture. By the time he completed his 
education in Tubingen, he was desperate to leave Wurttemberg altogether, and saw 
himself not as a theologian but as a philosopher. 
The second chapter examines the aforementioned philosophical context of 
Schelling's development, from Kant up to Fichte, and also gives an interpretation of 
Schelling's first two philosophical works, On Possibility of a Form of All Philosophy 
(1794) and On the I as Principle of Philosophy (1795). In both of these works, Schelling 
attempted—like Reinhold and Fichte before him—to unify the fractured Kantian system 
under a common principle. In one important sense, he went beyond Fichte by drawing on 
the philosophy of Spinoza. While writing these two books, Schelling also learned to use 
Fichte's concepts and methods, which he would later transfer over onto Nature. Just as 
Fichte saw self-consciousness as the product of original, conflicted forces, Schelling saw 
nature not as a static object, but as the product the basic forces of attraction and repulsion. 
Chapter 3 examines a shift in Schelling's philosophy which occurred after he 
graduated from the Tubingen Stift. In his earlier works, he carefully maintained the guise 
of Fichtean orthodoxy, even when he deviated from his mentor's ideas. But the main 
point of the Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism (1796) was at odds with 
Fichte's system, and indicated that Schelling was searching for a philosophy which 
escaped the narrow confines of Fichte's subjective, ethical Idealism. Indeed, the final 
letter hints at a forthcoming investigation of nature. That Schelling intended to study 
natural science is also proven by the aforementioned Oldest System Program. Finally, I 
argue that his intellectual feud with Friedrich Nicolai may have impelled him to abandon 
his youthful Idealism and investigate the "real" world instead. 
Chapter 4 takes a step backwards in order to orient the reader into Schelling's 
own scientific world. At the outset of the eighteenth century, Newton's natural 
philosophy dominated the agenda of even the life sciences. Herman Boerhaave, who 
trained an entire generation of European physicians, tried to interpret the human body as 
a series of springs and hydraulic pumps. But eighteenth century life scientists gradually 
abandoned the idea that living things could be'explained in the same manner as celestial 
bodies. In France, philosophes like Maupertuis and Buffon adopted a "vital materialism" 
which asserted that even inorganic matter is essentially dynamic, and that life is not an 
aberration, but the very purpose of nature. This vital materialism was transferred to 
Schelling by Herder, and deeply influenced his Naturphilosophie. Therefore it is fair to 
say that Naturphilosophie was not a revolt against science, but rather the final and boldest 
9 
statement that the world—even so-called "dead matter"—is organically linked and 
teeming with life. . 
In chapter 5,1 finally examine Schelling's Naturphilosophie, but I do not jump 
straight to a reading of the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (1797). Rather, I argue that 
his real turn to nature is announced in a serial publication, The General Overview of the 
latest Philosophical Literature (1797-98). By systematically reconstructing the 
composition of this text, which Schelling used as an avenue for exploring his diverse 
interests at the time, we can gain some insight into Schelling's Leipzig period, about 
which source material is extremely lacking. After showing how the General Overview 
was the true turning point in Schelling's thought, I examine the Ideas, arguing that, even 
in the empirical sections, we can see Schelling's eventual system shining through. At 
that point, I look back at his scientific training in Leipzig and give a hypothetical account 
of the previous year's studies. Of crucial importance to this chapter is the philosophy of 
Leibniz, whose influence on Schelling I believe has been gravely underestimated. 
Schelling calls for the revival of Leibniz in both the General Overview and the Ideas, and 
it is a mistake not to take this aspect of these works seriously. 
In Chapter 6,1 examine Schelling's next two monographs: On the World Soul 
(1798) and the First Outline of a System of Naturphilosophie (1799), along with the 
concise and important Introduction to that latter work. After failing to get a 
professorship at Jena after the publication of the Ideas, Schelling begins again from 
scratch and writes On the World Soul, which, unlike the Ideas gives a detailed account of 
organic nature. Schelling's vital materialism is in full bloom in this work, for he 
argues—like Diderot—that the forces of life are latent even in so-called "dead matter." 
10 
Goethe liked it so much that he called him to Jena as full professor. In preparation for his 
lectures, Schelling wrote the First Outline, the most systematic presentation of his 
Naturphilosophie. I argue that the First Outline is really a physical monadology which 
incorporates his earlier empirical insights. Leibniz's name barely appears in the First 
Outline, but his ideas are everywhere in Schelling's "dynamic atomism." The world of 
the First Outline is one constructed not by atoms of matter, but by "atoms of force," 
which lie at the bottom of upward development. Like Herder, Schelling believed that 
basic physical forces drive Nature upwards to humanity. And in this sense, Schelling 
comes full circle: he had begun his career trying to explain self-consciousness solely in 
its own terms. In the end, he explains self-consciousness by finding the seeds of human 
subjectivity in the objective, natural world. 
Finally, to conclude the dissertation, I offer my thoughts on the value of Schelling 
in contemporary debates about science and nature. I believe we must exercise some 
caution in this regard. The attempts to find similarities between Schelling's viewpoints 
and certain aspects of modern science is often misguided, because it rips Schelling from 
his context and misses the forest from the trees. In the end, the most valuable aspects of 
Schelling today are his larger insights about the relationship between philosophy and 
science, nature and man. On the first front Schelling offers hope to a world where 
philosophy and science occupy almost completely separate spheres. For 200 years, 
Naturphilosophie has been held up as proof that philosophers should not interfere with 
science. I argue the opposite. Naturphilosophie, for all its obvious flaws, offers a fruitful 
model of scientific-philosophical cooperation. And had previous generations taken 
Schelling seriously, and recognized that man is impossible without nature, perhaps the 
11 
ecological quandaries with which we now struggle could have been avoided. Ultimately, 
Schelling speaks to our situation, and we do not need to divorce him from his historical 
and philosophical context to realize this. 
12 
Chapter 1: Schelling's Swabian Education 
Among Germans one will understand immediately 
when I say that philosophy has been corrupted by 
theologian blood. The Protestant Pastor is the 
grandfather of German philosophy, Protestantism 
itself is its original sin.. ..One has only to say the 
words "Tubingen Stiff to grasp what German 
philosophy is at bottom—a cunning theology.. .The 
Swabians are the best liars in Germany, they lie 
innocently. 
—Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist" 
CONTEXTUALIZING GERMAN IDEALISM 
Nietzsche contended that German philosophy was essentially a disguised theology, and 
his argument is persuasive on its surface: one cannot deny that the development of post-
Kantian, "Absolute" Idealism was largely the undertaking of several graduates of the 
famous Tubingen seminary. Schelling and Hegel played an enormous role in that 
process, but several of their schoolmates—such as the theologian and philosopher 
Immanuel Niethammer and the poet Friedrich Holderlin—were crucial for it as well.12 
Many historians and philosophers have thus adopted a version of Nietzsche's aphorism as 
a master narrative for the interpretation of Schelling and Hegel, pointing out the supposed 
11
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theological—and uniquely Swabian theosophical—undercurrents in their writings. Not 
only do these scholars claim that Idealist thought was a secularized version of Swabian 
Pietism, but they argue that it belongs to a mystical tradition stretching back to Jakob 
Bohme and Paracelsus.13 If anything, this narrative has become even more popular in an 
age skeptical of grand philosophical systems. Reading Schelling and Hegel as heirs of a 
mystical religious tradition makes them seem more authentic and more appealing to those 
hostile to eighteenth century rationalism. If the Idealists can be "exposed" as mere 
theologians, their admittedly excessive pretensions to systematicity can be casually 
dismissed as quaint artifacts of a bygone philosophical age. In some ways, the narrative 
is an excuse not to take Idealism seriously. 
Fortunately for those who see Schelling's Naturphilosophie—which is 
inseparable from German Idealism as a whole—as relevant to present-day concerns, this 
13
 The first, and often the most outlandish, exhaustive study is Robert Schneider, Schellings und Hegels 
Schwabische Geistesahnen (Wurzburg-Aumuhle: Konrad Triltsch Verlag, 1938). Ernst Benz, The Mystical 
Sources of German Romantic Philosophy (Allison Park, PA: Pickwick, 1983), "Schellings Schwabische 
Geistesahnen," in Schellings Philosophic der Freiheit (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1977), 75-138 is more 
balanced in his assessment. Wilhelm August Schulze, "Oetingers Beitrag zur Schellingschen 
Freiheitslehre," Zeitschrift fur Theologie undKirche (54) 1957: 213-225, correctly limits the scope of his 
study to Schelling's later works. Jean-Francois Marquet, "Schelling et la Philosophic de la Nature," in 
Epochen der Naturmystik, ed. Antoine Faivre, Rudolf Christian Zimmerman (Berlin: Erich Schmidt, 1979), 
426-444 argues that Schelling's Naturphilosophie is only "pretended" science and in reality simply a 
version of Boehme's mysticism. Reiner Heinze, Bengel und Oetinger als Vorldufer des deutschen 
Idealismus (Inaugural Diss.: Minister, 1969) essentially recapitulates Schneider's hypotheses. Manfred 
Durner, "Die Naturphilosophie im 18. Jahrhundert und der naturwissenschaftlichte Unterricht in Tubingen: 
zu den Quellen von Schellings Naturphilosophie," Archivfur Geschichte der Philosophic (1991): 71-103, 
devotes a small section to the influence to Pietist Naturmystik. Laurence Dickey, Hegel: Religion, 
Economics, and the Politics of Spirit 1770-1807 (New York: Cambridge, 1987), focuses not on mysticism 
but on Wurttemberg's role in the formation of Hegel's thought on politics and community. Like the others, 
he is skeptical of the Kant-Fichte-Schelling-Hegel narrative. Glenn Alexander Magee, Hegel and the 
Hermetic Tradition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), is a recent addition to the literature which 
picks up on and expands Schneider's theories. Even Schiller, whose radical The Robbers even repulsed 
Goethe, does not escape this tradition. Arthur McCardle argues that Schiller himself was strongly 
influenced by the Swabian theosophical tradition. See his Friedrich Schiller and Swabian Pietism (New 
York: Peter Lang, 1986). 
14 
narrative crumbles upon closer inspection. Although Wurttemberg was important for 
Schelling's development, and although Schelling did turn to mystical-theological 
traditions after 1809, his early works by no means follow any theological agenda.15 In 
fact, the young Schelling was a radical—perhaps even an atheist—and a republican, and 
he became so precisely by revolting against the theological traditions he was supposed to 
follow. By the time Schelling left Wurttemberg in 1796, he harbored an outright disdain 
both for his homeland and for the professors who had trained him. And while writing his 
Naturphilosophie, Schelling saw himself not as a "cunning" pastor but as a philosopher, 
not as an alchemist but as an interpreter of cutting edge natural science. To say otherwise 
is to fundamentally misunderstand his entire project, which originally arose out of a 
unique constellation of sociopolitical, religious, and philosophical contexts in his native 
Wurttemberg. The present chapter will sketch out those contexts, and show how a young 
man destined for a career as a Protestant pastor became a radical philosopher and a 
revolutionary instead. 
14
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WURTTEMBERG IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: TRADITION AND 
CONFLICT 
Schelling's early life was powerfully shaped—but not predetermined—by his homeland's 
history. Of all the territories in the old Holy Roman Empire, at least in the eighteenth 
century, Wurttemberg was probably the most peculiar. Its geographical and demographic 
characteristics formed the basis of this uniqueness. Wurttemberg was, and still is today, 
an area filled with small towns and villages, many lying along the banks of the Neckar 
River and its tributaries. Its western areas feature the mountains of the Black Forest, 
while the Swabian Alb runs through the middle of the country, from southwest to 
northeast. The Danube River, originating in the Black Forest, runs through the south of 
the country. Even today, it is one of the most beautiful locales in Germany.16 In this 
setting, there was a remarkable absence of large cities; instead, smaller communities 
predominated. Indeed, Wurttemberg had the greatest concentration of what Mack 
Walker calls "home towns" in all of the Reich, with approximately 1 town per square 
German mile around 1800.17 In 1787, there were only three towns in the duchy with a 
population of 5,000 or more: Stuttgart (the ducal capital), Tubingen (home of the Stiff), 
and Ludwigsburg (the ducal residence).18 Given the multitude of "home town" 
communities, it should come as no surprise that there was no established nobility in 
Wurttemberg. Its nobility played almost no political role after the early sixteenth 
century, and as a result, the town/country conflicts so characteristic of other states was 
16
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completely absent in Wurttemberg.19 The entire country imbibed a middle class 
consciousness, and the young Schelling, a steadfast opponent of aristocratic pretensions 
and vice, was no exception. 
The absence of conflict between bourgeoisie and nobility did not, however, 
betoken a complete lack of internal strife. Since the early sixteenth century, the Estates, a 
quasi-parliament composed of church prelates and town representatives, possessed an 
enormous degree of political power and repeatedly came into conflict with the ruling 
Dukes. Not only did they control the expenditures of the government, but in 1498, they 
even succeeded in overthrowing a Duke (with the approval of Holy Roman Emperor 
Maximilian) on account of his "manifold bad and disorderly practices."20 Over the years, 
the powers of the Estates waxed and waned, and its influence was often successfully 
blunted by strong-headed rulers willing to operate without its explicit approval. 
Nonetheless, the Estates preserved a spirit of resistance in Wurttemberg unmatched by 
any other territory in Germany. This strong parliamentary and liberal tradition even 
impelled a British author to declare that the only two constitutions in Europe were those 
of Britain and Wurttemberg.21 This parliamentary tradition would play a crucial role in 
the eighteenth century, for in 1733, Duke Karl Alexander ascended to the throne. The 
successive reigns of Karl Alexander (1733-1737) and his sOn, Karl Eugen (1737-1793), 
would last for a combined sixty years and precipitate a long conflict between the Estates 
and ducal rule. 
19
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Karl Alexander's reign lasted only four years, but it set the tone for much of the 
eighteenth century, since his son would continue to pursue his policies. Karl Alexander 
alarmed the estates for two reasons. First, Wurttemberg was a Lutheran state surrounded 
by Catholic territories, and Karl Alexander was a convert to Catholicism. Although he 
paid lip service to the Estates on religious issues—through the so-called Religions-
Reversalien of 1733, in which he promised that his Catholicism would remain only a 
private affair—it was clear to everyone that his ultimate goal was the advancement of the 
Catholic Church in his duchy.22 This conjured up memories of past religious conflicts: a 
century earlier, the Thirty Years War had devastated Wurttemberg. After the Catholic 
victory at Nordlingen in 1634, Imperial forces ran roughshod over the country. 
Thereafter, Wurttemberg suffered at the hands of both French and Imperial armies, and 
by 1648 it had incurred severe losses in population and property. Any alliance between 
Karl Alexander and Austria would again make Wurttemberg vulnerable in a renewed 
Franco-Austrian conflict. 
Karl Alexander's absolutist ambitions were equally disconcerting to the Estates. 
He sought to imitate the absolutist model of Prussia by demanding the creation of a large 
standing army, which the Estates opposed not least because of its incredible cost. But 
Karl Alexander was able to successfully exploit the war of the Polish Succession (1733-
1738) and the concomitant threat of invasion by France to further these military 
22
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ambitions, and the Estates were able to offer only minimal resistance to his plans.24 Were 
it not for his sudden death in 1737, his plans would most likely have succeeded. The 
Estates struck back the day after Karl Alexander's death, when a number of his closest 
advisers were arrested. His financial adviser, a Jew named Suss Oppenheimer, met a 
worse fate: he was eventually executed for his willing violations of the constitution. 
Thus, the specter of Catholic absolutist rule was temporarily banished, as Karl Eugen, the 
heir to the throne, was still only nine.26 
In 1744, however, Karl Eugen reached his majority, and he picked up where his 
father had left off. History has not been kind to Karl Eugen, for as Peter Wilson notes, 
"Whenever an example is required to reinforce the stereotype of the petty absolutist in 
eighteenth-century Germany, [K]arl Eugen is called upon to provide it."27 Wilson makes 
the case that Karl Eugen's ambitions were not very different from either his predecessors' 
or his successors', thus somewhat deflating his reputation as a larger than life despot.28 
Still, since we are examining the setting in which Schelling's ideas blossomed, Karl 
Eugen is extremely important. Not only did he arouse the hatred of the Protestant 
populace in general, but he helped provoke the revolutionary mindset which Schelling 
and many of his classmates in Tubingen embraced. Like his father, he was dedicated to 
24
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the buildup of a large standing army, and his officers went to great lengths to achieve this 
goal. What particularly incensed his subjects were stories of forced recruitment into the 
army. Although Karl Eugen denied that such practices occurred, Carsten notes that it was 
easy "to list numerous examples of forcible enrollment," some of which included the use 
of torture.29 The Duke was so desperate to increase the size of his army that he 
eventually sold it out to France, receiving money from Louis XV to recruit 6,000 infantry 
which would be at the latter's disposal. This turned out badly during the Seven Years 
War: Wurttemberg's forced alliance with France meant that these infantry were 
slaughtered by Frederick the Great during his brilliant victory at Leuthen in 1757. Two-
thirds of the 6,000 man force was destroyed. These events were not only embarrassing, 
but ironic: Karl Eugen idolized Frederick's "enlightened despotism", yet his army was 
crushed by him. 
Karl Eugen's military misadventures had disastrous financial consequences, 
which were compounded by his willingness to spend vast amounts of money on his 
court.31 In fact, his military failures may have provoked these cultural expenditures. As 
Wilson hypothesizes, 
Carsten provides the example of "twelve young men.. .who were taken to the barracks at Ludwigsburg, 
where they were threatened with starvation unless they enlisted, and their parents were forbidden to bring 
them any food. Then they were put on a wooden donkey and heavy stones were laid on their feet which 
they had to raise, and if any stone dropped, they were so severely beaten on their shins that some fainted. 
Timber was put into their hands which they had to hold with outstretched arms, and if they let one arm sink 
they were so beaten on the elbow that their wounds were still unhealed. This torture continued until they 
promised to enlist; but five escaped, whereupon their fathers were arrested and only released on payment of 
100 guilders." {Princes and Parliaments, 135-136). 
30
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The continuation of lavish court expenditure in the mid-
1760s has much akin to an act of defiance. If [K]arl Eugen 
could not outdo his rivals by realizing his political 
ambitions, he would at least overshadow them with a 
dazzling court.. ..The court and art patronage were to 
compensate for his failure.... .32 
Thus, there was a deep connection between his military and cultural excesses. Karl 
Eugen's profligacy led both his subjects and subsequent historians to view his reign as a 
"heady rush of hunting expeditions, ballets, mistresses and military adventures.. ,."33 He 
repeatedly spent more money than the Estates authorized, and subsequently sought to 
replenish his coffers with a variety of tax schemes, ranging from a salt tax which obliged 
all Wurttembergers to buy 15 pounds of salt, to an annual tax to be levied by soldiers. In 
both cases, refusal to pay meant either incarceration or a fine, on top of one's existing tax 
debt.34 The Estates naturally opposed these measures, for if Karl Eugen could 
successfully carry them off, they would lose the power of the purse and be as weak as the 
impotent Estates in other German lands. Opposition to these ducal schemes could be 
dangerous. Johann Jakob Moser, the most famous leader of the opposition and one of the 
leading theorists of hometown communities, was even sent to prison for speaking out 
•ye 
against the Duke's plans. 
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In detailing the conflicts between the Estates and the Duke, Carsten and Wilson 
focus largely on the issue of military expansion and the related disputes over funding and 
conscription. Wilson explicitly downplays the importance of religion in these conflicts, 
especially in his discussion of the Seven Years War. Wilson portrays Karl Eugen's 
alliance with Catholic France and Austria completely in terms of Wurttemberg's 
geopolitical situation. The duchy was surrounded by anti-Prussian, Catholic territories, 
and an alliance with Frederick would have meant certain disaster.36 But other scholars 
have emphasized the religious aspect of the political squabbles in eighteenth century 
Wurttemberg. Laurence Dickey, in his contextualization of Hegel, gives much more 
weight to the religious feud between the Catholic Duke and the Protestant Estates. 
Dickey argues that the "overriding concern of Wurttemberg Protestants" during the 
eighteenth century was the limitation of Catholic ducal authority, and that the religious 
and constitutional traditions of Wurttemberg were intimately woven together: 
In this context, the interest of Protestant prelates and those 
of other members of the Estates converged—negatively in 
their antipathies to Catholicism and absolutism and 
positively in their commitment to legitimizing the Estates 
as the guardian of the religious and civil liberties of all 
Wurttembergers.37 
While Dickey argues for a powerful intersection between Protestantism and the 
interest of the Estates in the eighteenth century, he makes it clear that this univocal front 
36
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only arose with the accession of Karl Alexander in 1733. Before that, the church prelates 
often sided with the Dukes, because the ruler traditionally controlled the funding of the 
church.38 The Reversalien of 1733-1734 changed this arrangement, giving the Estates 
control over church revenues. Whereas prelates and city-dwelling representatives had 
heretofore often disagreed, they now stood united in opposition to the Catholic Dukes. 
Furthermore, the friendship between the Pietest theologian Johann Albrecht Bengel 
(1687-1752) and the legal theorist Johann Jakob Moser (1701-1785) forged an 
ideological union between pietism and the oppositional tradition of Wurttemberg. 
Political opposition to the Duke, under the guise of the veneration of the 1514 Treaty of 
Tubingen, became thoroughly intertwined with the call for the creation of a civically-
engaged, pious Protestant culture.40 Thus, the separate traditions of religious revival and 
constitutionalism easily coalesced.41 It was this union of Protestant and Constitutionalist 
ideology that allowed the estates to frustrate Karl Eugen's absolutist ambitions. 
If Protestantism and political resistance made common cause in 1733, their 
alliance began to fade after 1770.42 In 1764, after becoming overwhelmed with Karl 
38
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Eugen's tax schemes, the Estates lodged a formal complaint against the Duke with the 
Aulic Council, one of the two highest courts of the Holy Roman Empire. The result was 
remarkable: Moser, who had been imprisoned for five years, was ordered released, and 
the Council ordered Karl Eugen to summon a diet to discuss the problems.43 Karl Eugen, 
still reeling from the disaster of the Seven Years War, was deprived of funds and 
desperately needed the support of the Estates, but the diet dragged on for years without 
much progress. Further cases were brought to the Aulic Council until 1770, when that 
body finally proposed a compromise, the so-called Erbvergleich, which was a 
monumental victory for the Estates.44 Faced with financial problems and the pressure of 
Austria, Karl Eugen had little choice but to accept the agreement, which gave the Estates 
what they had wanted all along—guaranteed status as equal partners in the government of 
the country. It was precisely this victory, however, that broke up the seemingly 
monolithic alliance between Protestants and Constitutionalists. Karl Eugen was no 
longer a threat, and contented himself with court projects and the founding of his new 
Karlsschule in Stuttgart. But despite its final resolution, the legacy of the conflict would 
influence future generations: the long period of political strife had given birth to a new 
form of Pietism, one explicitly eschatological in focus, which would live on in the 
popular consciousness long after the threat of Karl Eugen had receded. The 
aforementioned theologians Bengel and Oetinger were the torch bearers of this 
movement, and their ideas were embraced by Schelling's own family. 
Walker, Moser, 245-247. 
Wilson, War, State, and Society, 233. 
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PIETISM, ESCHATOLOGY, AND NATURMYSTIKm EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY WURTTEMBERG 
The cultural and political impact of Pietism in Germany cannot be understated. During 
the eighteenth century, Pietist ideas gave birth to innovations in fields as disparate as 
aesthetics and medicine.45 Pietism began in the late sixteenth century as a revolt against 
the perceived spiritual stagnation of the Lutheran church. Reformers wanted to renew the 
faith by going back to its simpler, more spiritual roots. After all, Lutheranism had begun 
with the assertion of the priesthood of all believers and emphasized each individual's 
direct relationship with God. Nevertheless, the official Lutheran church had become a 
rigid organization very similar to the Catholic Church against which it had originally 
rebelled. In this corrupted Lutheran church, dogma and doctrine trumped inner spiritual 
rebirth. Pietism thus deemed Lutheran orthodoxy "to be essentially an uninspiring, 
woodenheaded preoccupation with largely irrelevant theologumena, and which it, 
therefore, held responsible for the deplorable state of the Lutheran churches in both 
Germany and Scandinavia."46 All Pietists agreed that the essence of Christianity lay not 
in any particular Church structure but in a direct relationship with Christ.47 Additionally, 
Pietists stressed the need for each individual to experience a spiritual rebirth. This rebirth 
must be total, and one must, in terms of Pauline theology, be "in but not of the world."48 
45
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Orthodox Lutheranism, which happily accommodated itself to a supposedly corrupt 
world and surrendered its autonomy to the state, violated this tenet of Pietist belief. A 
final characteristic of Pietism was its emphasis on the Bible, which focused on the 
application of the Bible's teachings to daily life.49 The drive to understand the Bible 
properly led to new methods of exegesis and innovative Biblical scholarship, but it often 
degenerated into an outright mistrust of reason.50 The expulsion of Christian Wolff from 
the University of Halle in 1723 demonstrated that this distrust of reason could make 
Pietists as intolerant as the orthodox Lutherans they so vehemently criticized. 
Philipp Jakob Spener (163 5-1705), usually identified as the father of the 
movement, hinted at all of these aspects of Pietism in his writings, but it was his 
followers in Halle, such as August Hermann Francke (1663-1727), who first built Pietism 
into an organized system, encompassing education and politics as well.51 The University 
of Halle, the most prestigious University in Prussia during the eighteenth century, became 
a bastion of Pietist thought. However, a uniquely Swabian variant of Pietism arose 
alongside it in Wurttemberg, and this variant interacted with the political developments 
outlined in the preceding section.52 This arose partly from a visit Spener made to 
49
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Tubingen and partly because of a desire for spiritual rebirth in a land that was still 
recovering from the devastation of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).53 Bengel emerged 
as the first and most important leader of Wurttemberg Pietism. He accepted the tenets of 
the Halle school, but made two unique contributions to the movement: the first was a new 
method for biblical exegesis, and the second was his eschatology. The latter bears some 
resemblance to Hegel's philosophy of spirit, a fact that many scholars misinterpret as a 
sign that Hegel was a "theologian in disguise." 
Bengel spent a great deal of time interpreting the Book of Revelation. He 
believed that it was fundamentally dissimilar from the rest of the books in the New 
Testament; it was delivered in the style of an Old Testament prophetic book, and Bengel 
interpreted it as the direct revelation of Jesus Christ, not the apostle John.54 Like many 
Christians throughout history, Bengel believed that Jesus would soon return, and that he 
himself was a "divinely chosen instrument" whose role it was to identify the date of the 
second coming.55 1836 was the year of Christ's return, according to Bengel.56 Bengel's 
apocalyptic thought was probably fueled in part by the political situation in his homeland. 
As mentioned above, Bengel played an important role in the alliance between Protestant 
and Constitutionalist ideologies in their battles against Karl Alexander and Karl Eugen. 
Many Wurttembergers believed that their fight against the evil (even Satanic) Catholic 
Dukes was a sign of the end times, and thus Bengel was by no means unusual in his 
53
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conviction that his was one of the last generations before the second coming. He lived in 
an age in which traditional structures were breaking down, and these moments in history 
are always conducive to the development of eschatology.57 
Although expectations of the last days have pervaded Christian history, Bengel's 
particular version was extremely innovative: he introduced "history" into God's very 
being, and many commentators have drawn a parallel between this aspect of Bengel's 
thought and Hegel's historical vision. Robert Schneider argues that Bengel was the first 
Swabian "Philosopher of History" and that his theology made the entire religious culture 
"through and through historical."58 Bengel not only believed that God knew the outcome 
of history in advance,59 but he believed that God Himself will change in the future. 
When Christ eventually returns, he will render the scriptures superfluous since humans 
will have a direct knowledge of God. This in turn will inaugurate a new relationship 
between man and God, one in which God's very essence will change.60 Of course, 
comparing this with Hegel's vision of a self-actualizing world spirit is problematic, 
especially because Bengel's "chiliasm" is, by Heinze's own admission, "purely 
passive."61 In Bengel's account, it is not man's job to move along the process of history, 
but God's alone. Oetinger, the second of the great "Swabian fathers," likewise embraced 
the idea of a changing God, although in a much less eschatological context. 
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If Bengel is usually compared with Hegel, Oetinger (1702-1782) is most often 
compared with Schelling, especially in the context of Schelling's early Idealism and 
Naturphilosophie. Indeed, Oetinger was deeply interested in natural science and 
constructed a sort of theosophical philosophy of nature. Oetinger refused to 
compartmentalize human knowledge, instead thoroughly blending theology with 
philosophy and natural science.62 Furthermore, there are affinities between Schelling's 
so-called "real-idealism" and Oetinger's belief in inseparability of body and spirit. Still, 
in his own time, Oetinger was looked upon as a potentially dangerous rebel and as a 
disciple of Jakob Bohme, whose works he helped reintroduce to the German public. He 
first came to public attention in 1765 by translating some of the writings of the Swedish 
mystic Swedenborg into German, appending his own—often sympathetic—commentary 
to the translation. The commentary brought Oetinger's orthodoxy into question, and he 
was questioned by the Stuttgart Konsistorium, the arbiters of Swabian Pietist dogma, in 
1766, and he was forced to recant some of his positions. Oetinger's difficulties with the 
Konsistorium aptly demonstrated that official Swabian Pietism had degenerated into the 
same doctrinally-obsessed mindset that the original Pietists had criticized. 
In addition to his work on Swedenborg, Oetinger devoted himself to the 
philosophy of another mystic: Jakob Bohme. Oetinger appropriated Bohme's theories 
regarding the conflicting forces of nature, and combined these ideas with his own 
kabalistic inquiries to create an elaborate Naturmystik, which comprehensively explained 
the development of all the powers of nature at creation. Oetinger explained life itself as a 
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conflict of forces, thus foreshadowing the ideas of Herder, Goethe, and Schelling.64 He 
also seized upon the centrality of light in Bohme's system and maintained, as Schelling 
would later in On the World Soul, that light is "the first principle of all nature" and the 
"ultimate principle of all bodies."65 Finally, Oetinger was a renowned anti-dualist: 
although many giants of eighteenth century philosophy (Newton, Leibniz, Wolff) 
separated matter and spirit, world and God, Oetinger saw them as manifestations of a 
deeper unity.66 Oetinger famously declared that "Embodiment is the goal of the works of 
God (Leiblichkeit ist das Ende der Werke Gottes)." Like his spiritual ancestor Bengel, 
Oetinger believed that the essence of God could change, and that in 1836, a "Golden 
Age" would begin, one in which spirit and body would be reconciled.68 God had even 
foreshadowed this unification of the spiritual and the corporeal by coming to earth in the 
bodily form of Christ.69 These four aspects of Oetinger's thought—his polarity thinking, 
his explanation of life, his emphasis on light as first principle, and his anti-dualism—have 
been seized upon by those who argue for connection between Oetinger's theosophy and 
Schelling's Naturphilosophie. But we much approach this argument cautiously. 
Although there is no evidence that Schelling even read Oetinger prior to the construction 
of his Naturphilosophie, Oetinger's ideas may have permeated Swabian religious culture 
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and predisposed Schelling to see Nature as active and spiritual. However, even if 
Oetinger influenced Schelling in this way, it does not prove that Schelling was simply a 
"cunning theologian" in the late 1790s. He may have kept Swabian Naturmystik in his 
philosophical toolbox, but he saw himself first and foremost as a. philosopher. 
We now have sufficient background to delve into Schelling's biography. The 
eighteenth century in Wurttemberg had produced a unique concoction of political and 
theological viewpoints. Before mid-century, the Bengel-Moser alliance combined 
innovative theology with the spirit of political resistance. Yet as the century came to a 
close, those factors had faded from view, replaced by a stagnant official Pietism and a 
tendency towards political passivity. Schelling's family had some connections to the 
Bengel-Oetinger circle, but it was primarily the stodgy Pietism of the Konsistorium that 
Schelling encountered during his formative years, a Pietism wholly in line with what he 
saw as political oppression. Still, although Schelling's life up to the age of twenty is a 
story of his gradual rejection of his family's clerical traditions, he could also draw on an 
older, more radical tradition. Thus Schelling was both thoroughly Swabian and 
thoroughly opposed to the present climate of his homeland. 
SCHELLING'S EARLY LIFE: FROM LEONBERG TO TUBINGEN 
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling was born on January 27, 1775, in the small town of 
Leonberg (also the hometown of Johannes Kepler), where his father had served as 
"second pastor" oxDiakon since 1771.70 His father, Joseph Friedrich Schelling, and his 
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mother, Gottliebin Marie Schelling, nee Cletz, both came from clerical families, and as 
such, "their mindset was that of Old-Wurttemberg piety."71 Both belonged to a group of 
families deeply influenced by the teachings of Bengel.72 This family consciousness 
played an enormous role in the church structure of eighteenth century Wurttemberg, as it 
opened up opportunities for young men hoping to become pastors or theologians. In 
wealthy church families, it was a tradition that every other son studied theology,73 and 
nearly half of new clergy each year were sons of either theologians or pastors.74 Given 
such traditions, it was assumed that young Friedrich would study theology, and his early 
education reflected this expectation.75 
Schelling's philosophical origins lay not in the culturally dominant northern part of Germany, but in the 
south (8-10). 
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At the time of Schelling's birth, Joseph Schelling was a moderately successful 
theologian. Although his most important works dealt primarily with oriental languages, 
especially Arabic, he had also studied philosophy in his youth. He worked with the 
famous Leibnizian logician Gottfried Ploucquet, under whose supervision he wrote a 
Magisterarbeit in 1758.76 In 1777, two years after Schelling was born, his father's career 
took a positive turn, as he was called to a position at the Bebenhausen Klosterschule. The 
Klosterschulen in Old Wurttemberg were the preparation grounds for young theology 
students who would eventually attend the famous Tubingen Stiff. Thus, Schelling spent 
his early years in Bebenhausen, a picturesque town about an hour away from Tubingen, 
located squarely within the forests of what is today the Schonbuch Naturpark. Schelling 
probably gained an early appreciation from his surroundings, enjoying the beautiful view 
of the valley heading towards Tubingen and wandering around in the forests whose "wild 
beauty" he praised in a childhood essay on the history of the Kloster.77 At the age of 
eight, he began his study of ancient languages, and at age ten, Joseph Schelling sent his 
son to Latin school in Nurtingen, where he met Friedrich Holderlin for the first time.78 In 
Nurtingen, Schelling lived with his uncle Kostlin, a Diakon in that town. Those who 
argue for an Oetinger-Schelling connection often point to Kostlin as a possible missing 
Michael Franz, "Joseph Friedrich Schelling, Klosterprofessor in Bebenhausen," in "...so hat mir das 
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link, but this is pure conjecture.79 Regardless, Schelling did not remain in Niirtingen for 
long. In late 1786, his teachers reported to the Schellings that young Friedrich was so far 
ahead of his classmates that he could no longer learn anything at the Latin school.80 This 
put his father in a difficult position: his son, who would shortly turn twelve, was too 
young to enter the Klosterschule, which normally accepted students at the age of 
fourteen.81 He had no choice but to allow Friedrich to enroll informally with his own 
students, who were between sixteen and eighteen years old.82 Still, this was no problem 
for young Friedrich: he excelled in his studies here, and rather than enroll him in a 
Klosterschule when he was old enough, his father attempted—and succeeded—to enroll 
him at the Tubingen Stiff, where he would make friends with Holderlin and Hegel, both 
five years his senior. Ironically, by sending him to Tubingen, his father propelled him 
along an unexpected path: it was in Tubingen that Schelling would become religiously, 
politically, and philosophically radicalized, embracing philosophy instead of theology 
and breaking with his family's clerical past. 
LIFE AT THE STIFT, 1790-1794 
Schelling's time in Tubingen was productive but ultimately unhappy. The Pietists in the 
church of Wurttemberg—partly out of nostalgia for the sixteenth century, and partly 
because of an inherent resistance to reform—mandated strict discipline in all theological 
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schools.83 This applied not only to the Stift, but to the Klosterschulen as well. The 
church used the latter to instill discipline at an early age. There, a student could expect 
punishment for such sins as talking to girls, taking trips home, visiting shops, or even 
speaking German.84 Life at the Stift was hardly different. Since their education was paid 
for by the state, Karl Eugen took a personal interest in his future clergy. They were to be 
educated in the "spirit of obedience and traditional discipline," thus preparing themselves 
to fight against those who questioned their divinely appointed rulers.85 The rules of the 
Klosterschulen still applied: every aspect of the students' lives was regimented, from 
their dress to the fixed times of morning prayers and weekend church services. And of 
course, smoking and dancing were out of the question.86 Friedrich Nicolai, whose 
account of his visit to Tubingen would later spawn an intellectual feud with Schelling, 
on 
described the atmosphere of the Stift as conformist and Spartan. 
Unfortunately, we have very few letters from Schelling during his first four years 
at the Stift, and none at all to or from Hegel and Holderlin. There is good reason for this: 
until Holderlin and Hegel graduated in 1793, there was simply no need for 
correspondence. Fortunately, Holderlin was extremely close to his mother and wrote to 
her religiously, often complaining about his life at the Stift and subtly asking her for 
permission to leave. Shortly after his arrival in 1788 he wrote to her of his "annoyance, 
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the confinement, the unhealthy air, the poor lodgings," all of which "perhaps weaken my 
body more than a freer place would." "O dear Mamma! My blessed father used to say 
that his university years were his happiest. One day I'll have to say that my university 
years embittered my life forever." In any epoch, such an oppressive atmosphere would 
engender resentment on the part of students. But in the winter of 1790, when Schelling 
matriculated, the situation was greatly exasperated. The fresh air of freedom was 
blowing in from the west. 
Because of Wurttemberg's proximity to France, and because the administration of 
the Stift could easily be construed as akin to despotic monarchs, the French Revolution 
was both geographically and intellectually close to the students in Tubingen. The 
Revolution tantalized Schelling and his classmates—across the Rhine, a new age was 
dawning, yet they were unable to participate in those world-changing events. Instead, 
they coped with them intellectually. They read Rousseau, recited the hymns of the great 
German poet Klopstock, and discovered in Spinoza an alternative to orthodox 
Christianity.89 They celebrated Bastille day, admired Schiller's rebellious Sturm und 
Drang play The Robbers, and explicitly likened their own Duke to the justly overthrown 
French King.90 And although the famous story of Holderlin, Schelling, and Hegel 
planting a liberty tree is probably apocryphal, Schelling was reputed to have translated 
Holderlin to his mother, GSA, VI, 1: 45-46. 
BuD.l: 15-16. 
the Marseillaise into German, prompting the suspicions of Karl Eugen himself, and 
leading to a personal inquisitorial meeting.91 
The Duke traveled to Tubingen and had all the Stipendiaten assembled in the 
mess hall, and then made Schelling and a few other suspected radicals step forward. He 
had a copy of the translated Marseilleise in his hands, and then alluded to Schelling: "In 
France, a neat little song has been composed, and it is sung by the Marseilles bandits; he 
knows it." Karl Eugen, according to Plitt, then 
Fixed his eyes on Schelling sharply and for a long time. 
Schelling, however, looked at the Duke with his bright 
blue, brilliant eyes, equally unmoved. This dauntlessness 
pleased the Duke so much that he desisted from any further 
reprimands.92 
Whether or not this is true, little of direct political import arose from the students' 
actions. Even Holderlin, who may have favored violent revolution and the establishment 
of a Swabian republic, was still just a harmless student.93 Nonetheless, as Marx quipped, 
the Germans always think what the French actually do.94 Schelling and his friends would 
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carry out a revolution in thought, one which had a twofold origin: first, in the monism of 
Baruch Spinoza, and second, in the Critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Ironically, his 
teachers at the Stiff would unwittingly provide him with some of the tools to carry out this 
revolution. 
When Schelling arrived in Tubingen, the once proud Stiff was experiencing a 
crisis. During the 1780s, Karl Eugen had established his own academy, the so-called 
Karlsschule in Stuttgart, dedicated to the training of military officers and government 
bureaucrats, but encompassing the natural sciences and medicine as well. Unlike the 
Tubingen Stiff, whose student body was comprised primarily of the sons of existing 
clergy and theologians, the Karlsschule was ostensibly open to children of all 
backgrounds. This was where Friedrich Schiller, the son of a military doctor, was 
educated in medicine in the late 1770s. The creation of the Karlsschule was not intended 
to weaken the Stiff—if anything, it was intended to provide a better education for non-
clergy—but this was precisely the effect it had, diverting funding and faculty from 
Tubingen to Stuttgart.95 The "Ephorus," essentially the head of the Stiff from 1777 to 
1806, was Christian Friedrich Schnurrer, originally a professor of oriental languages 
whom the Duke chose to lead the Stiff because of his youth and vitality. The imposing 
yet somewhat liberal Schnurrer was the "dominant personality" at the Stiff during his 
reign as Ephorus, a man who in addition to his administrative duties lectured on the Old 
and New Testament and who commanded his students' respect and admiration.96 
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Schnurrer had to deal with the perceived decay of the Stiff, and could not have foreseen 
the upheavals his school would undergo in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Many 
of the faculty were neither willing nor able to cope with new ideas, which fed the 
dissatisfaction of students like Schelling. 
While Schnurrer was the dominant administrative figure during Schelling's 
education at the Stiff, the most powerful theologian was undoubtedly Gottlob Christian 
Storr. Although he was famous—Kant even mentioned the "famous Doctor Storr in 
07 
Tubingen" —Storr was an old-fashioned theologian. He constructed his own 
theological system and dismissed the theological innovations of the eighteenth century. 
He had little use for radical biblical criticism in the style of Semler and Reimarus, and 
emphasized the absolute and divine authority of the scriptures. Not surprisingly, he 
showed little interest in the Kantian philosophy or its implications for theology. More 
balanced in this respect was Storr's student Johann Friedrich Flatt, "Tubingen's only 
philosopher of importance."98 Flatt was well read in the critical philosophy, and 
attempted to make Kant agree with his teacher's dogmatics. Thus, Flatt was a prime 
example of the retrograde Kantianism Schelling later pilloried in his Philosophical 
Letters. Schelling attended the lectures of Schnurrer, Storr, and Flatt, but he also learned 
much from the philosophical faculty. 
Schelling's classes in Tubingen—especially during the first two years, which 
were intended to prepare the students for more rigorous theological training—were 
surprisingly diverse. Between 1790 and 1792, he received instruction not only in the Old 
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and New Testament, but in philosophy, natural law (Naturrecht), and aesthetics as well. 
His courses on philosophy familiarized him with, to name a few, Plato, Epictetus, Cicero, 
Malebranche, Locke, Leibniz, and even Kant." In spite of this broad curriculum, 
Schelling was dissatisfied with his philosophical training, especially as it related to the 
sage of Konigsberg. His professors, especially Flatt, invoked a safe version of the critical 
philosophy; one stripped of its radical tendencies and suited to upholding traditional 
theology. Schelling would later complain that his teachers justified every irrational 
dogma by invoking practical reason, thus perverting Kant's teachings. In response, 
Schelling and his friends conducted their own readings of Kant in private.100 We will see 
Schelling's full backlash against his teachers in Chapter three. 
As theology students, Holderlin, Schelling, and Hegel were most interested in the 
application of Kantian principles to theological questions. Carl Immanuel Diez, a friend 
of Schelling's, took Kant's teaching to its most radical conclusions and eventually 
abandoned theology altogether. Kant had argued in the Critique of Pure Reason that 
human knowledge is limited; all our knowledge must lie within the boundaries of 
possible experience, and when reason attempts to overstep those boundaries, it becomes 
hopelessly entangled in contradictions. And who oversteps those boundaries more than 
theologians? According to Diez's reading of Kant, theology as a whole is meaningless. 
Divine revelation is impossible, the Bible is simply a contradictory product of misused 
human reason, Jesus and his apostles were merely superstitious fools, and Christian 
Wilhelm Jacobs stresses the conflict between the "official" Kant and the one to which the students were 
drawn. It was certainly no crime at the Stiff to study Kant, but Schelling and his friends wanted to use him 
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Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1989), 52-53. 
ethical teaching is invalid because it is based on revelation rather than reason. 
Theology is a "science" which seeks to prove the unprovable. Diez's critique flowed 
directly into German idealist philosophy, for Henrich notes that "only a few years later, 
the same model, from a completely different perspective and with far greater 
philosophical skill, was elaborated by Schelling."102 
We can gain an understanding of Diez's influence on Schelling by examining his 
much more well-documented impact on Holderlin. Holderlin had already come under 
Diez's influence as early as 1789 and no doubt infused the sixteen year old Schelling 
with this radical critique of Christianity. That Holderlin accepted Diez's critique is 
evidenced by a letter to his mother in 1791. Holderlin's mother was deeply religious and 
he was always afraid to disappoint her by falling away from Christian doctrine; 
nevertheless he was usually remarkably candid about his theological doubts, often gently 
trying to convince her that strict adherence to orthodoxy was unimportant.103 Holderlin 
tells her of the hollowness of all proofs for God's existence, and he also relates his 
discovery of Spinoza, who would have an enormous impact on the thought of the young 
Schelling: 
In Diez's extant theological writings, he rigorously applies Kantian principles in order to show that 
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I studied that part of philosophy (Weltweisheii)which treats 
of the rational proofs for the existence of God.. .although it 
led me for a time to thoughts that would perhaps have made 
you uneasy had you known of them. For I quickly sensed 
that these rational proofs for the existence of God and also 
for immortality were so imperfect that they could be 
overthrown altogether by clever opponents, at least in their 
principle parts. In this period, writings by and about 
Spinoza fell into my hands. [Spinoza was] a great noble 
man from the previous century, who was nevertheless, 
strictly speaking, an atheist (dock Gottesldugner nach 
strengen Begriffen). 104 
It was this attitude that Schelling imbibed from his friends in Tubingen, and that would 
propel him first towards an unorthodox understanding of scripture, and then finally to an 
outright rejection of theology altogether. 
Before we conclude this chapter, we must also look at one aspect of his Tubingen 
education which may have laid the groundwork for his Naturphilosophie. In addition to 
his education in theology and philosophy, between 1790 and 1792, Schelling attended the 
lectures of Christian Pfleiderer, who taught mathematics as well as theoretical and 
experimental physics.105 This is important, for it demonstrates that Schelling encountered 
the natural sciences long before his stay in Leipzig in 1797-1798, and thus the impulse to 
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construct a Naturphilosophie may have already been present in his Tubingen years. He 
certainly ignores that topic in most of his early writings, which begin to appear in 1792. 
However, in later chapters I will show that a number of his early philosophical works in 
1795-1796—the Philosophical Letters, the General Overview, and even the Oldest 
System Program of German Idealism, if one concedes the authorship to Schelling— 
betray a latent interest in natural science. 
Nonetheless, Schelling wouldn't turn to natural science until he first turned 
towards philosophy, and nothing was more important to this latter turn than his discovery 
of Fichte in 1793-1794. The spell which Fichte cast over the young Schelling was the 
most important aspect of his intellectual development in Tubingen. On New Year's Day 
of 1795, while still preparing to receive his theological degree, he wrote to Hegel: 
I cannot give you much of a report on my theological 
works. For about a year they have become minor matters 
to me. The only thing that interested me up until now were 
historical investigations of the Old and New Testaments 
and the spirit of the first Christian century—here, there is 
still much work to be done;—for some time, however, I 
have abandoned this. Who wants to bury himself in the 
dust of antiquity, when in the course of his own time every 
moment rides on with him? At present, I live and breathe 
philosophy.106 
Schelling to Hegel (6 January 1795), in BuD II: 57. 
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Thus, in the span of a year, Schelling abandoned biblical criticism and became Fichte's 
most promising philosophical disciple. However, to understand Fichte's impact on 
Schelling, we must also understand Fichte's two most important philosophical 
predecessors, Immanuel Kant and Karl Leonhard Reinhold. Therefore, the next chapter 
will begin with an excursus in Kant, Reinhold, and Fichte's philosophy, and then turn to 
an examination of Schelling's first two philosophical works: On the Form of Philosophy 
in General (1794) and On the I as Principle of Philosophy (1794). 
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Chapter 2: Schelling's Philosophical Beginnings 
SCHELLING AND CLASSICAL GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 
The seeds of Schelling's Naturphilosophie were sown during his early life and education. 
Not only did he develop an appreciation for nature at an early age, wandering the woods 
in Bebenhausen, but he also received basic training in the natural sciences at the Stift, 
where he most likely imbibed—albeit unconsciously—the dynamic view of nature found 
in Oetinger's writings. But this does not come close to explaining the origins of his 
Naturphilosophie, especially since Schelling saw himself neither as a theologian nor as a 
disciple of Oetinger. Something crucial happened between his arrival in Tubingen and 
his turn to the natural sciences: by 1794, Schelling had abandoned theology altogether 
and instead aimed to solve—like so many others before and after him—the fundamental 
problems left behind by Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy. For the purpose of 
explaining the genesis of Schelling's Naturphilosophie, his confrontation with this 
philosophical context was decisive in two ways: first, his dynamic philosophy of the 
human mind, which closely followed the arguments of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-
1814), foreshadows the dynamism with which he would later infuse nature. Just as 
Schelling refused to treat the mind as a "thing" in his early writings, so too would he 
refuse to see nature as a lifeless and powerless object. Second, and more importantly, 
Schelling's attempts to solve the problems of critical Idealism pushed him headlong into 
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Naturphilosophie, which emerged as the only way to unify philosophy.107 In the eyes of 
the Idealists, Kant's system, although a great step forward for philosophy, utterly failed to 
explain something absolutely central for a philosophy of human life: how can a 
mechanical, physical world, in which every phenomena supposedly has a direct cause, be 
reconciled mankind's freedom, its ability to actually act in that world? Kant failed to 
provide a satisfactory answer to this question, as it was still possible to declare that 
humans are still cogs in a giant world-machine. What Kant needed was a vision of nature 
in which mankind was at home, a nature which left open room for freedom. This is what 
drove Schelling towards Naturphilosophie. Fichte, although he was also obsessed with 
freedom, showed almost no interest in nature at all, and his system cried out for someone 
to restore nature to her proper place.108 Thus, Wurttemberg may have provided the seeds 
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1081 largely agree with Kurt Schilling's appraisal of the Kant-Fichte-Schelling relationship. Schilling 
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is somewhat extreme, but given the importance of the Third Critique, it is at least somewhat plausible. 
Despite their personal acquaintance, Fichte and Schelling had drastically different approaches to 
philosophy, and Schelling actually has more in common with Kant. The only things that Schelling took 
from Fichte were his concepts and his terminology, which he would employ in his description of nature. 
(Natur und Wahrheit: Untersuchung iiber Entstehung und Entwicklung des Schellingschen Systems bis 
1800 (Munich: Reinhardt, 1934), 15. "Schelling, [although] at first an enthusiastic disciple of Fichte, 
increasingly realized during the course of his development that, from the beginning, his goals and 
intentions were completely different from Fichte's." (41). Intraud Gorland agrees that Schelling largely 
appropriates Fichtean concepts for a different purpose (Die Entwicklung der Friihphilosophie Schellings in 
der Auseinandersetzung mit Fichte (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1973), 9. Michael Blamauer explores 
the disjunct between Fichte and Schelling in another way, stressing that Schelling's Naturphilosophie was 
yet another attempt to "ground" transcendental philosophy, which prior to Schelling saw nature only as a 
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cause" (Subjektivitat und ihr Platz in der Natur: Untersuchung zu Schellings Versuch einer 
naturphilosophischen Grundlegung des Bewusstseins (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2006), 103-104. Of course, 
those who believe in the caricatures of Schelling's Naturphilosophie celebrate Fichte's neglect of natural 
of Schelling's Naturphilosophie, but it was the confrontation with Kant and Fichte which 
began the growth process. 
In order to properly deal with these two aspects of Schelling's thought, it is 
necessary to examine not only Kant and Fichte, but the wider philosophical climate to 
which they were responding. Therefore, this chapter will proceed as follows: first, I will 
summarize Kant's attempts—beginning with the Critique of Pure Reason (1781)—to put 
metaphysics on a new, more solid foundation. I will also discuss the Pantheismusstreit or 
pantheism controversy of the mid 1780s. The Pantheissmusstreit was an intellectual 
maelstrom which drew in Germany's most important intellectuals, including Kant 
himself, and it raised the possibility that a revived, vitalized version of the system of 
Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) could serve as an alternative to Kant's cautious philosophy. 
Second, I will discuss the systems of Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757-1823) and Fichte, 
both of which attempted to give Kant's philosophy a unity it previously lacked. Finally, I 
will discuss Schelling's first two philosophical works, On the Possibility of a Form of All 
Philosophy (1794) and On the I as Principle of Philosophy (1795), which represent 
Schelling's own attempts to unify the diverse aspects of Kant's system. By the end of 
the chapter it will be clear that, from the beginning, Schelling sought a much grander 
synthesis than any of his predecessors, one which drove him towards a study of natural 
science and an effort to bring together mind and nature in a way neither Kant nor Fichte 
science. Daniel Brazeale, for example, says that "What is striking about Fichte's concept of nature is how 
little he believed one can learn about nature from the a priori standpoint of philosophical reflection—which 
may explain why he himself showed so little interest in developing this branch of his system... .Fichte 
would appear to have far more in common with what we today call the philosophy of science than with the 
a priori Naturphilosophie of Schelling and Hegel." ("The Spirit of the Wissenschaftslehre, in Sally 
Sedgwick, ed., The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 179). By the end of this dissertation it should become abundantly clear that Schelling did not 
believe we could investigate nature from an armchair. 
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would have countenanced. His first two philosophical works, though they pay almost no 
attention to nature, are thus vital for an understanding of why Schelling turned to 
Naturphilosophie in the first place. 
KANT'S NEW METAPHYSICS AND ITS CONTEXT 
Before 1781, when Kant published his Critique of Pure Reason, German philosophers 
had largely divided themselves into two camps. One side could trace its roots back to the 
great German rationalist, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1715). Unfortunately, 
Leibniz's philosophy largely remained in private correspondence and short essays, and 
his largest book, the New Essays concerning Human Understanding, was not discovered 
by the German public until the 1760s.109 Because of that, most eighteenth century 
Leibnizians were really followers of Christian Wolff (1679-1754), who, in addition to 
carrying on a lengthy correspondence with Leibniz himself, shared many of his rationalist 
commitments, and published his systematic German Metaphysics while teaching at Halle 
in 1719. Both men believed that philosophy could be carried out a priori, or in other 
words, deductively from first principles. For instance, even the nature of God could be 
deduced by the human mind. By defining God as a perfect being, the rest of his 
properties could then be discovered. By mid-century, the "top-down" metaphysical 
systems of the German Wolffians were also characterized by poor writing and an 
incredibly difficult vocabulary. While there were some Wolffians who wrote well, such 
as the great Jewish Aufklarer Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), their stylistic faults made 
most of them unattractive to the lay reader. 
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Separate from, and sometimes opposed to the Wolffians were the 
Popularphilosophen, whose founding father was Christian Thomasius (1655 - 1728), the 
first professor in Germany to lecture in the vernacular.110 Many of them were still loyal 
to Leibniz and Wolff, but they were repulsed by Wolffs inscrutable writing style."' 
They helped bring the ideas of John Locke (1632-1704) and David Hume (1711-1776) to 
Germany, and they were also impressed by Hume's elegant style, which conveyed deep 
philosophical ideas without boring his readers to tears. The Popularphilosophen were 
committed to the project of the Aujklarung or Enlightenment, and wanted to spread their 
beliefs to the average reader. British empiricism and French sensationalist philosophy 
crept into their systems, and some even became interested in Hume's skepticism, which 
rejected the notion that humans can ever reach certainty or ultimate truth. Hume argued, 
like John Locke, that all knowledge comes from the senses. But if our senses are 
inherently unreliable, then all knowledge is, as well. 
Admittedly, the division between Wolffians and Popularphilosophen was not as 
hard and fast as implied by the preceding paragraphs. No Wolffian completely 
disregarded empirical research, and neither did most Popularphilosophen completely 
abandon deductive reasoning. Yet they are useful categories for understanding Kant's 
project, because at different points in his early, pre-critical career, he belonged to both 
factions.112 Kant, who was born in a Prussian Pietist family, was trained by a Wolffian at 
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the University of Konigsberg, but by 1764, his sensationalist tendencies clearly 
manifested themselves.' 13 By the time he wrote his Inaugural Dissertation in 1770, a 
work which foreshadowed many of the basic aspects of the Critique of Pure Reason, it 
was clear that Kant's main aim was to synthesize the rationalist and empiricist traditions 
and create an altogether new kind of metaphysics. He wanted to retain the beneficial 
aspects of empiricism without falling into the sort of skepticism that Hume and his 
German followers had embraced. 
The foundation of Kant's project is the Critique of Pure Reason, which limits the 
scope of reason by performing an exhaustive inventory of the mind's powers. According 
to Kant, before we can actually start philosophizing about the world, we need to 
understand our own minds; the new metaphysics must therefore arrive at "transcendental 
knowledge," which Kant defines as "all knowledge which is occupied not so much with 
objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge 
is to be possible a priori."114 In other words, philosophers cannot take reason for granted, 
and apply it to whichever things they please. Rather, Kant argues that we must first 
Kant had a long career, and was almost sixty years old when he published the Critique of Pure Reason. For 
a time, in his earlier life, he was the epitome of an Aujklarer, a witty conversationalist and a popular and 
entertaining lecturer at the University. See John Zammitb, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 6. 
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figure out exactly what we can and cannot know. Then, and only then, after philosophy 
has been put on a firm foundation, can a stable philosophical edifice be constructed. 
In order to lay this firm foundation, Kant proposes a radical change in the way we 
think about knowledge. Even today, most people assume that there are objects "out 
there" in the world, situated in space and time, which somehow impress themselves upon 
our minds and create our experiences. From this common sense standpoint, the mind is a 
passive receiver of information. Kant turns this standpoint on its head, explaining that 
space and time are not features of the external world, but are instead structures of our 
own minds which we impose upon the raw data presented to our senses. But even after 
we put objects into space and time, we must organize the data even further: Kant argues 
that we only have coherent experience when the mind imposes order on this data, and it 
does so through what Kant called categories, or "pure concepts of the understanding." 
For Kant, without space, time, and the categories, the human mind would be as useless as 
the human eye in a pitch black room. Space, time, and the categories act like night vision 
goggles, allowing us to see things clearly and have meaningful sensations and empirical 
knowledge. 
Nonetheless, like the empiricists, Kant recognizes the limits of this type of 
knowledge. For him, it is the "understanding," not reason, which processes everyday 
sense experience, and is also responsible for the natural sciences. This is a major shift, 
for it introduces a distinction into reason which most rationalists would never allow. 
Kant claims that the understanding is perfectly capable of performing its tasks—and the 
achievements of Isaac Newton prove this—but it is only equipped to process this type of 
data, which must lie "within the bounds of possible experience." As a result, the human 
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mind is hopelessly cut off from ultimate truths. We have knowledge only of phenomena, 
not ultimate reality, or what Kant calls the "noumenal world." We know objects as they 
appear to us, but we cannot know them directly. In a rare poetic passage, Kant describes 
the phenomenal world as an island, "the land of truth—enchanting name!—surrounded 
by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion, where many a fog bank and 
many a swiftly melting iceberg give deceptive appearance of farther shores.. .."U5 Kant 
will warn us that, as soon as we leave this small, safe, "land of truth" and attempt to 
know objects beyond appearances, we are destined for philosophical danger. 
The "wide and stormy ocean" is the land of what Kant calls the "thing-in-
itself."116 For Kant, the thing-in-itself could be anything at all. We know that the thing-
in-itself is the source of our experience, but we literally cannot say anything about it 
beyond that. Thus, we know it only as some unidentified X which causes our experience. 
For both Kant's critics and his Idealist followers, the doctrine of the thing-in-itself was 
deeply unsatisfying, for it seemed to violate Kant's own rules about the application of the 
categories. One of Kant's categories is causality, and it seems to be invoked when he 
intimates that the thing-in-itself causes our experiences. But Kant also says quite clearly 
that the categories cannot be applied beyond the realm of possible experience, and the 
thing-in-itself certainly lies beyond this boundary. How then, can Kant claim that the 
thing-in-itself, that unidentified X, causes our experiences by acting upon our sensory 
organs? Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi famously quipped that "I need the assumption of 
thing-in-themselves to enter the Kantian system; but with this assumption it is not 
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possible for me to remain inside it."117 It was equally repulsive to Fichte, who would 
later completely banish it from his system starting with the Aenesidemus review. 
Schelling will do the same in both his theoretical philosophy and in his 
l i f t 
Naturphilosophie. 
Nonetheless, the thing-in-itself was a cornerstone of Kant's own philosophy. 
Because he believed that reason, if misused, could undermine belief in God and morality, 
Kant avoided any attempt to know things-in-themselves. Indeed, he identified the 
attempt to do so as the source of all faulty metaphysics. Reason, when used properly, 
establishes the rules of logic and can be used practically to decide questions of action and 
morality.119 But when reason oversteps this boundary and applies the categories of the 
understanding to things beyond possible experience, it becomes dialectical. For Kant, 
"Dialectic" means the process by which reason oversteps its boundaries and falls into 
contradiction with itself. His use of the term is wholly at odds with Hegel's; for the 
latter, the dialectic is something positive, the real method of discovering philosophical 
truth. Hegel's dialectic is a series of stages whereby apparent contradictions are negated 
and superseded, ultimately yielding philosophical progress. For Kant, the "dialectic" of 
reason results in dogmatism, contradiction, and error. Kant's "Transcendental Dialectic" 
is thus a sweeping demonstration of the many ways reason goes astray. In the 
"Paralogisms of Pure Reason," he shows that how it falsely establishes the individual self 
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as a substance, even though, as Hume pointed out, it is difficult to establish the mind as 
anything more than a bundle of disparate sensations.120 Later, Kant shows how all proofs 
of God's existence are impossible. And finally, in his famous "Antinomies," he 
demonstrates that reason can simultaneously "prove" contradictory things about space, 
time, God, and freedom. Reason, allowed to outstrip is proper limits, gives rise to the 
nonsense of self-contradiction. 
Nevertheless, Kant offers us a way out. After telling his readers that humans can 
never arrive at ultimate truths, he attempts to show that, despite our inability to prove 
things theoretically, we are justified in assuming them practically. For example, 
although we cannot know that we are free beings, we are justified in assuming freedom 
practically. In our everyday life, we consistently believe that some actions are 
blameworthy, precisely because we assume that a criminal could have and ought to have 
done something differently. If we really believed that every criminal's actions were 
predetermined by physical causes, we could never find him or her guilty. Therefore, 
Kant argues that, so long as we cannot disprove freedom, we are justified in assuming it. 
He offers a similar argument for assuming the existence of God and immortality: if there 
is no God to mete out punishment in the afterlife, then there can be no ultimate grounding 
for morality here on earth. After all, the just often suffer, and the wicked often live 
wonderful lives. God and immortality are needed to make us believe that virtue will 
eventually be rewarded with happiness. We cannot prove them, but we must assume 
them. 
As we will see, Schelling substantializes the "Absolute I" in his On the I as Principle of Philosophy. 
But he does so in an attempt to solidify Kant's discoveries. 
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Despite Kant's attempts to practically rescue the very truths he so effectively 
demolished theoretically, the Critique of Pure Reason left many of his readers 
disappointed. Some resented the fact that Kant took away the ultimate truths which 
formed the basis of religion and philosophy since antiquity. Moses Mendelssohn, though 
a friend of Kant's, bitterly referred to him as the "all-destroyer." The Romantic writer 
Heinrich von Kleist, after seeing Kant question all the truths he cherished, fell into 
existential despair and would eventually commit suicide. Kant was also criticized both 
by Christian fundamentalists and religious radicals. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi believed 
that Kant's system led ultimately to atheism, while radicals (like Schelling) contended 
that Kant, with his "practical proof of God, had simply smuggled religion in through the 
back door. Thus, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason initially drew more criticism than 
admiration. And in 1785, an attractive philosophical alternative arose when the German 
public suddenly warmed to the pantheism of Baruch Spinoza, who argued that, contrary 
to the Christian tradition, God does not dwell outside the physical world, but rather is 
identical to it. Spinoza argued for a particular form of monism: he believed that there 
was only one substance in the world, a substance which actually created itself. That one 
substance is God. Spinoza used this idea to solve the Cartesian problem of mind-body 
dualism. Descartes had suggested that there were two substances in the world: mind and 
extension. Spinoza, on the other hand, said that mind and extension were merely two 
"attributes" of God, and that there was no difficult explaining their interaction. 
The idea that nature was universal, all-powerful, and even divine seemed like an 
answer to many philosophical and natural-scientific problems in the mid 1780s. Indeed, 
the Pantheismusstreit would spur Kant to write his Critique of Judgment, which would 
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play a crucial role for German Idealism as a Whole and Schelling's Naturphilosophie in 
particular.121 Although European and German intellectuals had never forgotten about 
Spinoza, few dared to discuss him publicly.122 His reputation as an atheist, combined 
with his radical political views, had rendered him a "dead dog," at least in public 
discourse.123 If one used the term "Spinozism" in the 1700s, it was usually intended to 
slander an opponent. That all changed in 1785, when Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-
1819) published a little book accusing the great German Aufklarer G.E. Lessing, who had 
died a few years earlier, of Spinozism.124 Jacobi's accusations were based on a 
conversation with Lessing in 1780, during which Lessing supposedly declared allegiance 
to Spinoza's system. Regardless of the veracity of Jacobi's account, his little book set off 
a firestorm of controversy, both personal and philosophical. Since "Spinozist" was still a 
dirty word, Lessing's friend Moses Mendelssohn rose to his defense, arguing that Jacobi 
had certainly misunderstood what Lessing had meant. Mendelssohn would actually die 
of pneumonia attempting to clear his friend's name. 
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The philosophical fallout of the Pantheismusstreit was even more important. In 
one sense, Jacobi held Spinoza in high regard: he argued that Spinozism is the most 
consistent of all philosophical systems, and that all philosophy, if taken to its logical 
conclusions, ends up at Spinozism. Jacobi himself was a skeptic and a follower of David 
Hume, but he actually used this skepticism in service of traditional religion. Jacobi 
wanted people to embrace religion not for rational reasons, but through a leap of faith, 
and thus he used Hume to demonstrate reason's impotence.126 Jacobi's contention that all 
philosophy ends in Spinozism provoked opposition from established philosophers, and in 
the public debate that followed the publication, Jacobi needed allies. He turned towards 
two of the most important figures in German intellectual life: Goethe and Herder. This 
move backfired spectacularly. 
Little did Jacobi know that Goethe and Herder had been reading Spinoza together 
during the early 1780s. When Jacobi asked for their support in a letter, Goethe gave an 
incredible answer. Quite simply, he and Herder read Spinoza in an entirely different way 
than Jacobi did. Spinoza, Goethe wrote, was not an atheist, but rather a firm believer in 
an immanent God, a God who dwells in the world, in every "rock and stone." Herder, in 
his God: Some Conversations (1787), simply expanded on Goethe's short response to 
Jacobi. According to Herder, had Spinoza1 lived in a later epoch, he would have 
abandoned his deterministic mechanism and embraced a view of divine nature as creative 
Jacobi argued that he and Hume both emphasized the importance of "belief." Hume, in his own way, 
argued for a leap of faith, for despite the uncertainty which our mind confronts about its knowledge, at 
some point it must assume that objects exists in the world and go about its practical business. Jacobi often 
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Hume iiber den Glauben oder Idealismus und Realisms (1787) with the Vorrede to the 1815 edition (New 
York: Garland, 1983), 1st ed: 45. 
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and active.127 The "new" Spinoza which Herder and Goethe invented appealed to a new 
generation of philosophers, eager to grasp philosophy and the world as a totality. What 
could be more appropriate than the pantheism of Spinoza, which identified the world with 
God. 
Kant was justified in seeing the growing enthusiasm for Spinoza as a threat to his 
own system. Every unpopular aspect of Kant's system seemed to be corrected by the 
new Spinoza. Where Kant put up a barrier between knower and known, Spinozism, with 
its presumption that everything in existence isactually divine, seemed to unify subject 
and object. Whereas Kant's system was rife with divisions—between sensibility and 
intellect, between theoretical and practical philosophy—Spinozism seemed to give 
philosophy unity and coherence. Kant objected vehemently to those—especially his 
former student Herder—who seemed to be lapsing into the same "dogmatism" Kant 
believed he had defeated in the Critique of Pure Reason. Unfortunately for Kant, he 
would never succeed in reigning in the next generation of philosophers, who sought to 
"complete" Kant's own system with or without his authorization. 
REINHOLD, FICHTE, AND GRUNDSA TZPHILOSOPHIE 
The first philosopher to seriously attempt a grand synthesis of Kant's Critical Philosophy 
was Karl Leonhard Reinhold.128 Reinhold, a former Austrian monk turned Aufklarer, 
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spent time as an advocate of the enlightened policies of Joseph II before moving to 
Leipzig and converting to Protestantism in 1783. He was originally a follower of Johann 
Gottfried Herder's (1744-1803) philosophy, and butted heads with Kant over the latter's 
negative review of Herder's Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind.129 Shortly 
afterwards, in the midst of a spiritual crisis, he read Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 
which renewed his faith in the possibility of a rational religion. He converted to 
Kantianism almost immediately and quickly became the most important popularizer of 
the new system.130 His Letters on the Kantian Philosophy—which dealt 
disproportionately with Kant's moral and religious ideas131—presented that system to the 
reading public in a simplified but convincing form, and in the wake of the 
has written extensively on the Reinhold-Fichte relationships. See in particular his "Philosophie als System 
- Reinhold und Fiche" in Erneuerung der Transzendentalphilosophie im Anschlufi an Kant undFichte, ed. 
Klaus Hammacher and Albert Mues, 331-342 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog,1979). 
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Pantheismusstreit, Reinhold successfully portrayed Kant as the middle ground between 
Mendelssohn and Jacobi.132 When Reinhold became chair of philosophy at Jena—a 
position later occupied by Fichte—he established that university as the hub of Kantianism 
in Germany. 
Nevertheless, despite his enthusiasm for Kant's thought, Reinhold began to see a 
problem with the Critical philosophy.133 Unlike the systems of other philosophers— 
Descartes and his Cogito being the best example—there was no first principle or 
Grundsatz for Kant's system, from which all other aspects of the system could be 
deduced. Kant had written much about sensation, the intellect, and morality, but he was 
never able to demonstrate how they might be connected. This was a grave problem if one 
wanted philosophy to ascend to the status of a"science" or Wissenschaft.134 At the very 
time Reinhold realized this, Kant's system was under assault from skeptical thinkers like 
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Solomon Maimon, and G.E. Schulze, better known by his 
pseudonym "Aenesidemus." All three ruthlessly exposed the inconsistencies in Kant's 
system. Reinhold reasoned that the best way to insulate Kant from these objections was 
to find a Grundsatz for the entire Critical Philosophy, and he found it in what he called 
the "principle of consciousness (Satz des Bewufitseins)" which stated that, "In 
consciousness, the subject distinguishes the representation from the subject and the object 
Beiser, The Fate ofReason, 233. 
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 In German, Wissenschaft does not refer only to the natural sciences, but to any organized system of 
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and relates the representation to both." Using this as his starting point, Reinhold 
recapitulated the Kantian system in a new form. 
Despite his initial desire for his philosophy to be "without a nickname," it 
gradually came to be called the Elementarphilosophie.136 In the course of a few years, he 
laid out this philosophy in three crucial works: Attempt at a New Theory of the Human 
Power of Representation (1789), Contributions toward Correcting the Previous 
Misunderstandings of Philosophers (1790), and On the Foundation of Philosophical 
Knowledge (1791). As he developed his system, he became increasingly critical of Kant 
and more convinced that he was offering not just a defense of the Critical Philosophy, but 
a superior version of it.137 Reinhold's "deductions" of Kant's philosophy from the 
"principle of consciousness" are usually dismissed by present-day commentators: Beiser 
calls them "not in the slightest convincing," while Henrich calls them "sophistical."138 
But one should not forget the staggering influence Reinhold exerted on the following 
generation. Kant held out the promise of a new metaphysics, but he spent his whole 
career laying the foundations for a system he would never complete. Reinhold arrived 
and gave hope to a new generation of philosophers that Kant's revolution in thought 
could be completed. Although Fichte and Schelling regarded Reinhold's system as a 
135
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failure, they commended him for recognizing the need for a Grundsatz of all philosophy. 
Fichte, who attempted to go beyond Reinhold and find a new foundation for philosophy, 
can only be understood in this context. 
Today, it is difficult to understand how Fichte's philosophy—written as it was in 
an awkward, almost unreadable form—could be seen by college students as fresh and 
exciting. But for Schelling's generation, not just in Wurttemberg, but throughout 
Germany, Fichte was the very embodiment of political and philosophical revolution. 
Born in Saxony as the son of a poor ribbon weaver and given an education by a nobleman 
impressed with his ability to recite sermons verbatim, Fichte was among the best 
examples of the social mobility dreamed of by middle-class intellectuals like Schelling.139 
Fichte was also one of the most vocal supporters of the French Revolution in Germany, 
and concomitantly demanded that the Kantian philosophy be taken to its logical 
conclusions, pushing past the boundaries that Kant so desperately wanted to maintain. 
Fichte's thunderous lectures at Jena, beginning in 1794, drew listeners from across 
Germany, including Schelling's older friend Friedrich Holderlin. Fichte famously 
claimed that he was loyal not to the "letter" of Kant's philosophy but to its "spirit," and 
Schelling and his friends in Tubingen, themselves resentful of the "pseudo-Kantianism" 
epitomized by their teacher Johann Friedrich Flatt, immediately seized on this aspect of 
Fichte's thought. Finally they had found someone who intended to use Kant not as a 
bulwark for orthodoxy and tradition, but for political and philosophical revolution. Thus, 
Fichte's dry prose ignited a fire in the minds of Schelling and his peers. 
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 For an exhaustive, contextually sensitive account of Fichte's first forty years, see Anthony La Vopa, 
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The project of Grundsatzphilosophie was fundamental to Fichte's early 
philosophical concerns. Before his discovery of Kant—which he likened to a sort of 
religious conversion—Fichte himself had doubted human free will. This made him 
especially receptive to Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. While earning a meager 
living as a private tutor in Leipzig in the summer of 1790, Fichte found a potential client 
who wanted to study Kant.140 Though he lacked any knowledge of the critical 
philosophy, Fichte promised to tutor him, and-devoted himself to an intense study of all 
three Critiques. The result was profound. Suddenly, his belief in "absolute freedom" and 
"the concept of duty" were restored. "It is unbelievable how much respect for mankind 
and how much strength this system gives us!"141 
Fichte quickly came to idolize Kant, going so far as to travel to Konigsberg to ask 
for Kant's patronage. Kant turned him down, but did convince his publisher to print a 
little book Fichte had written called A Critique of all Revelation, in which Fichte applied 
Kantian principles to the reading of scripture. This led to a quite fortuitous public 
confusion: because everyone was expecting a work on religion from Kant at that time, 
many mistakenly believed that this anonymous little tract was written by the sage of 
Konigsberg himself. When Kant cleared the air and named Fichte as the true author, he 
became a philosophical celebrity overnight. __ 
Despite his newfound fame, Fichte did* not rest on his laurels. He, like Reinhold, 
was concerned with the impact of the skeptical attacks on Kant, and began his own search 
for a unifying Grundsatz. However, he felt that Reinhold's own attempt to find it had 
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failed, and it was G.E. Schulze who convinced him of this failure. Schulze, a former 
schoolmate of Fichte's, anonymously published a little book in 1792 entitled 
Aenesidemus. The book was a supposed correspondence between Hermias, a Kantian, 
and Aenesidemus, a self-professed Humean skeptic who obviously spoke for Schulze 
himself. "Aenesidemus" questioned both Kant and Reinhold, and Fichte saw it as a 
serious challenge to his own beliefs.142 Aenesidemus shattered his faith and prompted 
him to begin his own search for the true Grundsatz. 
In recognizing the importance of the skeptical attacks on Kant and Reinhold, 
Fichte continually insisted that Kant had spoken the truth, but that he had, for some 
reason or another, not adequately described the foundations of his system. Earlier we 
saw that Reinhold had done something similar. Both Reinhold and Fichte believed that 
Kant had correctly described the operations of reason but failed to trace them back to a 
single point from which they all derived. Fichte claimed that Kant had not "presented the 
system" but nevertheless "had it in his possession," wondering aloud whether Kant 
"consciously realized" that he possessed this system, or whether he simply "had a genius 
[in him] which told him the truth without communicating to him the reasons for it," or 
even whether Kant purposely left the task to someone else.143 No doubt Fichte—and 
Schelling after him—was attracted by the third possibility. 
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 Fichte wrote to none other than Flatt, describing the importance of this critique. "Aenesidemus, whom I 
count as one of the notable products of our age, convinced me of what I already suspected; that Kant's and 
Reinhold's work had not [made] philosophy into a science. This shook the foundation of my own system, 
and since one cannot live well under the open sky, it forced me to rebuild it anew. I convinced myself that 
philosophy can only be made into a science if it is developed from a single principle, like in geometry.. ..I 
believe I have found [this principle], and as far as I have advanced in my own project, it has been proven 
worthy. (Fichte to Flatt (November or December 1793), in Fichte, Gesamtausgabe, ed. Reinhard Lauth and 
Hans Jacob, with contribution from Hans Glitwitzky and Manfred Zahn (Stuttgart: Bad Cannstatt: 
Frommann, 1970), III, 2, 18. Hereafter cited as GA. 
Fichte to Flatt (November or December 1793), GA, III, 2: 18. 
Fichte used the Aenesidemus review as an opportunity to offer his own solution to 
the problem of the Grundsatz.™4 He agreed with Schulze that Reinhold's "Principle of 
Consciousness" was invalid as a philosophical starting point, and paid deference to 
skepticism's contributions in the history of philosophy.145 But Fichte refused to give up 
on the search for a Grundsatz, stating that "the Principle of Consciousness is a theorem 
which is based upon another first principle, from which, however, the Principle of 
Consciousness can be strictly derived, a priori and independently of all experience."146 
Therefore, Reinhold's principle is valid, but it is not the true starting point of philosophy. 
Reinhold himself, according to Fichte, had cleared the path for this new solution: the first 
principle of philosophy, for Fichte, is the "self-positing I," and everything that is not-I 
only obtains reality through its relation to the I. Thus "the notion of a thing in itself, to 
the extent that it is supposed to be a not-I which is not opposed to any I, is self-
contradictory...."147 This self-positing I is not, however, the "subject" that appears in 
Reinhold's Principle of Consciousness. The self-positing I "is because it is and is what it 
is" and is thus "absolutely independent and autonomous." It is an "absolute I." But the 
"absolute I" strives towards consciousness, requiring it to create, ex nihilo, something 
On the Review and its role in the development of Fichte's thought, see especially Daniel Breazeale, 
"Fichte's Aenesidemus Review and the Transformation of German Idealism, Review of Metaphysics 34 
(1981): 545-568. 
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opposed to it, a not-I. Empirical consciousness arises only as the mediation of these two; 
it is a lower standpoint which views I and not-I as equal.148 
This is extremely difficult material, and it smacks of mysticism. Yet somehow, it 
energized an entire generation. There is still debate as to what Fichte precisely meant. 
Did he believe that the entire world is literally "created" by this absolute "I," and that 
there is truly nothing independent of it?149 If so, this would mean that, if humanity died 
out, the world itself would vanish. Recent interpreters have done much to call this 
reading of Fichte into question, arguing that he never denied the ontological reality of the 
"objective world," but simply stressed the futility of discussing it independently of 
human consciousness.150 After all, if we are equipped to experience the world in a 
certain way, there is little point in trying—like Kant in his discussion of the thing-in-
itself—to get outside that standpoint. Fortunately, one can understand Fichte's 
importance for Schelling—especially for his Naturphilosophie—without resolving this 
debate. The key to doing so is grasping Fichte's conception of the "I" as active and 
unconditioned. 
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it is crucial to understand that the "Absolute I" is not the same as the human intellect or "Empirical I." 
One of the key innovations of the Aenesidemus review is Fielite's distinction 
between seeing the mind as a fact (Tatsache) and as an act (Tathandlung). Recall that in 
the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant emphasized that the human mind is no passive 
receptor of information, but rather that it imposes order on the data of sense experience. 
However, Kant was adamant that the categories operate on data given to us from real, 
external objects (things-in-themselves), and that therefore the mind is nonetheless 
constrained from without. If it is constrained, it is conditioned (Bedingt), literally "made 
a thing." Fichte played up the first tendency while downplaying the second. For him, 
consciousness is not static—it arises out of opposed spiritual or mental forces, or as he 
puts it, the conflict between the absolute I and not-I. This emphasis on the "activity" of 
the mind gives us an insight into Fichte's popularity. While his system seems almost 
insane by twenty-first century standards, it offered solutions to a number of post-Kantian 
dilemmas. By insisting that the mind "creates" the external world, the boundary between 
knowing subject and thing-in-itself—which plagued Kant's system—was dissolved. This 
bridges the gap between sensibility and intellect, since both sensible "experience" and the 
human intellect are dictated by the "self-positing I." Finally, Fichte's ideas offered 
readers a connection between theoretical and practical philosophy. Practical or moral 
philosophy deals precisely with willing and action. But in Fichte's new philosophy, 
knowing is a form of acting! Kant had talked of the "primacy of practical reason," but he 
never demonstrated that theoretical philosophy was, in its very essence, subordinate to 
the practical. 
The Aenesidemus review established Fichte as one of the most promising young 
philosophers in Germany, and he was eventually called to replace Reinhold as Chair of 
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Philosophy in Jena in 1794. For the duration of the 1790s, Fichte attempted to give his 
system a final and satisfactory articulation, writing several versions of his 
Wissenschaftslehre.151 While Schelling was advancing towards his new standpoint, 
Fichte kept re-writing his own system.152 A few things never changed, however. The 
self-positing I forever remained the Grundsatz of Fichte's system, and he never ceased to 
emphasize that the mind is characterized by a conflict of opposing forces. In 1794, 
Schelling was drawn into the orbit of Fichte, and he would begin his own search for a 
Grundsatz. But the early system he arrived at, although at times inconsistent, would go 
beyond what Fichte had imagined. In his first two philosophical works, Schelling would 
deviate from his mentor by appealing to none other than Spinoza, precisely because 
Spinoza's God, when slightly reconfigured, offered Schelling a better way to reunite what 
Kant had separated. Amazingly, Schelling did this all while simultaneously finishing his 
theological studies in Tubingen. 
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SCHELLING'S DISCOVERY OF REINHOLD AND FICHTE 
In Chapter 1 we saw that all the theological students at the Tubingen Stift undertook two 
years of "philosophical studies" before moving on to the theologically-oriented phase of 
their training. At the end of these two years, the students were required to write a 
dissertation (usually on a topic given to them by a professor) and also complete two 
shorter papers called "Specimina."153 Schelling's dissertation on the origin of human evil 
broke from the traditions at the Stift. Normally, students defended a thesis given to them 
by one of their teachers. Schelling, however, wrote about a topic of his own choosing. 
The dissertation shows the influence of Herder and other eighteenth century biblical 
critics, and Schelling introduces a conception of the Edenic "Fall" that will reappear—in 
philosophical guise—in his Ideas of 1797.154 Schelling defended his work in September 
of 1792, before none other than Ephorus Schnurrer. Schelling's two "Specimina," 
however, are much more important in the context of post-Kantian philosophy, and it is 
extremely unfortunate that they are both lost. However, from their very titles we can see 
that, already in 1792, Schelling was familiar with some of the central elements of 
Grundsatzphilosophie. The first was an essay on Reinhold, entitled "On the possibility of 
'"£»£>, 1:21. 
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a philosophy without a nickname, with some remarks about the Reinholdian 
Elementarphilosophie." The second shows that Schelling was concerned with the unity 
of the critical philosophy: "On the agreement of the critique of theoretical and practical 
reason, especially relating to the use of the categories and their realization." It is very 
likely that these two "Specimina" loomed larger for Schelling, who had familiarized 
himself with Kant's philosophy early in 1791, than his larger dissertation.155 The timing 
of Schelling's interest in Reinhold—recall that Fichte also published the Aenesidemus 
review in 1792—makes his relationship with Fichte all the more fascinating: apparently 
the seventeen year old Schelling had independently started along the same path as the 
thirty year old Fichte, looking for a way to ground the Kantian philosophy. 
Since he was a theological student-—one prone to embrace the most radical trends 
in biblical criticism—Schelling must also have known of Fichte from his Attempt at a 
Critique of All Revelation. In June of 1793, Fichte made a trip to Tubingen, and returned 
once again in May of 1794. There is some debate as to whether Schelling and Fichte 
actually met during either of these visits.156 Horst Furhmans says they did, but Reinhard 
Lauth argues that they did not.157 The editors "of the Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe offer a 
middle position, suggesting that Schelling at least saw Fichte during these visits but likely 
did not get the chance to speak to him.158 Regardless of whether they spoke, Schelling 
already idolized him, especially because of Fichte's political reputation.159 Could anyone 
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be more admirable than this fiery champion of the French Revolution who was also 
improving Kant's system? As soon as Schelling got a copy of On the Concept of the 
Wissenschaftslehre, he dedicated himself to an original formulation of Fichte's principles. 
He sent his own text, which would soon be published, to Fichte himself, along with a 
deferential letter that praised Fichte's "latest work, which introduced new and great views 
to the philosophical world."160 Fichte's reply is lost, but Schelling's initial letter began a 
fruitful correspondence that would last until their bitter falling out in 1802.161 
ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A FORM OF ALL PHILOSOPHY 
Schelling published On the Possibility of a Form of All Philosophy in 1794, and most of 
the material in this little book is derivative; in many respects, it closely follows Fichte's 
On the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre.162 In introducing the project, Schelling wastes 
no time connecting his own thoughts with the search for a Grundsatz for the Kantian 
philosophy. Like Reinhold and Fichte before him, Schelling finds fault with Kant's first 
Critique, which attempts to "lay the foundation" for philosophy "without having 
anywhere established a principle that would not only form an original form as the root of 
all particular forms but also give the reason for its necessary connection with the 
lwBuD, 1:51. 
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particular forms that depended on it."163 According to Schelling, this fault naturally led 
to the "important objections" of skeptics like Aenesidemus and Maimon, who ruthlessly 
exposed Kant's lack of "a basic principle."164 Furthermore, according to Schelling, 
Reinhold's answer to these objections was insufficient, for his Elementarphilosophie 
adequately explains only the content of philosophy, not its form. Taking his inspiration 
from Fichte's early work, Schelling claims that he will "arrive at a solution of the entire 
problem of the possibility of philosophy as such."165 Ultimately, for philosophy to be 
established as a true science, indeed the science of all sciences, it needs a firm starting 
point, "a plainly absolute axiom that has to contain the condition of all content as well as 
of all form if it is really to condition it at all."166 
The argumentative strategy of On the Possibility of a Form of all Philosophy is 
poor. Schelling himself admits that "The whole investigation, of which the above is a 
sample, is necessarily dry and not very promising in the beginning."167 Schelling begins 
by presupposing that philosophy is a science, one that stands above all other sciences and 
whose first principle cannot be taken from any other science.168 This first principle of 
philosophy must give it both content and form simultaneously. He also follows Fichte's 
argument against two incorrect methods of reaching the first principle. First among these 
(thought not the first he mentions) is the search for the ultimate axiom by means of 
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regress. Schelling asks, "Should we retrace our steps from axiom to axiom, from 
condition to condition, until we arrive at the ultimate, absolute, categorical axiom?"169 
Obviously not, for how could we ever reach our goal by randomly picking out a lower-
level axiom and groping around for its connection to the highest? This procedure seems 
to violate the very essence of philosophical investigation. Instead, Schelling insists that 
"the absolutely unconditional proposition" must be found in a "quite different way." It 
must come at the beginning, as something "given only by its own criteria." By rejecting 
infinite regress, Schelling announc 
With this "regressive search" ruled out, Schelling now deals with two interrelated 
dead ends, taken by Reinhold and Leibniz, respectively.170 Reinhold tried to make the 
ultimate axiom a material axiom, by locating it in consciousness. His first principle ("In 
consciousness, the subject distinguishes the representation from the subject and the object 
and relates the representation to both") asserts something very factual about the 
operations of the subject. But how can a "fact" like this be the ultimate axiom? How 
could everything in philosophy be deduced from this one sentence? Here Schelling 
acknowledges the power of one of Aenesidemus' objections: Reinhold's "axiom" is in 
fact a proposition with a subject and a predicate, and as such, presupposes "a form which 
expresses the relationship of subject and predicate."171 In other words, the very fact that 
Reinhold's principle is a normal sentence means it depends on the way we construct all 
sentences. But the ultimate axiom needs to be something that presupposes nothing: it 
mAA,\, 1,279. 
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must determine itself completely. Thus, Reinhold's principle cannot be what we are 
looking for. In this way Schelling sweeps aside Reinhold, and he simply reverses his 
procedure in refuting Leibniz, whose principle of non-contradiction represents an attempt 
at making the ultimate axiom purely formal. Here, Schelling offers less of an argument, 
instead simply asserting that there can be "no general form that does not presuppose, by 
necessity, some definite content."172 Regardless of the strength of his logic, Schelling's 
twin dismissals of Reinhold and Leibniz show that the ultimate axiom must be one in 
which form and content are not derived one from the other, but one in which they are 
"mutually conditioned."173 The form must be deduced from content and vice versa. 
None of this is innovative; Fichte had ruled out these two false means of reaching 
the first principle. After thoroughly investigating how not to reach the absolute axiom of 
philosophy, Schelling finally identifies it. It is Fichte's self-positing I. It is worth 
quoting Schelling at length as he makes this revelation: 
A strictly unconditional axiom has to have a content which 
is in turn unconditional, that is, this axiom cannot be 
conditioned by the content of some other axiom (be the 
content a fact or an abstraction and reflection). This is 
possible only insofar as that content is something which in 
its very origin is posited unconditionally as a content not 
determined by anything but by itself and which, therefore 




posited absolutely except that which contains an absolutely 
independent original self and is posited not because it is 
posited but because it is itself that which posits. This is 
nothing other than the originally self-posited I, which is 
marked by all criteria enumerated.174 
Schelling wrote this fully in the spirit of Fichte's early work. Like Fichte, Schelling 
recognizes something unique about the structure of the I. Everything said earlier in this 
Chapter about Fichte's formulation of the "Self-positing I" applies here as well. Very 
little in this text is original: Schelling's only new contribution to Fichte's doctrine is a 
precise account of how all twelve of Kant's categories flow from the self-positing I. In 
this sense, Schelling's talents as a historian of philosophy—a talent also shared by his 
friend Hegel—are already beginning to show, and he will further develop those talents in 
his next work, On the I as Principle of Philosophy, one in which he begins—ever so 
slightly—to advance a uniquely Schellingian doctrine.175 By the time he wrote this next 
work, he harbored a complete disdain for theology, and was eager to leave the Stift. 
"I LIVE AND BREATHE PHILOSOPHY" 
After the writing of On the Possibility of a Form of All Philosophy, Schelling became 
even more enchanted by philosophy, and while he still planned on completing his 
theological training, it was only out of necessity. Because Hegel and Holderlin had 
graduated, Schelling's letters to them provide evidence of how disillusioned he was with 
mAA, I, 1,279 
175
 Knittermeyer stresses Schelling's attention to the history of philosophy in Schelling und die 
Romantische Schule, 46-47'. 
theology. A letter from Hegel on Christmas Eve, 1794, must have reminded him of how 
badly he wanted to leave Tubingen. "How does it look in Tubingen?" Hegel asked. 
"Until someone like Reinhold or Fichte sits at a teacher's desk there, nothing that matters 
will come out of that place. Nowhere is the old system more enthusiastically propagated 
than there."176 Hegel complained about the "mechanical heads" that predominated in 
Tubingen and made references to Storr's attacks on Kant's religious philosophy. 
I have already quoted Schelling's response to Hegel, in which he declared his 
allegiance to philosophy and wrote that his theological studies were worthless in the 
present age. But he also speaks of the need to advance beyond the Kantian philosophy, 
and praises Fichte for doing just that. "We need more from philosophy! Kant has swept 
everything away, but who would know it?....Oh you Kantians who are now everywhere! 
You stick only to the letter [of his philosophy] and bless yourself for not seeing very far!" 
Fichte, however, had "raised philosophy to new heights," and Schelling tells Hegel that 
he wants to "greet the new hero, Fichte, in the land of truth!"177 Significantly, it was in 
this letter that Schelling announced his intention to write "An Ethics a la Spinoza," an 
obvious reference to On the I as Principle of Philosophy.178 
Hegel responded at the end of the month, again complaining about the 
"theological-Kantian path" of philosophy in Tubingen.179 Schelling fired back with a 
letter on February 4, which gives us a great deal of insight into his study of Kant, 
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Reinhold, and Fichte. Reinhold is to be praised, Schelling says, because his philosophy 
was "a step," albeit one that must be passed over, and without Reinhold, philosophy 
might not have progressed so rapidly.180 Schelling describes Kant as the "dawn" of 
philosophy and describes the situation of theology as a "satire." But the most amazing 
statement in Schelling's letter pertains once again to Spinoza. What must Hegel have 
thought when he read the following lines? 
Orthodox conceptions of God are not for us anymore.181— 
My answer is, we must go further than a personal God. I 
have therefore become a Spinozist! Do not be surprised. 
You will soon hear why. For Spinoza, the world (the 
object in opposition to the subject) was everything, for me 
the I [is everything]. The actual difference between the 
critical and dogmatic philosophies appears to me to be that 
one begins from the absolute I (conditioned by no object), 
the other from an absolute object or Not-I. The latter leads 
in its final consequences to the system of Spinoza, the 
former to Kant's. Philosophy must begin from the 
absolute. One asks oneself where the absolute lies, in the I 
or in the not-I. Once this question is decided, everything is 
decided.—For me, the highest principle of all philosophy is 
the pure, absolute I, i.e. the I which is simply I, 
180
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unconditioned by any object, but rather posited through 
freedom. The alpha and omega of all philosophy is 
freedom.182 
Has Schelling really become a Spinozist? Not in the true sense: what he has done is 
move towards a substantialization of Fichte's absolute I. Spinoza's philosophy is 
admirable because his God is exactly the type of "ultimate axiom" the post-Kantians have 
been looking for. Spinoza's only mistake was that he made God an object, not a subject. 
A few months after he wrote this letter, Schelling published On the I as Principle of 
Philosophy, in which this theme is more fully developed, and which moves beyond 
Fichte's "subjective Idealism." 
ON THE I AS PRINCIPLE OF PHILOSOPHY 
In On the Possibility of a Form of All Philosophy, Schelling had explicitly connected his 
work to the search for a unifying Grundsatz and clung closely to Fichte's philosophy as 
presented in On the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre.,83 In On the I as Principle of 
Philosophy, he stays within the boundaries of Grundsatzphilosophie while drawing 
extensively on the philosophies of Spinoza and Leibniz, particularly in his usage of the 
term "substance."184 This was a crucial innovation, and his interest in these great 
182
 Schelling to Hegel (4 February 1795) inBuD, II, 65. 
183
 Rosenkranz treats the first part of the text as completely derivative: "In this book he connects [his ideas] 
completely to Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre." At the same time, however, Rosenkranz admits that "Schelling 
hardly mentions Fichte," instead focusing on Kant and Reinhold {Schelling, 22). 
184
 Dieter Henrich argues that On the I represents a departure from Grundsatzphilosophie. I do not see how 
his position is tenable, given the introduction to this work, which is replete with the language of 
Grundsatzphilosophie and which I will shortly discuss. In the next Chapter, I will argue that Schelling's 
true departure from this tradition is marked not by On the /but by his Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism 
and Criticism. 
78 
rationalists will later be essential to the development of his Naturphilosophie. By 1799 
he will refer to Naturphilosophie as the "Spinozism of physics" and will construct a 
monadological account of nature. For now, though, Schelling is still trying to follow in 
Fichte's footsteps, although he takes a much more exciting and creative path than he had 
a year earlier. 
The Preface to On the I as Principle of Philosophy is a strange mixture of 
admiration for Spinoza and by-the-book Grundsatzphilosophie.185 Schelling states that 
he intends "to annul explicitly the very foundations of Spinoza's system," by overturning 
Spinoza's rejection of human freedom. On the other hand, "Spinoza's system seems to 
me more worthy of high esteem, because of its bold consequences, than the popular 
coalition-systems of our intellectual world, which through a patchwork of all possible 
systems spells death to all true philosophy:"186 Schelling's negative comment about 
"patchwork" systems reinforces a major theme in German Idealism: the desire for unity. 
Repeating what he had written to Hegel at the beginning of 1795, Schelling states that 
one day he will hopefully "bring to realization the idea of writing a counterpart to 
Spinoza's Ethics.,M1 Apparently he conceived On the I as the groundwork for this 
project, and one could presume that his 1801 Presentation my System of Philosophy is its 
culmination. 
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Regardless, the rest of the preface falls squarely under the heading of 
Grundsatzphilosophie. Schelling says that his book "will depict the results of critical 
philosophy in its regression to the last principles of knowledge,"188 repeating the charge 
that Kant had not "established the principles of all knowledge" and that "the Critique of 
Pure Reason cannot possibly be the way of philosophy as a science."189 Schelling also 
complains about the lack of unity between Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy. 
The latter "does not seem to be of the same structure with the theoretical; instead it seems 
to be a mere annex (Nebengebaude) to his philosophy as a whole and, what is more, an 
annex wide open to attacks from the main building."190 Schelling reiterates that On the I 
as Principle of Philosophy will "establish the principles" of "the original sense of 
[Kant's] thoughts."191 
Schelling then commences his search for "something in which and through which 
everything that is reaches existence, everything that is being thought reaches reality, and 
thought itself reaches the form of unity and immutability." Schelling seems to dispose 
with the terminology of "first principles" and use the term "unconditioned" instead. Is 
this just a meaningless shift in terminology? Absolutely not. This hints at Schelling's 
willingness to do what Fichte had never done: substantialize the absolute I, to understand 
it as a noumenal reality. Whereas Fichte searched merely for a "principle," On the I as 
188
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Principle of Philosophy is after something with real ontological status.193 This explains 
the ease with which Schelling slides between his own philosophy and Spinoza's: Spinoza 
had, indeed, come very close to the ultimate truth of philosophy. He correctly described 
the properties of the unconditioned, but simply located it in the wrong place.194 
Let us make the above paragraph more intelligible. Much like in On the 
Possibility of a Form of All Philosophy, Schelling explores two incorrect pathways to the 
first principle or, in his new terminology, the unconditioned. One dead end is to locate 
the unconditioned in an object, and in the case of Spinoza and Leibniz, that object is God. 
But this is self-contradictory, owing to the very precise meaning of the German term for 
"unconditioned." In German, the word is Unbedingt, or literally, that which is "not 
thinged" or "not a thing." Schelling rejoices in the connotations of this word, saying that 
it "contains almost the entire treasure of philosophical truth."195 Any external object is, 
quite simply, a thing, and therefore no object can possibly be unconditioned, even God! 
By appealing to the precise meaning of the term, Schelling swiftly dismisses all dogmatic 
systems of philosophy, which by definition begin with an object outside of human 
consciousness. 
Frederick Beiser, in his German Idealism, makes a remarkable comment about On the I as Principle of 
Philosophy. He identifies it as the only text in the history of German Idealism in which "the absolute 
subject, the infinite ego, or universal spirit, understood as a metaphysical principle or noumenal reality" 
plays a large role. "If it appeared as all, it was only very briefly, confined to a short phase of Schelling's 
philosophical development, the few months he adhered to the doctrines espoused in his early Vom Ich als 
Prinzip der Philosophie (1796); but Schelling quickly moved away from this position, and even during this 
period he equivocated whether he meant to commit himself to the existence of the absolute subject." 
(German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism 1781-1801, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2002), 5.). Beiser argues that Schelling was not yet familiar with the practical aspect of Fichte's 
philosophy, and thus had not seen his mentor qualify the theoretical part of his thought. Had been familiar 
with the third part of Fichte's Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre, he might have not tried to 
"dogmatize" the Absolute I. (475). 
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But Schelling also rejects an equally erroneous conception of the unconditioned, 
one which locates it in the empirical subject. Here, Schelling obviously has Reinhold in 
mind. This approach also "carries a contradiction within itself, which is obvious at first 
glance."196 Every empirical subject needs a relationship with objects just to be an 
empirical subject. In a way, the empirical subject needs objects, because it is unthinkable 
without objects against which it can define itself. Therefore, "Neither [subject nor 
object] can contain the unconditional because both are conditioned reciprocally."197 
Since the approach of Reinhold is as unfruitful as that of the dogmatists, what is the 
answer? We should already know it by now: it is the absolute I or self-positing I, which 
"is, only because it is," and which attains reality only through itself: 
The absolute can be given only by the absolute... .The last 
ground of reality is something that is thinkable only 
through itself, that is, it is thinkable only through its being; 
it is thought only inasmuch as it is. In short, the principle 
of being and thinking is one and the same."m 
Like Fichte before him, Schelling reminds us of the fact that we cannot "prove" that this 
is the starting point. It simply is because it is, and we have access to it not through 
discursive reason, but only through intellectual intuition. To ask the philosopher to 
"prove" the unconditioned is ridiculous: for if someone cannot recognize the fact that she 
is an /, no amount of philosophizing will ever convince her. But there is no elitism here: 
"intellectual intuition," the recognition of oneself as an I, is not a privilege of great 
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minds: '"I am because I am!' That takes possession of everyone instantaneously."199 
Furthermore, the very meaning of the unconditioned is that it is dependent on nothing 
higher than or outside of itself. "Proving" something means using an external criterion to 
assert its validity, which would be self-contradictory in the case of the unconditioned. 
Once Schelling has established what the unconditioned is, he can follow Spinoza 
in granting it certain properties. In perhaps the most striking section of On the I as 
Principle of Philosophy, he begins talking exactly like Spinoza and identifying the 
Absolute I as not just a "first principle" but as an actual substance.200 This is the crucial 
innovation mentioned at the start of our reading of this text: 
If substance is the same as the unconditional, then the I is 
the only substance. If there were several substances there 
would be an I outside the I, which makes no sense. 
Therefore everything that is is in the I, and outside the I is 
nothing. For the I contains all reality, and everything that 
is, is through reality. Therefore everything is in the I. 
Without reality there is nothing. Now, there is no reality 
except in the I, therefore there is nothing outside the I. If 
the I is the only substance, then everything that is, is merely 
a quality /Accidens,) of the I.201 
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But one must remember that Schelling is not reverting to Spinozism, which asserts the 
"substantiality of the not-I."202 Recall that the whole point of this text is to "annul" 
Spinoza's system insofar as it sets out from ah object and renders humans unfree. 
Schelling, like Fichte before him, believes in the priority of practical reason. "The 
beginning and the end of all philosophy is freedom."201 The "I am I" again represents not 
a mere fact but the free act by which the structures of human consciousness are brought 
about. 
For this reason, Schelling tries to explain how the human being, as a finite I, is 
free. Explaining the freedom of the Absolute / i s unproblematic: like Spinoza's 
substance, it possesses absolute power, and what appears to humans as a "moral law" is 
for the Absolute I a "natural law" flowing necessarily from its very essence.204 Schelling 
offers a somewhat unconvincing resolution to the problem: the empirical I, he claims, is 
indeed partially conditioned by objects. It cannot negate them like the Absolute I can. 
But still, "objects alone could never produce an /. The empirical I owes the act that it is 
empirical to objects, but it owes the fact that it is an I at all to a higher causality."205 
Because the empirical I is only partially dependent on objects, it partakes in the same 
causality of the Absolute I, only to a lesser degree. "Thus the causality of the empirical I 
differs from the causality of the absolute I not at all in principle (in quality) but only in 
quantity."206 Schelling strongly believes that our similarity to the absolute I makes us 
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capable of heroic striving. Thus, he makes an interesting criticism of Kant's demand that 
virtue be rewarded by happiness. "Empirical happiness," which is simply the aligning of 
human will with natural causality, is nothing to be glorified. Infinite striving demands 
that we not try "to become happy, but no longer to need happiness, indeed to become 
incapable of needing it, and to elevate our very being to a form that is repugnant to the 
form of happiness as well as to [the form of) its opposite."207 Similarly, in the 
Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, Schelling will sneer at Kant's belief 
that we need a God to reward our virtue with happiness. 
Despite the innovations of On the I as Principle of Philosophy, Schelling remains 
attached to Fichte's methods, emphasizing the primacy of practical reason and 
demanding that the very purpose of philosophy be the advancement of human freedom. 
Still cooped up in Tubingen, still watching the events taking place across the Rhine, he 
believed that philosophy could, quite literally, change the world. The empirical I, 
because it shares some of the characteristics of the absolute I, "ought to strive to elicit in 
the world that which is actuality in the nonfinite, and which is man's highest vocation— 
to turn the unity of aims in the world into mechanism, and to turn mechanism into a unity 
of aims."208 Although his use of the term "mechanism" reveals that he has yet to achieve 
the breakthroughs of his Naturphilosophie, this conclusion to On the I is still a powerful 
demand for both political and philosophical revolution which hints at atheism. We do not 
need a God to ensure the harmony of natural causes and human will. Although we can 
never achieve this harmony perfectly, human freedom is powerful enough to approximate 
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it through infinite striving. And despite his continuing philosophical maturation, this is 
an ideal which will remain with Schelling after his graduation from the Stiff and into his 
next philosophical text, the Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. 
GRADUATION AND BEYOND 
Between 1781, when Kant published the Critique of Pure Reason, and 1795, when 
Schelling wrote On the I, German philosophy had developed rapidly, with successive 
system builders giving way to one another. Reinhold believed he improved on Kant, and 
Fichte believed he had improved on Reinhold. Schelling, on the other hand, preferred to 
remain a disciple of Fichte, although he was already on his way towards superseding him. 
Furthermore, he had mastered the use of Fichte's concepts, which stressed the activity 
and conflict within the I, and which he would soon deploy in his Naturphilosophie. This 
was a remarkable accomplishment; by the age of 20, Schelling had inserted himself into 
the mainstream of German philosophical circles, and proposed his own unique variant of 
Grundsatzphilosophie, which drew on Spinoza's pantheism. On the I as Principle of 
Philosophy established him as a promising young philosopher, but he would soon 
graduate from Tubingen and be forced, like so many of his colleagues, to take a position 
as a private tutor. Nonetheless, his position did not stop his productivity. In fact, it was 
during his time as a tutor that he move beyond Fichte's Grundsatzphilosophie and turn to 
the natural sciences. The first of these is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Schelling's Exodus from Tubingen: from Stuttgart to 
Leipzig 
IDEALISM IN TRANSITION: FROM SUBJECT TO NATURE 
In On the I as Principle of Philosophy, Schelling had established himself as Fichte's most 
talented disciple, but his obvious interest in Spinoza, and his substantialization of Fichte's 
I, showed that the student was headed in a different direction than his master. Fichte's 
main concern had always been ethical: even if his system began with a theoretical 
grounding, namely the self-positing I, theory was always subordinated to practice in the 
Wissenschaftslehre. This is why Fichte reminded his readers that knowing is a form of 
acting or willing: the centrality of action in his system allowed him to reinforce 
humanity's belief that it could shape the objective world, and bring it into alignment with 
reason. This is also the reason his dry prose could excite an entire generation: Fichte's 
theory seemed to give a perfect explanation of and justification for what was happening 
across the Rhine. Today, we think of philosophy as hopelessly isolated from the "real 
world." But for the Germans in the 1790s, philosophy was precisely what sanctioned a 
revolt against tradition. 
Schelling, too, saw human freedom as central to his early Idealism, and he 
supported the Revolution. But he was reluctant to treat theoretical philosophy as 
complete and move towards an ethical theory. Schelling saw theoretical problems which 
Fichte did not, and was willing to exploit philosophical resources—such as Spinoza— 
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which Fichte dismissed. On the I is evidence of this tendency. As the review in the 
Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung stated, that book offered the reader a real ground 
(Realgrund) of our knowledge, not simply a first principle.209 Schelling found an 
ontological basis for our knowledge, and that alone could be considered just another sort 
of "dogmatism" which set out from an external, objective absolute. Still, Schelling had 
managed to stay—albeit uncomfortably—in the territory of Grundsatzphilosophie, and 
his condemnation of Spinoza's system showed that he still harbored prejudices against 
dogmatic system. For Schelling, those systems are self-contradictory, because an object 
is necessarily conditioned (bedingt). 
This makes Schelling's next philosophical work, the Philosophical Letters on 
Dogmatism and Criticism, all the more striking. This work is crucial for Schelling's 
development and as such I give it relatively more weight than his earlier works. It is vital 
for two reasons: first, it proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that Schelling was no 
"theologian in disguise." The vitriol of the first four letters—largely directed at the 
theologians in Tubingen—is truly startling. Secondly, and more importantly for the 
development of his Natprhilosophie, he incorporates Holderlin's criticisms of Fichte, and 
comes to the conclusion that dogmatism (epitomized by Spinoza) and criticism 
(epitomized by Kant) are both irrefutable philosophical systems, one of which deduces 
the subject from an absolute object, the other of which deduces the object from an 
absolute subject. At the end of the text, Schelling still sides with criticism, but the very 
admission that dogmatism is irrefutable points towards a growing tension in his own 
thinking. Gradually Schelling realizes—and this is reinforced by the Oldest System 
209ALZ3\9 (11 October 1796): 89-92. The review's description of Schelling's argument is quite accurate. 
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Program of German Idealism—that the objective world is a mirror of the subjective 
world, and that Fichte's focus is too narrow. Simply examining the "I" is insufficient. 
Philosophy cannot be grounded solely in the subject, but in fact needs to be balanced by 
the object. Therefore, the objective world, i.e: nature, must also be examined, with close 
attention to its relationship to man. This belief in the parallelism of subject and object 
characterizes not only Schelling's Naturphilosophie, but his System of Transcendental 
Idealism (1800) and Presentation of my System of Philosophy (1801) as well. Thus, 
Schelling's writings between his graduation from Tubingen and his scientific education 
in Leipzig help dictate the methodology of his early Naturphilosophie. In these years, his 
writings begin to transcend the dichotomy between criticism and dogmatism and open up 
a completely new form of Idealism, one which equates subject and object, spirit and 
nature. Amazingly, Schelling advanced steadily along this philosophical path despite his 
time-consuming duties as a tutor for an aristocratic family. 
SCHELLING AS HOFMEISTER 
Schelling graduated from Tubingen in the summer of 1795210 with no desire to pursue a 
theological career; given the dearth of clerical positions available at this time, it would 
have been difficult for him to secure a job anyway. However, Schelling was also wary 
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of becoming a University professor in general, partly because of his disdain for the 
orthodoxy promoted by his teachers in Tubingen.212 He would have much preferred to 
earn a living as an independent writer, something only possible in the wake of the 
blossoming of the German reading public in the Hochaufklarung and the work of men 
like Mendelssohn and Lessing.213 Still, regardless of his own personal wishes, he was 
forced—like so many other famous German intellectuals of his day—to take up work as a 
private tutor or Hofmeister. Even before his graduation, Schelling's father entered into 
correspondence with Strohlin, a professor of French literature in Stuttgart, about the 
Riedesel brothers. These two young barons, who at the time were living with Strohlin, 
were in need of a tutor. Originally, those in charge of the barons' education wanted the 
tutor to be a jurist or a Frenchman, but Strohlin strongly recommended Schelling because 
of his familiarity with the German university system.214 His efforts succeeded with the 
proviso that the barons approve of their new tutor. Thus, Schelling went for a time to 
Schelling's correspondence with Hegel during the years 1795-1796 are, along with the Philosophical 
Letters, his most concise expressions of disdain for his teachers at Tubingen. Schelling complained that the 
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also—even more dangerously—the mask of enlightenment." Schelling to Hegel (21 July 1795), BuD, II, 
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profession [of theology], with its worldly advantages, is woven into the whole of the state." Hegel to 
Schelling (End of January 1795), BuD, II, 61. It is obvious that both Schelling and Hegel looked 
skeptically upon academic careers at universities run by the German states. 
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Stuttgart to live with Strohlin and become familiar with his future students, whose trust 
he gained almost instantly.21 s 
In November 1795, Schelling arrived in Stuttgart, where he continued his 
philosophical development despite his exhaustive duties as Hofineister. Because the 
Riedesels were studying law, Schelling took up the subject and penned a "New 
Deduction of Natural Right" and he also finished his work on the Philosophical Letters 
on Dogmatism and Criticism. Despite his productivity, Schelling was miserable in 
Stuttgart. But he was looking forward to accompanying his students to Leipzig, and 
perhaps beyond. He wrote to Niethammer in January 1796 describing his situation: 
Since November I have been here in Stuttgart as the future 
guide and attendant for two barons von Riedesel, in 
Professor Strohlin's house. This position has hardly been 
pleasant for me, because a large part of my time is as good 
as lost. Yet I put myself through this trouble in the hope 
that I will be repaid for it in the future. Next spring I am to 
accompany them to Leipzig, and if I endure their years of 
study there, on further journeys—perhaps to England, 
and—if the monarchy is restored in France!—also there. 
Schelling's dreams of trips to England and France never materialized, but he 
could hardly have envisioned that the coming stay in Leipzig would be one of the most 
fruitful periods of his life. In spite of his uncertainty, a departure from Stuttgart would, as 
215Plitt, I, 90-91. 
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he indicated to Hegel, still be welcome, because he had tired of living in Wurttemberg.217 
However, the stay in Stuttgart was not completely devoid of intellectual stimulation, for 
in November and December of 1795 he met often with his erstwhile Tubingen classmate, 
Friedrich Holderlin. Holderlin—having just returned from Fichte's famous lectures in 
Jena—was crucial in driving Schelling away from Fichte's subjective idealism and 
towards a new "appreciation of nature, a philosophy of all-encompassing unity, which 
celebrated the beautiful and understood itself as close to Hellas.. ."218 In other words, 
Holderlin pushed Schelling further in a theoretical direction and forced him to question 
the assumptions which had guided his early philosophy. 
HOLDERLIN, SCHELLING, AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS ON 
DOGMATISM AND CRITICISM 
Considering their philosophical reputations today, it is perhaps ironic that Hegel and 
Schelling never had the chance to hear Fichte's famous lectures in Jena in 1794, but 
Holderlin—the most neglected of the three Tubingen friends—did.219 Although he did 
not stay long, he flirted with the idea of following in the footsteps of Friedrich Immanuel 
Niethammer, a friend of Schelling's and also a Tubingen graduate, who had habilitated 
and become a professor of philosophy at Jena. This alone is sufficient to show that, 
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although Holderlin conceived of himself first and foremost as a poet, he saw philosophy 
as an indispensable companion to his poetic work and took theoretical questions very 
seriously. "Philosophy is a tyrant," he would write to Niethammer, "and I serve her needs 
moreso than if I had freely submitted myself to her."221 But his enthusiasm for Fichte's 
particular brand of philosophy was short lived. Although he religiously attended Fichte's 
famous lectures—and recommended them to Hegel—he quickly became skeptical of 
Fichte's philosophy. Holderlin began to suspect that Fichte was not as innovative as 
everyone first believed. Perhaps, Holderlin suggested to Hegel, the Wissenschaftslehre 
was simply a modified version of Spinozism, which replaced "God" with the "I". "At 
first I very much suspected [Fichte] of dogmatism," for his thinking seemed "as 
obviously transcendent as previous metaphysicians who proceeded from the existence of 
the world.'""2 If Holderlin's interpretation of Fichte sounds familiar, there is good reason 
for this; Holderlin attacks Fichte for implicitly arguing what Schelling had explicitly 
argued in On the I as the Principle of Philosophy. For Holderlin, infusing the "I" with 
the attributes of Spinoza's substance is simply philosophical sleight of hand, and surely 
he would not have been pleased by his former classmate's newest book. 
Holderlin would launch a more extensive critique of Fichte in a famous 
philosophical fragment first published in 1961 by Friedrich BeiBner in the Grosse 
Stuttgarter Ausgabe, who gave it the title "Judgment and Being."223 Holderlin penned 
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the little fragment on a page of a book, most likely in early April 1795, which, 
considering that Fichte had only begun to give his lectures in May of 1794, "is 
astonishingly early in the history of speculative idealism." In this text, Holderlin took 
aim at Fichte's contention that the statement "I am I" is the starting point of all 
philosophy. Fichte said that this short sentence not only gave us the law of non-
contradiction (A=A), but captured the inner dynamic of consciousness, in which we see 
ourselves as both agent and object, both free and constrained. In his criticism of Fichte, 
Holderlin makes philosophical use of the German word for Judgment, Urteil. The prefix 
Ur means "original," while the verb teilen means to divide or cut, and thus, according to 
Holderlin, Urteil connotes an original division between subject and object. Holderlin 
argues that the statement "'I am I" is in fact "the most fitting example of this concept of 
original division."225 Remember that Fichte—and Schelling in his first two philosophical 
works—believed that the whole of philosophy could proceed from the firm basis of the 
"self-positing I." Fichte had made it a principle, and Schelling had made it a substance, 
but they both believed that this was the true starting point. But, as typical post-Kantians, 
Fichte and Schelling were striving for unity, and Holderlin points out that "I am I" is not 
a unified statement. Indeed, it already contains a division within it—the division between 
I as subject and I as object or predicate. One cannot separate the I as subject from the I as 
object without "violating the essence" of being, and therefore there is a great difference 
Dieter Henrich, "Holderlin on Judgment and Being," in The Course of Remembrance, 75. Henrich 
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between mere "identity" and "absolute being."226 Holderlin, as Dieter Henrich notes, 
believes "that the consciousness 'I am' is neither basic nor self-sufficient and that one 
must revert to an even deeper foundation."227 
These criticisms of Fichte, though remarkable because of their timing, should not 
lead one to believe that Holderlin is merely shifting the Grundsatz of philosophy from the 
"I am I" to absolute being. Rather he is rejecting any attempt to find what Schelling 
earlier called an "absolute axiom" for philosophy. For if being cannot be separated 
without "violating its essence," any attempt to use it as a "first principle" will fail. 
Henrich astutely remarks that "One could say, then, that Holderlin attempts to base a 
form of monism on the principle without at the same time falling into a methodological 
99R 
monism by deriving principles from it." In other words, Holderlin has not given up the 
search for a deep, satisfactory, and unified basis for all philosophy. He has, however, 
given up the idea that we can find a first principle, and then proceed from there, as if we 
were doing a geometry proof. With respect to Holderlin's meetings with Schelling in late 
1795, this fact is crucial, for his letters to Niethammer show quite clearly that he saw 
Schelling's On the Possibility of a Form of all Philosophy, and, most likely, On the I as 
Principle of Philosophy as dragged down by just this sort of "methodological monism." 
However, by December of 1795, he apparently believed that the faults of Schelling's first 
book had been remedied. He wrote to Niethammer in December that "Schelling, as you 
990 
may know, has defected a bit from his original convictions." And a few months later, 
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he noted that, although he and Schelling were "not always in accord with one another," 
Schelling had, "with his new convictions, gone down a better road, without ever reaching 
the destination on the worse one."230 There is little doubt that the finest example of 
Schelling's departure from his earlier Grundsatzphilosophie is the Philosophical Letters 
on Dogmaticism and Criticism. Henrich argues that this departure actually took place in 
On the I, but there are good reasons to doubt this. First, Holderlin's positive reports to 
Niethammer came at a time when Schelling had already begun work on the Philosophical 
Letters.231 Secondly, if Holderlin was tepid about accepting Fichte's claim that the I = 
Spinoza's substance, he would have been utterly repelled by On the I, which makes that 
very claim in stronger language than Fichte ever desired. In that text, Schelling had 
stated: 
If substance is the same as the unconditional, then the I is 
the only substance. If there were several substances there 
would be an I outside the I, which makes no sense. 
Therefore everything that is is in the I, and outside the I is 
nothing. For the I contains all reality... .Therefore 
everything is in the I.232 
Based on this passage alone, if Holderlin merely "suspected" Fichte of dogmatism, he 
most certainly would have convicted Schelling of the same offense. Therefore, it is likely 
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that the text expressing Schelling's "new convictions" is not On the /but the eclectic 
Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. 
The varying subject material of this text betrays the fact that Schelling composed 
the Philosophical Letters over a long period of time. Indeed, the work itself was 
published in two separate installments in Neithammer's Philosophisches Journal. 
Written as an imagined correspondence with a friend—one can easily imagine Holderlin 
as the recipient of the letters—the text is united insofar as Kant is the lynchpin.234 The 
first four letters, composed while Schelling was still awaiting his final exams at the 
Stiff235, are primarily attacks on the Tubingen Kantians who had, according to Schelling, 
lapsed into a new form of dogmatism, one vastly inferior even to the old dogmatism of 
Spinoza, Leibniz and Wolff. As we saw in the previous chapter, Gottlob Christian Storr 
was the most powerful force in the Stift, and at first, he had no urge to use Kant to 
buttress his orthodoxy. But his students clearly saw the incompatibility of Storr's biblical 
literalism with Kant's teachings. After all, "What opposition could be both greater and 
clearer than the one between Storr's insistence on the divine authority of the word and 
Kant's principle of the autonomy of reason?" But as Kant became more famous and 
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more powerful, more philosophically inclined professors like Johan Friedrich Flatt and 
students like Schelling's classmate Susskind began to incorporate Kant's moral 
philosophy into their own theological systems. Storr, originally uninterested in Kant, 
accepted these innovations. This incensed Schelling, and he complained to Hegel that 
there were now "hordes of Kantians" in Tubingen, all of whom "have taken some of the 
ingredients of the Kantian system (from the surface, of course)" in order to create 
"powerful philosophical soups (kraftige philosophische Brtihen)" which rendered 
theology stronger than ever.237 Schelling ridiculed these "philosophical soups" in the 
Letters. And along with this harsh condemnation of his Tubingen teachers and 
colleagues comes a powerful argument against the possibility of any supramundane God. 
Indeed, if one wanted to label Schelling an atheist, the first part of the Philosophical 
Letters—with its sneering rejection of a "moral God"—would provide compelling 
evidence. At the very least, Schelling was advancing an extremely heterodox conception 
of God. 
In the remaining letters, Schelling examines the theoretical and practical claims of 
dogmatism and criticism. According to Schelling, these are the only possible 
philosophical systems. Considering his reputation as a disciple of Fichte, he comes to a 
surprising conclusion: neither dogmatism nor criticism can be refuted, either theoretically 
or practically. Furthermore, both systems lead to the same endpoint: the complete 
vanishing of the objective world. These contentions are inseparable from Schelling's 
interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, which he sees as merely the "canon" of all 
(i.e. both) possible philosophical systems. But although he goes to great lengths to 
Schelling to Hegel (6 January 1795), BuD, II, 56. 
establish the irrefutability of both systems, in the end, he sides with criticism. Criticism, 
Schelling maintains, can avoid arriving at the disastrous consequences of dogmatism so 
long as it refuses to imagine its endpoint as either attained or attainable. By preserving 
the possibility of an infinite struggle against the objective world, criticism safeguards 
human freedom. Schelling even leaves open the possibility that someday, when all 
people stand on the same level of freedom, dogmatism will disappear. Thus, despite its 
theoretical agnosticism, the Philosophical Letters openly favors the system of criticism. 
Before delving into a close examination of the text, a few points must be made 
clear: first, the Philosophical Letters, as we saw from Holderlin's newfound approval of 
Schelling's philosophical path, represents a definite departure from the 
Grundsatzphilosophie of his previous major philosophical works. The Letters seek no 
first principle for philosophy; in fact, they establish that opposing principles can lead to 
the same endpoint. Furthermore, Schelling argues that the principles of a system are not 
set up by theoretical reason and then followed out to their logical implications. Rather, 
whatever principle one chooses, one does so by an activity prior to the establishment of 
the principle. Second, the Philosophical Letters incorporates an incorrect yet fruitful 
misreading of Kant's critical philosophy. Schelling sees Kant as revolutionary even 
when the implications of his moral philosophy tend towards orthodoxy, and as we will 
see, Schelling dismisses Kant's staunch rejection of dogmatism by a mere change in 
vocabulary. Of course, Schelling is not alone in this creative misreading of Kant: it is a 
central feature of all German Idealist speculation.238 A last point to keep in mind is a 
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cautionary one. It would be a mistake to read'the Philosophical Letters as a drastic 
departure from Fichte. Some commentators have identified this text as the ultimate 
source of the later schism between Fichte and Schelling, but this is overstating the 
case.239 Surely, it may have shocked Fichte to see his supposed disciple admitting that 
dogmatism is irrefutable, and surely Schelling incorporated some of Holderlin's 
criticisms of Fichte within this work. But the Philosophical Letters still retains a 
Fichtean tone in the sense that it is primarily an ethical tract: Schelling argues that reality 
is obtained not theoretically but practically, not through knowledge but through 
productivity.240 In the end, the Fichtean notion of infinite striving is for Schelling the 
guarantor of the legitimacy of criticism. 
PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS, PART I 
The first four letters are, as mentioned above, an attack on the Tubingen Kantians, at 
times hinting at outright atheism. The assault is one of the most scathing in Schelling's 
works. Although he does not mention them by name, Schelling clearly targets his 
"Kantian" teachers Storr and Flatt, as well as his classmates Siisskind and Rapp. To 
the Critique of Pure Reason. The idealists, however, did attempt to do more here." Fichte, Schelling, and 
Hegel all "believed, accordingly, in a hidden, secret teaching of Kant...." Henrich, Between Kant and 
Hegel, 44. 
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Schelling, these men are imposters and not really Kantians at all.241 They are a new 
breed of dogmatists and pose a danger to those who would unwittingly become their 
allies; as such, they should be shunned by those who embrace the advance of reason and 
freedom. 
The time has come to part company so that we may no 
longer nourish in our midst a secret enemy who, laying 
down his arms here, takes up new weapons elsewhere in 
order to massacre us, not in the open field of reason, but in 
the recesses of superstition.. ..The time has come to make 
the freedom of minds known to the better kind of men and 
949 
to stop man from deploring the loss of his fetters. 
Schelling identifies two major problems with their interpretation of Kant. First, they 
falsely imagine that Kant emphasized the weakness of reason, and they rejoice in what 
they perceive as a resulting license to maintain their old prejudices. Whatever they 
"cannot prove," they simply "mark with the stamp of practical reason.. .."243 But in doing 
so, they are perverting Kant's revolutionary teachings. According to Schelling, 
interpreting Kant solely as the man who "found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order 
to make room for faith," misses the point.244 
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"[Kant's] system has been misunderstood or misused; it has 
been perverted into conventional phrases and preachers' 
litanies.. ..If Kant meant to say: Dear people, your 
(theoretical) reason is too feeble to comprehend a God, but 
even so you ought to be morally good people, and for the 
sake of morality you ought to assume a Being who rewards 
the virtuous and punishes the vicious—if Kant meant to say 
nothing but this, then there was nothing unexpected, 
uncommon, or unheard of in Kant."245 
In Schelling's estimation, the revolutionary aspect of Kant proclaimed not the weakness 
of reason but its strength, and when the "new dogmatists" appeal to Kant in order to 
justify their old religious beliefs, they betray their intellectual laziness and lack of 
character.246 "Give me the old honest Wolffian!" says Schelling—at least the Wolffians 
regarded those who "had no faith in their own demonstrations" as "lacking all 
philosophical sense."247 The new dogmatists, on the other hand, rejoice in the "weakness 
of their demonstrations," for that weakness, in their estimation, guarantees theological 
dogma. The "weak reason" they embrace, however, is nothing to be proud of. ".. .weak 
reason is not a reason which cannot know an objective God, but a reason which desires to 
know one."248 
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Besides mocking the "weak reason" of his "secret enemies," Schelling argues that 
their "moral God" is incompatible with human freedom. This argument is 
incomprehensible unless one has Spinoza in mind. For Schelling, the only possible 
objective God (a God outside of the I) is that of the Ethics, which is equivalent to 
"absolute causality." Spinoza rejected human freedom precisely because he believed in 
this "absolute causality" located solely within God. Schelling sees the pseudo-Kantians 
as unwittingly rejecting human freedom as well. They want to preserve orthodox 
religion, and thus invoke God because they believe him necessary for morality. They 
presuppose a "moral God" who has created, along with everything else, the moral law 
itself. But in doing so, they negate their own freedom. If the only possible "God" is the 
first and only cause, then just as in Spinoza's system, human beings are merely 
modifications of the divine and have no causal power of their own. Hence, their 
argument is a reductio ad absurdum, negating its own premise. The only way to 
maintain consistency is to postulate a moral law higher than any God. What Storr and 
Flatt should do is begin their system with the moral law and have God come 
afterwards.249 
As radical as it may seem, even this unorthodox version of the practical postulate 
seems flawed to Schelling. In the second letter, Schelling argues that free action can 
never be understood in terms of God. When we act freely, he claims, we do so 
independently and before any conception of God. If one acts and then believes in God 
afterwards, "[God's] causality has rendered your own null." Thus, Schelling seems 
shockingly close to one of Sartre's arguments for atheism: if God exists, his absolute 
2 4 9
^,I,3,54. 
causality renders our own freedom impossible. At the very least, the only possible God is 
one immanent in the subject. It should come as no surprise that Schelling chose to 
publish these letters anonymously—he was still living in Tubingen, preparing for his 
examinations by the very same "secret enemies" he lambasted in the text.250 
In spite of the apparent force of his argument about God and freedom, there is an 
ambiguity in Schelling's condemnation of a "moral God." Despite the famous distinction 
between the "spirit" and the "letter" of the Kantian philosophy, made not only by Fichte 
but by Schelling himself, he is not on firm Kantian footing. It is clear that Schelling is 
not defending Kantian moral philosophy, but using it to advance an even more radical 
conception of the moral law.251 In §87 through §89 of the Critique of Judgment, a text 
which Schelling knew very well, Kant had discussed the "moral proof of the existence 
of God.252 According to Kant, the moral law alone obligates us to be virtuous, "but it 
also determines for us, and a priori, a final purpose, and makes it obligatory for us to 
strive toward [achieving] it.. .."253 This final purpose is the highest good, but 
unfortunately, the physical world seldom rewards men with the happiness that should 
accompany virtue. In Kant's words, "the concept of the practical necessity of 
[achieving] such a purpose by applying our forces does not harmonize with the 
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theoretical concept of the physical possibility of its being achieved.. .."254 Kant says we 
must presuppose the existence of something beyond the mere causality of nature which 
will ensure "a happiness of rational beings that harmoniously accompanies their 
compliance with the moral law."255 Something supernatural must be invoked: "We must 
assume a moral cause of the world.. .in other words, that there is a God."256 Thus, God is 
brought in solely as a means to give us hope that virtue will—at some point at least—be 
rewarded with happiness. 
Unlike the "proofs" of the Tubingen pseudo-Kantians, however, Kant's proof was 
not a theoretical one. The inference we make about the existence of God is made only 
"for [the use of] judgment in accordance with concepts of practical reason, and hence for 
reflective rather than determinative judgment." Furthermore, Kant distinguishes 
between the assumption of a "moral basis for assuming a final purpose of creation" and a 
"moral being as the original basis of creation." The former is legitimate, while the latter 
is a misuse of reason. Kant never ceased to emphasize the theoretical impossibility of 
proving God's existence: 
Hence it is merely^br the practical use of our reason that 
we have established sufficiently the actuality of a supreme 
author who legislates morally, and we have not determined 
Kant, AA,V: 450. 
Kant,X4,V:451. 
Kant, AA, V: 450. 
Kant, AA, V: 455. 
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anything theoretically regarding the existence of this 
author.258 
It is precisely this restriction of theoretical reason that, according to Kant, prevents 
theology from becoming mere superstition.259 
Schelling is thus correct in condemning the Tubingen Kantians for their misuse of 
practical postulates. He is also right to insist that they make the moral law higher than 
any God; this has firm foundations in Kant's teachings. Indeed, Kant explicitly states 
that he is "not trying to say that it is as necessary to assume that God exists as it is to 
acknowledge that the moral law is valid.. ,."260 The moral law always comes first for 
Kant, and God is brought in afterwards to secure the correspondence of happiness and 
virtue. This is again related to Kant's insistence on restricting theoretical reason's access 
to God: 
But as far as religion is concerned, i.e., morality in relation 
to God as legislator, [the benefit of restricting reason's 
theoretical claims is this]: if we had to cognize God before 
[having morality], then morality would have to be governed 
by theology: not only would we have to replace an inner 
[and] necessary legislation of reason by an introduced 
external and arbitrary legislation of a supreme being, but all 
the deficiencies of our insight into the nature of this being 
Kant, AA,V, 456. 
Kant, AA.V, 459. 
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would have to affect the ethical precept[s] in this legislation 
and so pervert religion and make it immoral. 
Thus, two of Schelling's main criticisms seem to be in accordance with Kantian 
doctrine. Still, according to Schelling, even a post-hoc assumption of an external, 
objective God negates human freedom. This is radically un-Kantian. In essence, 
Schellign has taken Kant's argument a step further. Kant believes that, in order to make 
sense of our own moral efforts, we could assume a creator of the world, "even if only for 
the sake of avoiding the risk of [having to] regard that striving as wholly futile in its 
effects and of therefore allowing it to flag." This, we have seen, is grounded in Kant's 
worry that natural causality cannot be relied upon to reward virtue with happiness. 
Schelling, on the other hand, not only disapproves of a theoretical proof of an external 
God, but opposes its practical proof as well, since it would negate our own freedom. 
This is intimately related to Schelling's dismissal of Kant's worries about happiness. In 
the eighth letter, he bluntly states that the idea of rewarding virtuous men with happiness 
is a "moral delusion."262 This attitude stems from Schelling's association of happiness 
with passivity rather than with action and freedom—the happy man is one kindly acted 
upon by objects, not a free actor. 
.. .happiness, as long as it can reward us at all, is a 
happiness not as yet brought to pass by reason itself (how 
were reason and happiness ever to meet?)—a happiness, 
Kant, AA.V, 446. 
AA, I, 3, 92. 
therefore, which no longer has any value in the eyes of a 
reasonable being.263 
Given his total dismissal of Kant's anxiety over the relationship between virtue 
and happiness, it is not surprising that Schelling does, if only briefly, insinuate that Kant 
is not totally innocent of Storr and Flatt's theological crimes. In letter five, Schelling 
admonishes Kant for agreeing with the "spirit of the age," in which the new dogmatists 
claimed only to think what the older dogmatists thought they could know.264 This method 
"was to be applied by Kant himself to the thus renewed system of dogmatism rather than 
to the system of criticism first founded by him." In Schelling's estimation, Kant had 
unwittingly stumbled upon a system which he subsequently abandoned in favor of 
orthodoxy. Schelling's cryptic comment, unfortunately, does not identify where Kant 
had gone off his "revolutionary" track. Nonetheless, it is certain that the conflict between 
the idealized Kant and the real Kant looms large in the Philosophical Letters, and is 
wholly symptomatic of the ambiguous role Kant played in the construction of German 
Idealism. And if Schelling is only partially on firm Kantian footing in the first four 
letters—at least in the sense that he emphasizes that the moral law should come before 
God—he forfeits every bit of it in letters five through ten. There, his "creative 
misreading" of the sage of Konigsberg reaches new heights. 
AA,l,3,93. 
AA, l, 3, 71. 
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PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS, PART II 
In the first four Philosophical Letters, Schelling focused largely on the misuse of Kant 
and hardly discussed the Absolute, which was central to On the I. Remember that, in that 
work, Schelling argued that where one locates the Absolute is of crucial importance. In 
the remaining Philosophical Letters, he returns to this topic. All philosophies, he insists, 
are ways of dealing with the problem of the Absolute, and the Critique of Pure Reason is 
no exception. Kant's question about the possibility of synthetic judgments is, according 
to Schelling, really a question about the relationship between the / and the Absolute: 
"How do lever come to egress from the absolute, and to progress toward an 
opposite?"266 To put that incredibly esoteric into ordinary language: why does anything 
exist all, and how does consciousness—without which there is no difference between 
knower and known—arise? One way to answer this question is through 
Naturphilosophie, which explains how inorganic matter ascends to the level of living, 
conscious organisms. But Schelling is not yet equipped to answer the question in that 
way, and he sticks to the method of transcendental philosophy for the time being. 
Schelling wants the reader to remember that philosophy begins with a division between 
subject and object, that Ur-teilung which figured so prominently in Holderlin's Judgment 
and Being. Because theoretical reason always seeks the unconditioned, every possible 
philosophical system strives towards an overcoming of this division, towards that which 
is prior to and higher than this division. There are two possible ways philosophy can 
reach this goal: the object must become identical with the subject, or vice versa. "Either 
AA, I, 3, 60. 
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no subject and an absolute object, or no object and an absolute subject."267 The former is 
the path of dogmatism, while the latter is the path of criticism. 
Schelling maintains that the Critique of Pure Reason leaves both options open, 
precisely because it is too limited in its scope. In the schema of the Philosophical 
Letters, he traces the following four steps leading from the absolute to human experience: 
Absolute Unity -> Manifold -> Synthesis -^ Empirical Unity 
The division of or egress from the absolute leaves us with a manifold in need of 
cohesiveness, data in need of organization. The mind, in turn, imposes a synthesis on the 
manifold in order to yield coherent experience. Anyone familiar with the Critique of 
Pure Reason should recognize elements of Schelling's sketch in Kant's Transcendental 
Deductions.268 But Schelling finds fault with Kant's method, for it is a critique of the 
cognitive faculty alone, one which concerns itself only with the "formal acts of the 
subject."269 Consequently, "Instead of deducing the formal and the material steps of all 
synthesis from a principle at the base of both steps, the critique of the cognitive faculty 
explains the progress of one synthesis by that of the other."270 Kant doesn't try to get to 
267
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the ultimate root of philosophy, a root which determines both content and form. In 
essence, this is a repetition of Schelling's argument in On the Possibility of a Form of all 
Philosophy, where he says that the absolute axiom of philosophy, the self-positing I, must 
determine both content and form simultaneously. Kant never aspires to this, instead 
staying on a lower level concerned only with the way the subject thinks. Thus, Kant is 
unable to overcome the division between subject and object and fulfill theoretical 
reason's demand that philosophy should arrive at the unconditioned. 
Schelling's talk about synthesizing a divided absolute unity hints at the role 
Holderlin played in the composition of the Philosophical Letters. Holderlin's theory of 
"Ur-Teilung" apparently suggested to Schelling that he could explicate the problems of 
the Kantian philosophy in a new framework, that of an "original conflict within the 
mind."271 Thus arose the radical transformation of Kant's question about the possibility 
of synthetic a priori judgments into a question about egress from the absolute. This new 
formulation is, however, "clearly incompatible with Kant's theory."272 But Schelling, 
perhaps subconsciously invoking the spirit/letter distinction, believes that the Critique of 
Pure Reason supported his position. 
Schelling's fifth and sixth letters further develop the argument that the Critique of 
Pure Reason supports both criticism and dogmatism. As Schelling states succinctly, 
.. .the Critique is destined to deduce from the essence of 
reason the very possibility of two exactly opposed systems; 
it is destined to establish a system of criticism (conceived 
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as complete), or, more precisely, a system of idealism as 
well as and in exact opposition to it, a system of dogmatism 
or realism.273 
Kant correctly demonstrated—at least according to Schelling—that the conflict between 
criticism and dogmatism is impossible to decide in the realm of theoretical reason. But 
given Kant's obvious prejudice against dogmatism, how does Schelling's interpretation 
square with the Critique of Pure Reason?274 Schelling slyly explains the inconsistency 
away by inventing a new word! What Kant "really meant" by "dogmatism" was what 
Schelling termed "dogmaticism," or unsophisticated and unexamined speculation.275 
Therefore, since Kant was really attacking "dogmaticism" when he referred to 
"dogmatism," Schelling's interpretation is safe: the Critique indeed leads both ways. As 
a result, practical postulates can be used by both criticism and dogmatism; in fact, 
practical postulates are necessary for both. Since theoretical reason cannot decide the 
contest between the two systems, it must be transferred to the realm of practice. Even 
Spinoza knew this, and this is precisely why he called his system an Ethics. He correctly 
realized that "No man can convince himself of any system except practically, that is, by 
realizing either system in himself. " 
27iAA, 1,3, 69. 
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This demand that "we must be what we call ourselves theoretically" rears its head 
again in letter six.277 Recalling his earlier statement that we must make the absolute 
either a subject or an object, Schelling buttresses his argument about the 
indemonstrability of either system. We cannot prove what the absolute is, because proofs 
exist in the realm of the conditional. The absolute is unconditional and therefore we 
cannot prove anything about what it is or isn't. Furthermore, the contest between systems 
cannot even be resolved by a "choice." "Choosing" would imply that we simply pick a 
first principle and follow its implications. Our freedom will lead us to one system or 
another and we will live that system. "We should not establish these principles unless our 
freedom had already decided about them.. .."278 And as long as humans exist as they do 
now, both systems will continue to exist: 
Either of the two absolutely opposed systems, dogmatism 
and criticism, is just as possible as the other, and both will 
coexist as long as finite beings do not all stand on the same 
level of freedom. That is my thesis, and this, briefly, is my 
reason: both systems have the same problem, and this 
problem cannot be solved theoretically, but only 
practically, that is, through freedom. Now, only two 
solutions are possible; one of them leads to criticism, the 






This quotation, concise and powerful, could serve as a short summation of the entire 
Philosophical Letters. 
Although Schelling is careful to remain balanced in his assessment of the 
weaknesses of both dogmatism and criticism, there is no doubt that, contrary to what 
Fichte may have feared, Schelling opts for the latter as the better of the two systems. 
Indeed, the passage quoted above implies that there will eventually be a day when all 
human beings "stand on the same level of freedom" and presumably live the system of 
criticism. Furthermore, Schelling investigates the "ethics of dogmatism" in an essentially 
negative light, reminding the reader that Spinoza's embrace of an absolute object is the 
common principle of all Schwarmerei.2S0 The ethical imperative that Spinoza and other 
Schwarmer embrace is "Annihilate thyself!"281 Schelling describes this as a "destructive 
and annihilating principle,"282 and though he admires Spinoza for his ability to be 
cheerful in light of something so horrible, he nevertheless insists that this idea of self-
annihilation is the spot on which "The most sacred thoughts of antiquity and the 
phantoms of human insanity meet.. ,."283 Furthermore, although Schelling will later 
AA, I ,3, 85, 86, 90 for example. Schwarmerei, which is usually translated as "enthusiasm," was a 
standard pejorative word in the eighteenth century, used to deprecate either religious fanatics or anyone 
deemed unphilosophical. Kant did not hesitate to refer to Herder as a Schwarmer. 
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admit that criticism could also become Schwarmerei, he believes dogmatism rests upon 
an error in the interpretation of intellectual intuition. 
Schelling maintains that "We all have a secret and wondrous capacity of 
withdrawing from temporal change into our innermost self.. ,."284 In this intuition, 
subject and object are temporarily united, for in this state "I cease to be an object for 
myself."285 Spinoza, Schelling argues, objectifies this intellectual intuition and imagines 
that the identity has been gained at the expense of his own self: he believes that he has 
been swallowed up by the absolute object! At this point, the reader would expect that 
Schelling would excuse Spinoza's interpretation and declare that one can choose two 
paths. Quite the opposite: Schelling calls Spinoza's interpretation of this experience a 
delusion: 
Believing this, [Spinoza] deceived himself. It was not he 
who had vanished in the intuition of the absolute object. 
On the contrary, everything objective had vanished for him, 
in the intuition of himself. 
So, in spite of Schelling's ardent defense of the theoretical irrefutability of dogmatism, he 
does identify its objectification of intellectual intuition as a fundamental error and betrays 
himself as a proponent of criticism. By the time the reader reaches Letter 9, she sees that 
2 8 4
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Schelling reverts to his Fichtean beginnings and sides with criticism, offering a way in 
which criticism can avoid the pitfalls of Schwarmerei. 
Schelling begins Letter 9 with an important admission. Criticism, like 
dogmatism, can fall into Schwarmerei. If dogmatism explicitly demands that we 
annihilate ourselves as subjects, criticism indirectly leads to the same result; the abolition 
of the division between subject and object, the attainment of the absolute, obliterates 
both. Criticism demands "that everything called object shall vanish in the intellectual 
intuition of myself. In either case, every object is lost for me, and therewith also the 
consciousness of myself as subject. My reality vanishes in the infinite reality."287 
Surprisingly, the seemingly opposite paths of dogmatism and criticism lead to a single 
endpoint. At this juncture, the agnosticism of the Philosophical Letters reaches its high 
water mark, for Schelling will quickly move to establish that, in spite of this convergence 
of the two systems, criticism can be preserved as superior. Schelling jumps from a 
concise formulation of that agnosticism to his modified version of criticism: 
Thus it is confirmed throughout that all contradicting 
systems become identical as soon as one rises to the 
absolute. All the more urgent becomes your question, 
Wherein does criticism excel dogmatism, if both meet 
anyway in the same ultimate goal, in the last aim of all 
philosophizing?288 
AA, I, 3, 97. 
AA,l,3, 101. 
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The answer to the question is this: criticism can be superior so long as it never envisions 
its goal, the attainment of the absolute, as either attained or attainable. If it makes these 
mistakes, it becomes dogmatism, and "Philosophy is abandoned to all the horrors of 
Schwdrmerei." Schelling demands—just like his teacher Fichte—that humanity live in 
a state of infinite striving. 
Criticism, therefore, differs from dogmatism, not in the 
ultimate goal which both of them set up, but in the 
approach to it, in the realization of it, in the spirit of 
criticism's own practical postulates. Only the immanent 
use which we make of the principle of the absolute in 
practical philosophy for the knowledge of our vocation 
gives us the right to proceed unto the absolute.290 
Thus, though some scholars see the Philosophical Letters as a crucial departure from 
Fichte, the ninth letter makes it quite clear that Schelling has no intention—yet—of 
abandoning his hero. And with his approval of criticism now on the table, he makes an 
open assault on dogmatic philosophy in letter ten. 
Letter ten recalls the opening of letter one. Dogmatism is passivity in the face of 
an objective absolute, while Greek tragedy is one of the finest examples of resistance to 
it. Still, for the vast majority of humanity, the ideals of Greek tragedy—the simultaneous 
acceptance of and battle with fate—would lead only to despair. Only a "race of titans" 
could cope with a life in which we have no power over the objective world.291 Therefore, 
mAA,l,3,102. 
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we must embrace freedom. We must not surrender to the objective absolute, not 
disappear in its arms. And we must certainly not conjure up new justifications for our 
pre-critical beliefs. We must fight against the new dogmatists, for their "moral God" 
with its concomitant abolition of our causal powers is no less threatening to our freedom 
than Spinoza's open and honest surrender of his own subjectivity. We must "bring into 
the open these results of dogmatism" so that its repugnant consequences are obvious. "In 
this alone lies the last hope for the deliverance of humanity." 
This provocative and final battle cry is followed by hints of Schelling's future 
projects. For according to Schelling, it is only the victory of criticism and the 
supersession of this conflict—one which cannot be won theoretically but only in 
practice—that allows us feel at home in the world, and indeed be able to know it. "We 
feel freer in spirit if we now return from the state of speculation to the enjoyment and 
exploration of nature without fear that the ever-recurring anxiety of our unsatisfied spirit 
might lead us back into that unnatural state."293 This is a powerful clue that Schelling did 
not simply stumble upon natural science in Leipzig, but that he rather envisioned a turn 
towards nature once theoretical questions had been settled. Thus the Philosophical 
Letters end with a simultaneous reaffirmation of Fichte's ideal of infinite striving and 
foreshadowing of Schelling's eventual departure into the seas of Naturphilosophie. 
The Philosophical Letters are therefore eclectic but significant. They are the 
evidence of Schelling's own philosophical transformation as he finished his studies and 




disdain for the orthodoxy of his teachers at Tubingen. But they also represent an 
increasing willingness to "creatively misinterpret" Kant's works. He suggests that Kant's 
system, which was too limited in scope, sanctions both dogmatism and criticism, and that 
real philosophy must go further. Finally, the Philosophical Letters are evidence of 
Schelling's departure from Reinhold's and Fichte's Grundsatzphilosophie. As I have 
shown, he was indebted to Holderlin in this respect. Nevertheless, despite this change in 
attitude, one should not suggest—as Reinhard Lauth does—that this text laid the seeds 
for the destruction of the Fichte-Schelling alliance. Despite all the innovations of the 
Philosophical Letters, Schelling ends on a Fichtean note, clearly siding with criticism and 
recapitulating Fichte's idea of infinite striving. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the 
text, at least in the context of this dissertation, is Schelling's cryptic reference to the 
exploration of nature in letter ten. This passage shows that Schelling may already have 
been deeply interested in natural science in 1796. This hypothesis will be borne out again 
in the Oldest Systemprogram of German Idealism, which despite its brevity contains a 
stunning demand that we change the way we view the natural world. 
THE OLDEST SYSTEM-PROGRAM 
If the Philosophical Letters can be read as a document of Holderlin's influence on the 
young Schelling, this is no less true of the famous "Oldest System Program of German 
Idealism," a text found in Hegel's handwriting but which was most likely written by 
Schelling.294 The text begins by proclaiming the primacy of practical reason, "of which 
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 "Das sogannte 'Alteste Systemprogramm,'" in Materialien zu Schellings philosophischen Anfdngen, ed. 
Manfred Frank and Gerhard Kurz, (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1975). Franz Rosenzweig, the discoverer of 
the fragment, was certainly convinced of Schelling's authorship. I do not intend to render a decisive 
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fully appreciates this primacy, will constitute a "complete system of all ideas. The first 
of these ideas, the author declares, is "the representation of myself as an absolutely free 
being." This free, self-conscious being creates the entire world, a creation which is "the 
only true and thinkable creation out of nothing." At this point, the OSP is on firm 
Fichtean footing. Fichte himself called for a unification of Kant's theoretical and 
practical spheres under the banner of the latter, and his Wissenschaftslehre took the self-
positing I as the ultimate foundation of his system. 
In spite of the Fichtean beginnings of the text, it quickly proceeds to an area 
which was more or less unimportant in the Wissenschaftslehre, namely natural science. 
How, the author asks, "must the world be constituted for a moral being?" In other words, 
how must physics look if it is to be compatible with freedom? Quite simply, we must 
"lend wings to physics once again" by allowing it to progress faster than the typical 
experimental physics allows. The OSP is nothing if not ambitious. For the author now 
moves to the relationship between physics and politics. The state, he says, must always 
treat free human beings as a "mechanical wheelwork," and therefore we must "move 
beyond the state!" by demanding the "absolute freedom of all spirits." Thus, in the space 
of one page, the OSP deals with ethics, physics, and politics. How are these 
heterogeneous ideas to be unified? The answer is art. "Finally the idea that unites 
the spirit of the text is wholly in line with Schelling's writings in the Stuttgart period. For a comprehensive 
review of the history of this debate, see Frank-Peter Hansen, "Das dlteste Systemprogramm des deutschen 
Idealismus": Rezeptionsgeschichte undInterpretation (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989). Eckhart Forster 
has presented a strong case for Holderlin as the author in his '"To Lend Wings to Physics once again': 
Holderlin and the 'Oldest System-Programme of German Idealism'," European Journal of Philosophy 3 
(1995): 174-198. 
everything is the idea of beauty, taken in the word's highest platonic sense." Philosophy 
itself must become poetry, which is the real educator of mankind: 
I am now convinced that the highest act of reason, insofar 
as it encompasses all ideas, is an aesthetic act, and that 
truth and goodness are only made sisters in beauty—the 
philosopher must therefore possess as much aesthetic 
power as the poet. Men without aesthetic sense are our 
letter-philosophers (BuchstabenPhilosophen).. .Poetry 
thereby attains a higher worth, she becomes in the end what 
she was at the beginning—educator of mankind, for there is 
no philosophy, no more history. Poetry alone will survive 
all the other sciences and arts.295 
To make philosophy truly into poetry, a new religion, a "new mythology" is needed, a 
"mythology of reason" which makes philosophy "sensual." This is the only path by 
which the unphilosophical Volk can be made reasonable. Once this goal is attained, 
then "No power will be suppressed; then, universal freedom and equality will reign!" 
This new religion "will be the last, greatest work of mankind."297 
The Oldest System Program foreshadows a host of developments in Romantic and 
Idealist Philosophy, from Schelling's later philosophy of art to Friedrich Schlegel's and 
Novalis's call for a new mythology upon which to ground society. But once again, we 
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also see a reference to nature which suggests a future plan to frame natural science in a 
way that reinforces human freedom. One of the main problems of Kant's philosophy of 
nature was the way it set up a rigid boundary between (noumenal) free human action and 
the cold necessity of the laws of nature. How can a free being be a causal force in a 
natural world governed solely by mechanical causality? Kant never really answered this 
question, instead insisting on a bland compatibility between the two. Later in this 
dissertation, I will suggest that Schelling dissolves the problem by making the actions of 
nature themselves free and eliminating this boundary line between man and nature. Thus 
the Oldest System Program, like the Philosophical Letters, foreshadow the turn to natural 
science later in Schelling's career. 
SCHELLING AS IDEOLOGUE: THE ROAD TO LEIPZIG 
On March 28,1796, Schelling left Stuttgart along with his students, who were to begin 
their studies at the University of Leipzig. The trip relieved some of the gloominess of 
Schelling's stay in Stuttgart. When his students met up with some old friends in 
Darmstadt, he wrote to his parents that "It pleased me to see their genuine sensibility for 
old friendship burst forth.. ..The love for [my students] goes so far that a part of it passes 
over to their Hofmeister. In two days I've made an abundance of new acquaintances 
through them."298 He finally met with Christian von Gatzert, the guardian of the barons, 
in Darmstadt. Gatzert, he said, told him he appreciated his "New Deduction of Natural 
Right," which Schelling found remarkable. Normally, "With these people, what is 
Schelling to his parents (3 April 1796), BuD II, 87. 
written impresses. That is because they simply babble, but don't learn to think." 
Gatzert, an aristocrat, surprised him by being "a man of spirit and knowledge, and I count 
myself lucky that he is the guardian of my students." Twice, Schelling mentions that he 
hopes to be a buttress against aristocratic behavior, and seems elated with Gatzert's 
orders for him and his students: 
I expected aristocratic pretensions. Not at all! I am to 
educate them like one would educate any other person who 
wants to become a useful, knowledgeable, cultured man. I 
am to nip noble pride and aristocratism in the 
bud... [Gatzert] is familiar with the spirit of the age and 
knows well how the nobility must be secured, in order to 
maintain itself against the rush of the bourgeois class, 
which always comprises an endless majority of useful, 
cultured, knowledgeable and spirit- and talent-filled people. 
Schelling's trepidation over his duties as Hofmeister might seem at first glance to 
be the delusional products of a paranoid, anti-aristocratic Swabian mind. However, it is 
perfectly understandable given the social standing of his pupils and the typical role the 
Hofmeister played in the education of the nobility. In 18th Century Germany, noble 
families often required the Hofmeister to be little more than a travel guide, managing 
their sons' finances and leading them on the Grand Tour. In this case, the cultivation of 
proper aristocratic manners was prioritized, while "methodical, continual, and disciplined 
Schelling to his parents (3 April 1796) 
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intellectual work stood in the background.. .."30° Schelling was fortunate to serve a 
family who, in spite of the possibility of travel to England and France, wanted their sons 
to be educated in a bourgeois manner, with the Hofmeister serving more as a teacher than 
as a tour guide. 
Schelling's anti-aristocratic prejudices were confirmed by his stay in Darmstadt. 
He regaled his parents with tales of aristocratic buffoonery.301 For the most part, the 
population was symptomatic of the degeneration prevalent in an aristocratic city. Even 
the best minds, Schelling reported, enjoyed only "lucida intervalla." For example, the 
philosopher Friedrich Bouterwerk attempted to give lectures on Kant in the city, but half 
his listeners simply slept and the other half didn't understand anything. Even freethinkers 
were pulled down by the city's vices! "The most freethinking head I've met is a 
bookseller and printer, Kramer, who once had contact and dealings with Voltaire, but he, 
too, is drunk all day long."302 Still despite Schelling's bourgeois indignation towards life 
in Darmstadt, he looked forward to going through Frankfurt, where he almost assuredly 
met Holderlin again. From there, he traveled to Jena and Weimar where he was able to 
meet both Schiller and Herder (but unfortunately, not Goethe or Fichte). 
Schelling's arrival in Leipzig was a happy one. He was introduced to many 
"excellent acquaintances" right away, including the "famous doctor and philosopher," 
Ernst Platner, who was then a professor of Medicine at the University. Platner, according 
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to Schelling, was "a man who had everything which makes contact with a person 
pleasant: an expressive visage, effortless movements, proficient and refined speech, wit, 
and a treasury of knowledge."303 Platner seemed to have ensnared Schelling into a trap, 
forcing him and his students to listen to his often anti-Kantian teachings. Indeed, 
Schelling indicates to his parents that he is more likely to benefit from Platner's social 
connections than his philosophy.304 Nevertheless, and in no small part due to Platner, 
Leipzig made a good first impression on Schelling. He even compared it favorably to 
Jena, through which he had passed on his journey. While Leipzig was filled with worthy 
architecture, public gardens, music and theater, "the world-renowned Jena" was simply a 
"little town of partly ugly design, where one sees only students, professors, and 
Philistines."305 
THE TURN TO NATURPHILOSOPHIE IN LEIPZIG 
Trying to understand exactly why Schelling devoted himself to Naturphilosophie in late 
1796 and early 1797 requires a great deal of conjecture and speculation. Unfortunately, 
as Horst Fuhrmans states, "'Leipzig,' for us, is Schelling's most unknown period" and 
much about it remains murky.306 Given his past letters to friends like Hegel and 
Niethammer, in which he clearly outlined his philosophical projects, one would expect to 
find his correspondence littered with evidence of his newfound interest in natural science. 
In fact, just the opposite is the case. Not only do we have few letters to begin with— 
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certainly Schelling had little extra time to correspond with anyone, given his own studies 
and those of the Riedesels—but even the extant letters shed no light on his 
Naturphilosophie.307 Schelling only discusses planned books about Leibniz and Kant, or 
his work on the General Overview of the Latest Philosophical Literature, a text I will 
discuss in the next chapter. In fact, what seems to captivate Schelling entirely, at least 
from the summer of 1796 until June of 1797, is his desire to publicly confront the famous 
German Aufklarer, Friedrich Nicolai. Although few works on Schelling even mention 
this episode, a short summary of it seems necessary given its centrality in Schelling's 
correspondence during this period. Indeed, one is almost bewildered by the fact that 
hardly any of his letters from Leipzig^'/ to mention Nicolai. 
The root cause of Schelling's outrage at Nicolai was the eleventh volume of the 
latter's Description of Journey through Germany and Switzerland in the Year 1781, 
which was published in 1796.308 Although it purports to describe the events of 1781, 
Nicolai openly mocks Schelling's father (or, as Nicolai calls him, Magister Schelling the 
First) and equally disparages the philosophy of Friedrich himself (Magister Schelling the 
Second), particularly his On the I as Principle of Philosophy. Nicolai's criticism of 
Schelling's father rests primarily on his early work on the Arabic language. When he 
was only twenty-four, Schelling's father believed that the Arabic language was "the key 
to the proper understanding of the Hebrew language and therefore to the proper 
understanding of the Old Testament."309 Unfortunately, the elder Schelling, who wrote 
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with "a gravity which sometimes descends into comedy," "speculated so deeply into 
Arabic that he couldn't see left or right."310 Nicolai mocks him for not realizing that 
eighteenth century Arabic is very different from original Arabic, a fact which other 
scholars had quite easily exposed. Schelling's father should have realized "that modern 
Arabic scholars have to learn the language of the Koran as a dead language." 
Nicolai's description of Schelling's father lasts only two pages in the original text. 
He dedicates much more space to the son, obliquely attacking Fichte in the process. 
Nicolai notes that Schelling's "profound" On the I owes something to Fichte for his 
discovery of the "important Grundsatz" that "I is I." Schelling, however, "took this great 
discovery to a new level of deduction, which Professor Fichte himself was hardly capable 
of doing, despite [Fichte's] unspeakable capability in the formal deduction of fantasies 
(Hirngespinsten)."312 Nicolai pokes fun at Schelling's "hatred" of empiricism and 
characterizes his search for a Grundsatz as a retreat into the subterranean. Schelling and 
other "critical philosophers" build their systems not "upwards, in the sunlight," but rather 
they burrow into the earth, seeking "ground after ground (Grund unter Grund)" so that 
the "main story (Bel - etage)" of their system is located in "the darkest cellar."313 There, 
they do not seek the sunlight, but rather prefer the "dim little lamps of their formal 
deductions, which shimmer through their musty cellars."314 Nicolai's critique is through 
and through that of an empiricist. One has the data of the world in front of us, and thus 
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we need no subterranean tunneling to see the ground of this everyday experience. 
Nicolai contends that: 
It seems to me that the profound Indian philosophy, which 
through its transcendental contemplation in the end goes 
only far enough to see the tip of its own nose, and which is 
impossible for any material, sensual man to understand, is 
completely on the path [of] Professor Fichte and Magister 
Schelling....315 
Furthermore, Nicolai argues that "in truth, Schelling has absolutely nothing in common 
with Kant."316 It should not be surprising that Nicolai's comments, which are throughout 
bitingly satirical, should have incensed the proud young Swabian. Not only did Nicolai 
characterize Schelling's philosophy as an unnecessary "fantasy," but he challenged 
Schelling's fundamental belief that he was completing Kant's philosophical project. In 
addition, Schelling most likely felt a more mundane threat from Nicolai's criticisms: he 
may have feared that a souring of his reputation could cost him his job with the 
Riedesels.317 
Schelling's reaction to Nicolai's Reisebeschreibung was quick. On May 8,1796, 
he began his letter to Niethammer expressing his "great desire" to respond to Nicolai's 
criticism, going so far as to ask Niethammer for advice on how to proceed. "The plan is 
for I myself to write letters to Herr Nicolai. I hope [I can find] a publisher here to take 
Nicolai, GW, 20, 128. 
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them. Could you recommend one to me.. .?"318 Schelling also asked Niethammer to 
announce his plans in the Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung and the Intelligenzblatt. In his 
next letter to Niethammer, he returns to the subject of Nicolai without pause. "My only 
intention is to publicly ridicule that book-dawdler (jenen Biichervertrodler an liter. 
Pranger zu stellen). Because the rabble always assembles where there is something to 
gape and laugh at, they will surely assemble at the pillorying of Nicolai."319 Schelling 
rambles on, again noting that he will "prove Nicolai's ignorance," and judging from the 
letter, he sent something to Niethammer which has not survived. Schelling orders 
Niethammer: "If the document which you have in your hands is appropriate to bring 
before the public, don't hold it back."320 Apparently Niethammer judged that it shouldn't 
be published, but Schelling continued to write out drafts of his "fragments on Nicolai."321 
He even reassured his father in February of 1797 that "[The answer to Nicolai] lays on 
my desk, written and ready. There are good reasons it is being held back from this book 
fair; all the more certain it will come out next summer."322 
The public confrontation with Nicolai never occurred, and Schelling's furious 
work on an attack-piece apparently did not hinder his composition of the Ideas for 
Philosophy of Nature, whose completion he reported to Niethammer on June 4,1797.323 
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While we lack extensive evidence—even in spite of the hints in the Philosophical Letters 
and the Oldest System Program—about why Schelling turned to nature in the first place, 
we can piece together an account of the professors he learned from at Leipzig. Plitt noted 
that Schelling's first year of scientific studies in Leipzig focused on mathematics, 
physics, and chemistry, while the second focused on physiology.324 Perhaps this order 
sheds light on the structure of the Ideas, which tends heavily towards physics and 
chemistry and barely mentions the organic—a concept which would dominate his later 
works of Naturphilosophie. Despite the paucity of sources on Schelling's Leipzig period, 
one can still piece together a rudimentary account of his intellectual activities there. A 
number of professors at the University provided the scientific groundwork upon which 
Schelling would draw in his philosophy of nature. Therefore, at this point we enter the 
often unfamiliar world of eighteenth century science, a world which almost all English-
speaking scholars prefer to ignore, either because they lack even a rudimentary 
knowledge of it, or because their projects are too broad to incorporate it.325 They never 
mention the dozens of scientists whose works Schelling studied while composing his 
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Naturphilosophie, and neither do they mention contemporary scientists like Cristoph 
Heinrich Pfaff or Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer, with whom Schelling shared a mutual 
respect. This is a grave defect in the existing Schelling literature, and one which the 
following chapter will remedy. Not only will I chronicle Schelling's interactions with his 
professors at Leipzig, who themselves were allied to particular schools of eighteenth 
century scientific thought, I will give the 21st Century reader the context necessary to 
fully understand the larger scientific context of Schelling's Naturphilosophie from 1797 
to 1802. I will also examine another intermediary philosophical text, the General 
Overview of the Latest Philosophical Literature, which was composed alongside 
Schelling's scientific studies in his early Leipzig period. 
132 
Chapter 4: Schelling and Eighteenth Century Natural Science 
NEWTON AND NEWTONIANISMS 
No one in history dominated the opening of a new age the way Isaac Newton dominated 
the early years of the Eighteenth Century. He successfully united terrestrial and celestial 
mechanics and laid bare the workings of nature on a scale hitherto deemed impossible, 
leading Pope to declare famously that, after the arrival of Newton, "all was light."326 
With the publication of the Principia in 1687, Newton became the most important man in 
Europe. His staggering success led not only to lionization by his English countrymen, 
but also produced a fervent group of continental admirers who saw Newton's method— 
through which the world was to be understood mathematically, experimentally, and 
mechanically—as the key to unraveling the mysteries of other emerging scientific 
disciplines.327 Newton's dominance was assured not only by his scientific successes but 
by the aid his system lent to supporters of the social and political status quo, who were 
eager to ward off an emerging republican "Radical Enlightenment," born of the English 
civil war and furthered by men like Toland and Collins in England and Spinoza on the 
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continent.328 Newton's very definition of matter as impenetrable and powerless 
buttressed both political and religious orthodoxy.329 For Newton, passivity meant 
imperfection.330 And if matter—the fundamental building block of the natural world—is 
indeed passive, then there are no active powers or forces inherent in nature. Instead, all 
force comes from God's direct and tangible intervention in the world,331 an intervention 
Newton believed was periodically needed to keep the universe in order. From this, 
Newton's followers drew political conclusions: just as God must "impose order" upon 
"dead" matter in order to create a harmonious world, so must a strong monarchy impose 
order upon human individuals in order to create a viable society.333 
Newton's writings, however, were Janus-faced. The deductive, mathematical 
Newton of the Principia—the Newton presented in the orthodox Boyle lectures—was 
complemented by the experimental and sometimes speculative Newton of the General 
Scholium and the Queries. Contra Pope, all things were not yet light, and Newton fully 
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recognized this. The Principia left the cause of gravity unexplained, as well as the cause 
of such phenomena as electricity, magnetism, chemical attraction, and even life. In the 
Opticks, Newton allowed himself to make conjectures he called Queries. Some dealt 
with the nature of light, some with Newton's proposed ether theory, and some, such as 
the massive Query 31, proposed solutions to the puzzles of chemistry and electricity. 
Eighteenth century experimental scientists appreciated the Opticks because they believed 
that research into these hitherto unexplored phenomena could not be conducted 
mathematically. Inductive experimentation was the only conceivable angle of attack. 
Thus, we must be careful when we talk about "Newtonianism" as a homogenous entity. 
As Bernard Cohen reminds us, 
That there were in the eighteenth century two quite 
different traditions of Newtonianism—the hypothetico-
experimental or speculative-experimental tradition 
associated with the Opticks, and the mathematico-deductive 
(although not wholly unempirical) tradition associated with 
the Principia—is plain from studying the respective 
sources of the experimentalists and the mathematical 
physicists in the age of Newton.334 
Thus, it would be a mistake to describe the eighteenth century life sciences, or 
Schelling's Naturphilosophie, as a "revolt against Newton" in general. In fact, Schelling 
was most deeply interested in precisely the sciences (chemistry, electricity, magnetism, 
physiology) whose foundation had been laid by the "hypothetico-experimental" Newton. 
3 3 4 1 . Bernard Cohen, Franklin and Newton, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 179. 
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However, Schelling and others clearly revolted against the other Newton: the Newton of 
the Principia and the Boyle lectures. 
Earlier in the century, a revolt against this other Newton could be downright 
hazardous. The career of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz exemplified this best. Not only did 
Leibniz became embroiled in a bitter controversy with Newton's handlers over the 
discovery of the Calculus, but his metaphysics emphatically rejected the notion that 
matter and motion can fully account for the operations of the physical world, instead 
arguing that "in corporeal things there is something over and above extension, in fact, 
something prior to extension, namely, that force of nature implanted everywhere by the 
Creator."335 Unsurprisingly, when Leibniz's patrons in the House of Hanover became 
English royalty, bringing the "plagiarist" Leibniz along with them was out of the 
question. Doing so would have been political suicide for a foreign-born monarch wary of 
stepping on native toes. Thus, the great polymath remained in Germany and died not as 
a court intellectual, but as a mere librarian! However, the philosophy of Leibniz lived on. 
In Germany, he was the founder—by way of Christian Wolff—of German 
Schulphilosophie. In mathematics, he played a posthumous role in the Vis Viva 
controversy.336 And he was often appropriated by life scientists—sometimes for 
heterodox purposes—who were dissatisfied with the idea of "dead matter." Leibniz's 
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refusal to see matter as powerless no doubt was a reason the young Schelling praised him 
as a prophet of his own deeply unorthodox Naturphilosophie331 
This constant invocation—whether explicit or implict—of Leibniz, Newton's 
greatest opponent, during the eighteenth century, is significant, for it highlights an 
important fact: the story of the life sciences (as well as of chemistry and the physics of 
electricity and magnetism) in that epoch is often the story of the gradual overthrow of the 
mathematical-mechanical paradigm, and Romantic Naturphilosophie can therefore be 
seen as the endpoint of this trajectory. In Leibniz's time, attacking Newton was 
hazardous, yet by 1810 Goethe staked his scientific reputation on a bitter and sometimes 
misguided dismissal of Newton's entire empirical and mathematical approach to natural 
science. Pioneers such as Haller, La Mettrie, Buffon, Herder, and Blumenbach had long 
since made a new understanding of life possible. And although no less a philosopher 
than Kant still clung desperately to Newtonian mechanism as the only way to understand 
natural organisms, by 1780 the majority of life scientists considered this approach less 
than satisfactory.338 
Schelling and Naturphilosophie stand at the end of this sequence, and they 
represent the boldest and most comprehensive rejection of mechanical natural 
philosophy. Although some historians see Romantic Naturphilosophie as the antithesis 
of science or the rejection of what Peter Hans Reill calls "Enlightenment Vitalism," this 
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dissertation will establish just the opposite. Rather than being a manifestation of a 
"Counter-Enlightenment" or the abandonment of a cautious empiricism, Schelling's 
Naturphilosophie was a much-needed reevaluation of the relationship between man and 
nature in the wake of eighteenth century developments in the natural sciences. For all its 
flaws—and there are many—Schelling's Naturphilosophie offers the modern reader a 
new picture of nature, one regrettably lost over the past two centuries. It offers us a 
nature teeming with life, and a nature from which man cannot be divided. Unfortunately, 
seeing the world through Schelling's eyes is almost impossible for a modern reader 
unfamiliar with the science of his time. To facilitate a better understanding of Schelling's 
works from 1797 to 1802, a brief but comprehensive introduction to this sometimes 
bizarre world is needed. What follows is a narrative focused mainly on the life sciences, 
but also encompassing developments in chemistry and physics. 
FROM "NEWTONIAN MEDICINE" TO VITALISM 
Biology was not established as a formal discipline until the early Nineteenth Century; 
indeed, the word "biology" was coined almost simultaneously by Treviranus and 
Lamarck around 1800. What we call "biology" today was, in the early 1700s, largely the 
domain of physicians. During the first half of the Century, the fountainhead of medicine 
in Europe was Leyden, where Hermann Boerhaave, the most important physician on the 
Continent, trained students from across Europe, many of whom, after completing their 
education, returned to their native countries and set up their own medical schools.339 
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Boerhaave was among those on the continent who saw Newton's method as the key to 
attaining knowledge in all sciences, and he intended to carry that method over to 
medicine. Boerhaave believed in interpreting the human body as a machine: he 
contended that the solids and fluids of the body could be described mechanically.340 He 
lavished immense praise upon Hippocrates, but his particular Hippocrates was a construct 
of Boerhaave's own time, one who was dressed in the garb of mechanical philosophy.341 
And although he saw Descartes as an enemy, his so-called iatromechanism has much in 
common with Descartes' own assertion that animals are natural machines. The 
difficulties of this approach are obvious to the.modern reader, and they would soon 
become obvious to some of his best students, who would eventually discard it. 
Nonetheless, Boerhaave's contribution to medicine in the eighteenth century was 
enormous, for although he embraced a flawed method, he standardized medical training 
across Europe and created a network of physicians who would push the life sciences 
forward towards their eventual disciplinization. 
Despite Boerhaave's successes, mechanical medicine did not go unchallenged in 
his lifetime. The most important of his opponents was the German physician Georg Ernst 
Stahl, who created his own medical community at the University of Halle before 
eventually becoming the King of Prussia's personal physician. Stahl's medical 
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philosophy was heavily tinctured by his Pietism, which led him to reject mind-body 
dualism and conceive of the human body as an organic union of soul and matter. In 
Stahl's estimation, "The human body is therefore, in the true sense of the word organic, 
i.e. directed by and towards specific purposes. It is the organ of the soul, determined to 
serve its purposes."343 Stahl's insistence that the body is directed by intelligent purposes 
was anathema to most of his contemporaries. Indeed, Stahl's ideas seemed to flatly 
contradict the tradition of Descartes and Newton344 By rejecting medical theories which 
called for investigation of the human body in terms of matter and motion, Stahl was 
swimming against the current. Because of this, later generations of physiologists 
dismissed him as an arrogant, closed-minded religious fanatic, and modern historians of 
science have stubbornly clung to this characterization.345 Nonetheless, although Stahl's 
medical philosophy smacks of mysticism, residues of his philosophy, including his 
emphasis on the organic, would survive in Enlightenment vitalism and crop up again in 
Romantic Naturphilosophie. 
ALBRECHT VON HALLER'S SUBVERSIVE ORTHODOXY 
If Stahl's religious commitments led him to question Boerhaave's mechanical medicine, 
just the opposite was true in the case of Albrecht von Haller, a Swiss physiologist and 
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student of Boerhaave who became one of the greatest innovators in the Eighteenth 
Century life sciences. Christoph Heinrich Pfaff, a friend of Schelling, went so far as to 
call Haller's work the true beginning of proper physiological research. "Stahl, Glisson, 
and Boerhaave, etc." Pfaff said, were noteworthy, but their systems were characterized 
"mostly by hunches and a bit of reverie [Traumerei]." Haller, on the other hand, "by the 
method of his experiments, opened a new path for natural scientists [Naturforscher], 
which many after him happily followed."346 Haller's greatest contribution was the 
discovery of "irritability," a concept which also played an important role in his opinions 
on embryology. What makes Haller so fascinating is that he embodied the struggle 
between, on the one hand, religious orthodoxy, and on the other, the growing trend 
among life scientists to transfer powers traditionally granted only to God into nature 
itself. Haller's changing views on embryology perfectly capture this inner turmoil, but 
we must first begin by examining his discovery of irritability, a hitherto unrecognized, 
potentially non-mechanical force. 
By 1752, Haller recognized that muscles could contract involuntarily, in response 
to certain stimuli. He reasoned that, because sensibility of feeling played no part in these 
muscular contractions, the muscles themselves must have some force inherent in them. 
He labeled this force "irritability," and, as an admirer of Newton, likened this force to 
gravitation.347 The analogy seemed to be straightforward: in both cases, the effects of 
each force could be observed, and experiments could reveal the laws of their operation. 
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However, the roots of these forces seemed inaccessible to human reason.348 To Haller, 
this seemed consistent with his Calvinist ideology and his belief in a mechanically 
operated world directed by divine providence. Yet there were two major problems with 
his brainchild: first, irritability was inexplicable in terms of mechanical causes, thus 
defying the Newtonian paradigm, and second, the attribution of an inherent force to 
matter created an easily exploitable opening for materialism. If matter could move itself, 
then God was no longer needed to explain the operation of animal bodies. Thus, by 
introducing the "vital force" of irritability into his works, Haller unwittingly contributed 
to the downfall of the philosophy he cherished so dearly.349 Haller's desire to resist the 
materialist implications of his theory no doubt impelled him to convert back to the theory 
of embryological preformation, which buttressed orthodox religion by denying plants and 
animals the power to reproduce. 
Embryological preformationism (commonly referred to as "evolution" in the 
eighteenth century350) appears strange to twenty-first century eyes. Shirley Roe argues 
that part of its strangeness lies in the fact that it was "a theory that responded more to 
philosophical than to observational needs."351 Peter Hans Reill notes that it simply 
"boggles the mind."352 Essentially, preformation was the unique child of a mechanical 
philosophy desperate to deny inherent powers to matter. The question of exactly how 
348
 Roe, Matter, Life, and Generation, 33. 
349
 Reill, Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment, 130. 
350
 The term "evolution" first appeared in English in the context of Jan Swammerdam's work on 
embryology, and the Latin form of the world would later be used by Haller himself. See Robert J. 
Richards, The Meaning of Evolution: The Morhphological Construction and Ideological Reconstruction of 
Darwin's Theory, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 5. 
351 Roe, Matter, Life, and Generation, 7. 
352
 Reill, Vitalizing Nature, 57. 
plants and animals reproduce had occupied natural researchers since Aristotle, and over 
the years several theories had arisen. Aristotle had located the power of reproduction or 
generation in the matter of the sperm, while William Harvey embraced an ovist vision by 
maintaining that all organisms develop from an egg.353 But Descartes had ushered in a 
philosophy which deprived matter of all inherent force, and Newton's successes only 
strengthened this philosophy. Thus, loyal mechanists had to find a way to explain 
reproduction according to mechanical principles alone. If they could succeed in doing 
so, it would not only salvage mechanical natural philosophy, but prove that God had a 
direct hand in the creation of every plant and animal on earth. The stakes were high 
indeed. 
The great Cartesian philosopher Malebranche was the first to suggest a theory of 
embryological "encasement" or emboitement, and this concept was seized upon by a 
number of eighteenth century life scientists, including Spallanzani, Haller, and Haller's 
good friend and countryman Charles Bonnet. In Malebranche's system, every living 
thing was created directly by God at the time of the creation, and "encased" in the egg of 
the original creature. Thus—as preformationists were largely "ovist" preformationists— 
every human being existed within Eve herself, and God's plan dictated that each 
successive generation would somehow be activated and unfold at the right time. 
Organisms, in this system, were thus exactly like Russian dolls, each one being encased 
in another in miniature, and being "opened" at some point in time. This fulfilled the 
demand for an explanation which adhered to mechanical principles. No inherent force 
needed to exist in matter, because God himself had started the chain of causes, and it 
Roe, Matter, Life, and Generation, 3, andReill, Vitalizing Nature, 57. 
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perpetuated itself simply in terms of matter and motion. In addition, it precluded 
materialists from explaining life apart from God, and thus warded off the specter of 
atheism. Desperate to find scientific evidence for that which they were ideologically 
inclined to believe, Haller and other preformationists looked for miniature animals 
already existing within the embryo, and in many cases began to see things that weren't 
even there. Such was the seduction of preformationism—in Kuhnian terms, the 
"paradigm" was so powerful that it dictated the experience of some of the greatest 
researchers of the era. 
As mentioned above, the 21st Century reader will be mystified by the system of 
preformationism, and even the modern layman could identify some of its major problems. 
Foremost among these was the fact that children seem to resemble both their fathers and 
their mothers. If ovist preformationism were true, children should resemble only their 
mothers, not their fathers. Another difficulty with preformationism was the occurrence of 
what Eighteenth Century researchers referred to as "monstrous births," or what we would 
call mutations or birth defects. If God had created every single living being at creation, 
then he must have created the "monsters" as well. Consequently, God must be either an 
imperfect or malicious creator. Needless to say, both of these explanations were 
unattractive to the orthodox supporters of preformation; for them, God must be both 
wholly perfect and wholly good. 
The final difficulty with preformationism, and perhaps the most significant from 
an empirical, scientific standpoint, was the ability of some animals to regenerate not only 
certain parts of their bodies (as in lizards and crustaceans), but to create "new" life from 
their individual parts. Nothing exposed this mysterious ability more than Abraham 
Trembley's experiments on the polyp, or as modern science knows it, the freshwater 
hydra.354 Trefnbley, a Swiss researcher living in Holland, accidentally provided 
opponents of preformationism with an absolutely devastating piece of evidence in 1740. 
Trembley was initially interested in the polyp because scientists had difficulty deciding 
whether it was a plant or an animal. He conducted experiments on it, and discovered 
that, when cut in two, the polyp divides into two brand new organisms, and the procedure 
could be repeated ad infinitum. Trembley published his findings in 1741, and scientists 
were stunned. How could preformationism possibly account for this? Did God know 
ahead of time that Trembley would cut this or that polyp? As Reill bluntly puts it, "to 
pose the question pointed to its absurdity."355 
Despite Trembley's importance, it was another researcher who would become the 
foremost opponent of preformationism. In 1759, Caspar Friedrich Wolff completed his 
medical training at the University of Halle. His dissertation, Theoria Generationis, 
revived the epigenetic systems of Aristotle and William Harvey and meticulously 
undercut many arguments for preformationism. Rather than seeing the embryo as 
preformed by God, Wolff found evidence that the structures of the embryo arise 
gradually out of an undifferentiated organic material. Wolff quickly became embroiled 
in a public controversy with Haller himself, and the latter rewarded his young opponent 
by sabotaging Wolffs chances for an academic career in Germany. Eventually Wolff 
found a home in Russia at the Academy of Catherine the Great, where he remained for 
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the rest of his life. But unlike later opponents of Haller, Wolff carried no radical 
religious or political agenda; indeed, he was as orthodox as Haller himself, and their 
disagreement arose more because of their differing methodologies than anything else. 
Indeed, as Shirley Roe points out, there is a strong strain of Leibnizianism in Wolffs 
research. Even his attempt to make his theory friendly to orthodoxy smacks of Leibniz's 
criticism of Newton and Clarke: if preformation were true, then "All organic bodies 
[would] thus be miracles."357 
BOERHAAVE'S OTHER TRAJECTORY: FRENCH VITAL MATERIALISM 
As we have seen, Boerhaave's most famous student—Albrecht von Haller—unwittingly 
opened Pandora's Box. By granting power to organic matter, Haller sabotaged the 
Newtonian orthodoxy that guided his research. If matter could act on its own, then 
perhaps God was no longer needed as an explanation for life. Those with more radical 
tendencies were happy to exploit Haller's discovery. The first was another of 
Boerhaave's students, Julien Offray de La Mettrie. La Mattrie as a man was Haller's 
opposite—a radical who died from his supposed gluttony. With a devilish wit, La 
Mettrie tried to play up Haller's sensuality! His most influential work, Man a Machine, 
opens with a bitingly satirical, erotic, and hyperbolic "dedication" to none other than 
Haller himself. La Mettrie invokes one of Haller's youthful love poems and continuously 
compares the joys of study to the joys of sex. 
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Nonetheless, La Mettrie's philosophical disagreement with Haller is far more 
important than this entertaining prelude. First of all, like Wolff, he seizes upon Haller's 
own doctrine of irritability. However, unlike Wolff, he uses it to argue for a completely 
materialistic explanation of life. La Mettrie consistently argues that "matter is self-
moved, and that only a small capability for action suffices to explain all the "higher" 
abilities of humanity."358 "Given the least principle of movement, animated bodies have 
all they need to move, feel, think, repent, and in a word, to act in the physical world and 
also in the moral, which depends on the physical."359 That matter has the ability to act on 
its own is confirmed by experimental evidence, and anyone who disagrees will have to 
"deny thousands of facts that anyone can easily verify."360 The threat to orthodoxy here 
is clear: if "self-moving matter" can ground morality, then God becomes superfluous. 
Not surprisingly, La Mettrie also swiftly dismisses the system of preformation, claiming 
that Trembley's discovery "makes me feel sorry for the naturalist's system of 
generation."361 Finally, La Mettrie pokes holes in the porous barrier separating human 
and animal life. He clearly states that "the transition from animals to man is not abrupt," 
and that "Nature employs the same dough for both man and the animals, varying only the 
leaven."362 
Given La Mettrie's attacks on the theologico-mechanistic systems of both Haller 
and Boerhaave, one might be surprised at La Mettrie's extensive use of the very 
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"mechanical" metaphors so typical of seventeenth century scientific rationalism. La 
Mettrie variously describes the human body (and mind) as "a contraption of springs" or 
"an immense clock."363 Therefore, many interpreters read Man a Machine as the final 
stage of Descartes "beast-machine" hypothesis.364 In this view, La Mettrie thoroughly 
deprivileges humanity (and removes God from the picture), relegating us to the same 
status as animals. Humans are machines, too. Nonetheless, considering La Mettrie's 
early work, The Natural History of the Soul, and taking his ironic tendencies into 
account, it is possible to read his talk of "springs" and "clockwork" as satirical.365 Take, 
for instance, one long passage filled with "machine" metaphors. La Mettrie talks of 
Huygens' "planetary pendulum" which requires "more instruments, wheelwork, and 
springs" than a simple watch.366 Similarly, in the case of the human body, "nature had 
necessarily to employ more art and install more organs to make and maintain a machine 
that might mark all the throbbings of the heart and mind over an entire century."367 
Somehow, the human "machine" is able make, adjustments to itself and maintain a 
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number of separate, independently functioning systems.368 But this ability to self-
organize and to self-regulate is, in fact, wholly in contradiction with what seventeenth 
century scientists meant by a "machine" in the first place. La Mettrie has constructed a 
machine so complex and sophisticated that it has ceased to be a machine at all. But 
perhaps most convincingly, La Mettrie dismisses those "fools and ignoramuses" who 
reject the machine explanation in favor of a focus on "the soul and all the anxieties this 
chimera raises."369 Right before this passage, La Mettrie had identified one person who 
did just this, by "resurrecting] the ancient and unintelligible doctrine of substantial 
forms." That was "the author of the Natural History of the Soul," none other than La 
Mettrie himself.370 Either La Mettrie is calling his previous work foolish, or he is 
"calling Descartes' bluff." If animals are machines, then so are we. Since it is 
impossible to explain the human in strictly mechanistic terms, then it is also impossible in 
the case of animals. La Mettrie was undoubtedly a materialist, but his materialism was of 
a new sort: rather than seeing matter as lifeless and inert, he saw it as vibrant, creative, 
and active. He was a vital materialist. 
Of considerably more public repute than La Mettrie, but similarly enamored of an 
eroticization of nature, was the French scientist, mathematician, and explorer Pierre Louis 
Maupertuis (1698 - 1759). Maupertuis gained public acclaim in France for his 
expedition to Lapland, which helped prove that the globe was—contra Descartes and in 
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favor of Newton—flattened at the poles rather than at the equator. 7 He also made 
contributions to physics, including the Principle of Least Action, which played an 
important role in Kant's thinking about the unity of natural phenomena. Unfortunately, 
that principle launched him into a public feud with Voltaire and a subsequent smear 
campaign, which has relegated him to the marginalia of most histories of science.372 But 
Maupertuis also made contributions to the development of the life sciences—most of 
which were published anonymously—which fit perfectly into our story. Maupertuis, 
whom La Mettrie briefly mentions in his "dedication" to Haller, also advanced the cause 
of vital materialism. He attacked preformationist embryology and developed an 
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alternative, epigenetic explanation for the growth of the fetus. He was also one of the 
first European thinkers to take seriously the notion of gradual species change. Indeed, he 
sought to undermine the distinction not only between humans and animals, but also that 
between the organic and the inorganic. Maupertuis provocatively begged his readers to 
"not be angry if I say you were a worm, or an egg, or even a kind of mud."373 
Although Maupertuis took a lifelong interest in natural history, his first foray into 
public debate about the life sciences was a brief text about the scientific implications of 
an African albino boy brought to Paris.374 He used the sensational topic as an excuse to 
present his thoughts on generation, and subsequently added chapters to the little book 
until it became The Earthly Venus. In Part One, "Concerning the Origin of Animals," 
Maupertuis aims to "explain the different systems that have divided philosophers 
concerning the means of generation."375 But this is no neutral stock-taking, for 
Maupertuis clearly favors an epigenetic embryology. He rejects spermatic and ovist 
preformationism, as well as the "Intermediate system" which "comes out of the two 
preceding ones and combines the spermatic animalcules and the eggs."376 Instead he 
embraces William Harvey, who in the hopes of "discovering generation's mystery," had 
carried out a "scholarly massacre" on the stags and does of Charles I.377 Maupertuis does 
not exactly agree with Harvey's account of the process of development; his final theory is 
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actually "more scholastic than scientific."378 But Maupertuis is more than willing to take 
seriously Harvey's observations, none of which correspond to those of eighteenth century 
preformationists. Harvey failed to see the homunculi supposedly present shortly after 
conception. Maupertuis sarcastically asks "if some facts might have escaped this great 
man?'"" "Have we the right to doubt such authentic observations and thus sacrifice 
them to analogies and theories?"380 The implied answer is a resounding "no." As he will 
later explain, there is no reason to "give up the Ancients' ideas on the manner in which 
generation takes place, which ideas correspond pretty well with Harvey's 
experiments."381 
Maupertuis moves from a discussion of Harvey to more explicit counterevidence 
for preformation: the fact that both male and female "participate in the embryo's 
production." One obvious case is that of a marriage between a black man and a white 
woman. Their child, instead of resembling only one parent, has "features partially 
resembling those of his father and of his mother."382 But could not the "intermediate 
theory" of preformation, in which the preformed spermatic animalcule derives its 
nutrition from the egg, account for this? Not according to Maupertuis, and especially not 
in the case of the mule, the infertile offspring of a horse and a donkey. Maupertuis revels 
in the absurdity of all preformationist explanations: 
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Could the little colt, already completely formed within the 
mare's egg, take on the donkey's ears because a donkey 
had set the egg's parts in motion? Will it ever be believed 
or imagined that because the spermatic vermicule has been 
nourished within the mother, he will have acquired a 
resemblance to her and her traits? Would it be much more 
ridiculous to think that animals should resemble the food 
they eat or the dwellings they live in? 
Maupertuis also deploys other arguments for epigenesis, most of which are familiar to us 
by now: the existence of monsters, the sexual activity of hermaphrodites, and the 
reproduction of Trembley's freshwater Hydra, "more wonderful than that of the fable."384 
Ultimately, having failed at his disingenuous attempts to make preformationism fit 
empirical evidence, Maupertuis condemns the entire movement in terms the 21st Century 
would find accurate. "I apologize to the modern men of science for not accepting the 
theories they have so ingeniously evolved. My reason is that I am not one who believes 
that scientific progress is made by elaborating systems which are incompatible with 
certain known phenomena." 
Maupertuis rejection of preformationism is no doubt his central contribution to 
the story of the eighteenth century life sciences. But two other sets of conjectures 
contained in the Earthly Venus deserve mention; not only are they extremely forward-
looking, but they further demonstrate how French scientists were discovering what this 
383
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dissertation calls the "creativity of nature." The first is Maupertuis' own hypothesis on 
the formation of the fetus, which strikingly although imperfectly predicts some of the 
discoveries of modern genetics. Maupertuis proposed that individual particles from both 
male and female fluid seek one another out and join together to form a new being. In 
addition, Maupertuis believed it possible that, over successive generations, new species 
could arise. While he framed this in terms of human races, such an idea could—and 
was—appropriated for more radical purposes, not least by his friend George-Louis 
LeClerc, Comte de Buffon. 
BUFFON AND THE HISTOIRE NATURELLE 
German Idealism was the first philosophical school to take "history" in its modern sense 
seriously. To be sure, Locke had described his enterprise as a "Natural History of the 
Understanding," but he was using "natural history" in its 17th century sense: the 
collection and classification of individual facts.385 The idealists took history qua 
development more seriously: in Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism, he 
described the emergence of consciousness in a series of "epochs," and Hegel gave 
philosophy an even more explicitly developmental recasting. In a sense, what Schelling 
and Hegel did for philosophy, Georges Louis-Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, had done for 
natural science a half-century earlier.386 At a time when most scientists believed that the 
This, of course, was also the approach of great Swedish taxonomist Linnaeus. 
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only rational understanding of nature was static and mathematical, Buffon stressed the 
importance—and certitude—of the contingent. Reill argues that Buffon 
stood late-seventeenth-century mechanical-mathematical 
natural philosophy on its head, reversing its intellectual 
priorities... .For Buffon what was real was contingent. 
Grand mathematical descriptions, self-evident logical 
systems were delusions. Thus, he elevated history from the 
lowest form of understanding to a primary one.387 
For a number of reasons, few people read Buffon today, but he is absolutely 
critical to the story of this chapter.388 Buffon advanced a new theory of truth which 
dethroned mathematics and replaced it with history. Along with this, he undermined the 
biblical understanding of time, arguing that the universe is hundreds of thousands, if not 
millions of years old. And he also advanced the idea—unwittingly introduced by 
Haller—that there is a principle of movement inherent in matter, thus reviving an 
Aristotelian or Leibnizian worldview. In Buffon's moule interieure we see something 
corresponding to Blumenbach's Bildungstrieb, Goethe's Urtyp, and—dare we say— 
Schelling and Hegel's self-moving spirit. Buffon profoundly contributed to the 
dynamization and temporalization of nature so evident in the eighteenth century. 
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Let us now turn to these accomplishments in detail, beginning with his 
reevaluation of the importance of mathematics. Like his countryman Descartes, Buffon 
left us with an exhaustive description of his philosophical method, with which any 
serious examination of his philosophy must begin. In the Preliminary Discourse to the 
Histoire Naturelle, "On the manner of studying and treating natural history," Buffon 
discusses the multivalence of the word "truth," which "has never had a precise 
definition."389 Leaving aside types of truth irrelevant to natural history—such as truths of 
morality—he focuses his attention on two types of truth in particular: mathematical truths 
(verites mathematiques) and physical truths (verites physiques). Buffon notes that it is 
customary to place the former in the "first order of truths," because they are absolutely 
certain. Unfortunately, their certainty is matched only by their emptiness. According to 
Buffon, mathematical truths are essentially truths of definition, which merely repeat the 
premises upon which they are based. As such, they are arbitrary, and are "reduced to 
identities of ideas and have no reality."390 On the contrary, physical truths are those 
which are observed—not deduced—repeatedly in reality. "A frequent repetition and an 
uninterrupted succession of the same events is the essence of physical truth."391 It is 
important to note that Buffon makes no gesture towards skepticism here; he does not, like 
Hume, argue that this "frequent repetition" results only in a high degree of probability. 
Rather, he asserts that a physical truth is not just a probability, "but a probability so great 
389
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that it is equivalent to certitude." In a sense, Buffon's rehabilitation of the contingent 
meant that he chose the "hypothetico-experimental" Newton over the "mathematico-
deductive" Newton. What Franklin was for electricity, Buffon was for the 
"phenomenon" of life. 
The "first discourse" of the Histoire Naturelle was a radical departure from the 
conventions of Buffon's day, for mathematics had been the "language of nature" since 
Galileo's time. Buffon's "second discourse" was no less radical, for it challenged all 
existing "histories" of the earth. When Buffon began writing about the earth's history, 
most books on the subject, such as those by English authors Thomas Burnet and William 
Whiston, were explicitly theological, and they invoked the great flood of Genesis to 
explain the (corrupted) geological features of the earth.394 On the other hand, during the 
first half of the eighteenth century, the French writers Henri Gautier and Benoit de 
Maillet proposed a cyclical view of the earth's history devoid of catastrophism and 
similar to ancient models.395 These theories were not usually taken seriously, and Buffon 
HN, I: 55. Hume is less impressed with repeated occurrences of the same event. In the Treatise of 
Human Nature, he describes the construction of causal inferences. "As the habit, which produces the 
association, arises from the frequent conjunction of objects, it must arrive at its perfection by degrees, and 
must acquire new force from each instance, that falls under Our observation. The first instance has little or 
no force: the second makes some addition to it: The third becomes still more sensible: and 'tis by these 
slow steps, that our judgment arrives at full assurance. But before it attains this pitch of perfection, it 
passes thro' several inferior degrees, and in all of them is only to be esteem'd a presumption or 
probability." (I:III:XII 130). The upshot for Hume is that causal statements are only highly probable, not 
certain. "We may observe, that there is no probability so great as not to allow of a contrary possibility." 
(I:III:XII, 135). Phillip Sloan uses this aspect of Buffon to argue against those who see him as a disciple of 
Locke. "What Buffon is doing is effectively reversing Locke's conclusion on the relative degree of 
certitude of mathematical and physical knowledge." ("The Buffon-Linnaeus Controversy," 368). 
393
 Although I am not closely following Reill's argument, he frames Buffon's innovations in terms of 
language. 
394
 Thomas Burnet, The Sacred Theory of the Earth, 2nd ed., (London: R. Norton, 1691) and William 
Whiston, A New Theory of the Earth, (London: B. Tooke, 1696). 
395
 See Jacques Roger, Buffon: A Life in Natural History, trans. Luille Bonnefoi, ed. L. Pearce Williams, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 94-100. Roger sums up the alternatives thus: "Two models of 
opted to choose neither the biblical-historical nor the cyclic theory of the earth's history. 
He ridiculed the first for using extraordinary catastrophes and divine will instead of real, 
physical causes. He poked fun at Whiston for contradicting the Bible, thus mixing "bad 
physics" with the irreproachable "holy book."396 Although Buffon reserved most of his 
ridicule for the Flood theorists, he also dismissed the theories of less orthodox writers 
like Louis Bourguet, who similarly invoked catastrophes to explain geological 
changes.397 Buffon saw the invocation of catastrophes as an obstacle to a thoroughgoing 
naturalism; if the history of the earth could only explained by rare—or even 
miraculous—events, it precluded a natural/physical explanation, since the scientist can 
only comprehend "everyday" forces. 
For that matter, those causes whose effects are rare, violent, 
and sudden should not concern us; they are not found in the 
ordinary course of nature. But the effects which happen 
everyday, the movements which succeed each other and are 
renewed without interruption, the constant and always 
repeated operations; these are our causes and our 
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Buffon prudently maintains the appearance of orthodoxy in this discussion, but he 
implicitly overturns the Biblical understanding of the earth's history. If slow and gradual 
processes are responsible for all the features of the earth's surface, then they must have 
been active for a very long period of time, certainly longer than 6,000 years, the 
commonly accepted age of the earth in the eighteenth century. In his later Epoques de la 
Nature, Buffon would attempt to give the earth's age a precise number (-75,000 years), a 
figure exponentially exceeded by the one given in his manuscripts (at least ten million 
years).399 Clearly, Buffon knew he was treading on sacred ground, and preferred to 
remain silent on this issue in the bestselling Histoire Naturelle. Nevertheless, radical 
thinkers had no trouble drawing the obvious conclusions, and Buffon's new 
understanding of time would influence the development of the life sciences up to Darwin. 
Perhaps ordinary processes, working over incredibly long periods of time, could explain 
both the earth's features and the incredible variety of the organic world. In a way, time 
was a replacement for God.400 
Given the radical religious implications of Buffon's history of the earth, it should 
not surprise us that he also opposed that most orthodox doctrine of preformation, whose 
proponents tacitly admitted that they had no understanding of generation at all.401 Yet he 
was not as enamored with Harvey's proposals as his friend Maupertuis, whom Buffon 
nevertheless declared to be "the first to begin to approach the truth" about 
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reproduction.402 When discussing embryology, Buffon's language always retained traces 
of the mechanistic viewpoint; he could not free himself from the terminology of the 
"germ."403 But despite his reluctance to plunge headfirst into epigenesis, Buffon 
responded to the problem of generation by formulating a new theory which hinted at one 
of the major aspects of Schellingian Naturphilosophie: Buffon essentially made organism 
into the basic feature of nature. For Buffon, the building blocks of the natural world were 
"organic molecules," which, although they could not be observed directly, were living 
entities responsible both for reproduction and growth.404 Furthermore, the relationships 
or rapports between the organic molecules were paralleled by the wider relationships 
between animals arid nature. "The animal," Buffon argues, "unites all the powers of 
nature," and thus is "a center where everything is interrelated, a point at which the entire 
universe is reflected, a world in miniature."405 The Leibnizian overtones are not 
accidental: like Leibniz, Buffon believed that matter, specifically organic matter, was 
imbued with force. Organic molecules did not unite mechanically; rather, they were 
driven together by a force Buffon called the moule interieur, or internal mold. Buffon 
explicitly compared this force with Newtonian attraction.406 Newton (at least publicly) 
declined to speculate as to what exactly caused attraction; for him, it was sufficient to 
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observe it as phenomena. Likewise, Buffon could not explain the inner workings of his 
own "penetrating force," but concluded—through observation—that such a force was 
indeed active. Buffon's moule interieur, however, was multifaceted: it operated 
differently for different species, thus explaining the variety of the natural world. 
Ultimately, Buffon's new philosophy turned iatromechanism on its head. Living forces, 
not atoms, were the building blocks of nature, whose "main purpose is the production of 
organic bodies."407 Thus the principal innovation of Schelling's Weltseele—the primacy 
of the organic—is already contained in Buffon's Histoire Naturelle. 
Buffon was a master of scholarly caution. His masterpiece—which would 
become one of the bestsellers of the eighteenth century—gave support to a plethora of 
radical ideas, yet Buffon made the text appear just orthodox enough to avoid censorship. 
A Jansenist attack briefly put Buffon in the crosshairs of the Sorbonne, but he skillfully 
compromised with that body and avoided serious trouble.408 Buffon enjoyed a 
comfortable position in the ancien regime, and had no desire to advance radical causes. 
That task would be left to others, none more important than Denis Diderot. The contrast 
between Buffon's Histoire Naturelle and Diderot's books on the life sciences could not 
be greater. Buffon's masterpiece was a bestseller, yet one of Diderot's most profound 
contributions, D 'Alembert 's Dream, was destroyed by the author himself, and we still 
have it today only by an accident of history. Diderot's contribution to the life sciences 
was nevertheless profound. 
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DIDEROT AND LUCRETIAN VITAL MATERIALISM 
Maupertuis and Buffon were trained mathematicians and natural scientists who devoted 
their lives to empirical research, and they were often content to avoid the dangerous 
philosophical issues lurking in their writings. Although they certainly recognized some 
of the radical implications of their discoveries, neither had any desire to push the 
envelope and risk their careers. Thus, Maupertuis recoiled when accused of being a 
materialist or a Spinozist, and Buffon chose to suppress his private calculations on the 
age of the earth. After all, he was an employee of the King and had to maintain the 
appearance of orthodoxy whenever possible. Given these constraints, only an outsider 
could grapple with these larger, more radical problems. This outsider was none other 
than Denis Diderot, whose role in the Encylopedie is well known but whose contributions 
to the life sciences is sometimes overlooked. Those contributions were twofold: first, he 
was a philosopher of science in the modern sense of the term. He made no scientific 
discoveries, but synthesized existing knowledge and offered a method for research and 
interpretation. Second, he seized upon the most radical developments in the life sciences 
and advanced an atheistic—but still vitalist—materialism. 
Diderot was keenly interested in the life sciences as early as 1749, and had a 
particularly warm relationship with Buffon. Diderot devoured and annotated the Histoire 
Naturelle while he was imprisoned in Vincennes, and even secured a promise—though 
eventually unfulfilled—from Buffon to write the article "Nature" in the Encylopedie.409 
But although Diderot's early works reveal a strong interest in the natural sciences and the 
sensationalist philosophy of the eighteenth century, it was his Thoughts on the 
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Interpretation of Nature (1754) which put vital materialism front and center, and revealed 
Diderot's attempt to formulate a philosophy of science informed by the latest empirical 
research. Even the prefatory remark is striking; Diderot tells "young people inclined to 
the study of natural philosophy" that "Nature is not God, a man is not a machine, and a 
hypothesis is not a fact."410 In the text itself, Diderot quickly sides neither with the 
metaphysicians, "who don't know anything," nor with mathematicians, who occupy a 
purely "intellectual world," but with the experimentalist "chemists, physicists, and 
naturalists" creating a "great revolution in the sciences."411 
Although Diderot heaps praise on the experimental method, which he lauds for 
"proposing nothing" but being "content with whatever comes to it," Diderot's ideal 
scientist is not a mere passive observer.412 Rather, the mind must act upon the collected 
data—in terms familiar to us, it must form a hypothesis—and subsequently evaluate that 
hypothesis in light of experience. Diderot briefly sums up his method in Section XV: 
We have three principal means [of interpreting nature]: 
observation of nature, reflection, and experience. 
Observation collects facts, reflection combines them, and 
experience verifies the result of the combination. The 
observations should be meticulous, reflection should be 
Denis Diderot, Pensees sur I'interpretation de la nature, ed. Colas Duflo, (Paris: Flammarion, 2005), 
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profound, and experience should be exact. One rarely sees 
these means come together.413 
Interestingly enough, the scientist will not always discover what he originally sought. 
Well-formed hypotheses might send him down a blind alleyway, but they might also 
produce unanticipated knowledge. Thus, Diderot compares experimental physics to "the 
advice of a father, who on his deathbed tells his children that he has buried a treasure in 
his field, but does not know its precise location." The children proceed to dig up the 
field, and though they do not find the treasure, they do produce "an abundant harvest they 
had not expected."414 Thus, despite Diderot's condemnation of excessively "rational" 
speculation, he believes in the value of hypotheses—even incorrect hypotheses.415 In this 
spirit, Diderot concludes the Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature with a series of 
"questions" remarkably similar in format to Newton's Queries. Most significantly for 
our story, he grapples with the distinction between living and dead matter. "It is 
evident," Diderot tells us, that "matter in general is divided between dead matter and 
living matter."416 But why does nature make this division? Why isn't all matter dead or 
all matter alive? Furthermore, can there be a transition between the two? And how 
exactly can matter organize and move itself? Diderot leaves these questions unanswered 
for fifteen years, when he wrote a brilliant and radical dialogue entitled D 'Alembert 's 
Dream. 
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D 'Alembert 's Dream so scandalized D'Alembert and his patron, Julie de 
L'Espinasse, that it only survived in clandestine format. The work itself—comprised of 
a fictional conversation between D'Alembert and Diderot himself, and two conversations 
between L'Espinasse, the physician Bordeu, and a dreaming D'Alembert—touches on 
many aspects of Diderot's sensationalist empiricism, but a few in particular highlight his 
philosophy of Nature in general. In D 'Alembert's Dream, we see Diderot embracing the 
most radical consequences of recent research in the life sciences. In general, Diderot 
postulates a materialism which endows matter with the powers of self-movement and 
organization, thus dismissing God from the realm of explanations. Concomitantly, 
Diderot—like La Mettrie—breaks down the barriers in the Great Chain of Being, 
explaining how "dead" matter could acquire life and vice versa. Finally, Diderot even 
advances a theory of the appearance and disappearance of species in the earth's history. 
To be sure, this is not "evolution" as we understand it, and because of his Lucretian 
allegiances, his view of species change is, unlike the Naturphilosophen or the young 
Darwin, completely devoid of teleology. For Diderot, chance is sufficient to explain 
change, so long as it is coupled with long periods of time, an idea Diderot no doubt 
inherited from Buffon himself. 
Diderot's vital materialism emerges almost immediately in the first dialogue of 
D 'Alembert's Dream. Diderot declares that there is "not very much" difference between a 
man and a statue, and the more moderate D'Alembert challenges this.4I7 Diderot 
responds that the sensitivity so obvious in man is also contained in the stone, albeit only 
Denis Diderot, D 'Alembert's Dream, in Rameau 's Nephew andD 'Alembert's Dream, trans. Leonard 
Tancock, (New York: Penguin, 1966), 149. 
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as "latent sensitivity."418 He sounds downright Leibnizian when he proclaims that 
"motion is inherent in the thing itself, whether it is moved or remains stationary."419 
Even more interestingly, Diderot comes very close to Kant's and Schelling's views on 
repulsive forces. Even motionless objects possess an active repulsive force, and thus, "If 
by a sudden rarefaction you take away the air surrounding the trunk of that huge oak, the 
water it contains will suddenly expand and blow it into a hundred thousand splinters."420 
In addition to the motion inherent even in seemingly "dead" matter, Diderot also 
recognizes that each tiny part of an organic body—which he likens to a vibrating string— 
is also capable of "feeding and reproducing itself."421 Diderot discusses generation, 
specifically the development of an egg, "with which you can overthrow all the schools of 
theology in the world."422 He mocks those who "maintain, with Descartes" that a newly 
hatched chick is "an imitating machine pure and simple," noting that "even little children 
will laugh at you, and the philosopher will answer that if it is a machine you are one 
too!"423 No, Diderot says, the chick is not a machine, and neither was "spirit" bestowed 
upon it by a creator. Rather, the philosopher finds that "from an inert substance arranged 
in a certain way and impregnated by another inert substance, subjected to heat and 
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motion, you will get sensitivity, life, memory, consciousness, passions, thought."424 
Matter itself contains the sensitivity needed to explain life. 
This vitalized matter, able to explain much more than the dead, inert particles of 
the corpuscular philosophers, allows Diderot to declare that there is "only one substance 
in universe, in man, in animals.. ..A canary is flesh, a musician is flesh differently 
organized, but they have one and the same origin, formation, functions, and end."425 In 
other words, Diderot offers a materialist monism or what he occasionally referred to as 
"Spinozism."426 In addition to the blurred boundary between animal and man, there is 
also a blurred boundary between inorganic and organic. Diderot, like Buffon, believes 
that long periods of time bridge the gap between stone and human: 
When this marble block is reduced to the finest powder I 
mix this powder with humus or compost, work them well 
together, water the mixture, let it rot for a year, two years, a 
century, for I am not concerned with time. When the 
whole.. .has turned into humus.. .1 sow leguminous plants. 
The plants feed on the earth and I feed on the plants.427 
Once Diderot has shown that he can make "flesh out of marble," it is an easy transition 
from flesh to "the greatest mathematicians in Europe.," for "you will admit it is much 
more of a far cry from a piece of marble to a being who can feel than from a sentient 
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being to a thinking one."428 Diderot took an even more radical step when he embraced 
species change, but this should not surprise us, for even he admits that "once I have seen 
inert matter change into something sensitive there is nothing left to marvel at."429 He 
puts the strongest words into the mouth of L'Espinasse: "Let the present species of 
animals pass away, let the great, inert sediment go on working for millions more ages," 
and species will come and go, moving from inorganic to organic and back again. 
Diderot's Evolutionsbegriffis, in this sense, dramatically different from that of his 
German followers like Herder, and Romantic Naturphilosophen. Whereas the Germans 
(aside from Kant) were steeped in teleology, and conceived of Nature as moving upwards 
from stone to plant to animal, and finally to man, Diderot preferred a Lucretian natural 
history, in which chance and time combine to produce ephemeral natural products. 
Species—presumably humans as well—-arise and then die out, giving way to something 
completely different.430 
Diderot's entire philosophy of Nature thus took the steps from which Maupertuis 
and Buffon shrank. Maupertuis' work on generation led obviously to materialistic 
monism, but he dared not go that far. Buffon's philosophy led obviously to the 
conclusion that there are no firm boundaries in nature, yet he doggedly maintained a 
belief in the special status of man and denied the possibility of species change. Diderot, 
sitting on the fringe of French scientific culture, radicalized their contributions and in 
many ways paved the way for the Romantic Naturphilosophen. But Germany was not 
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France, and for the most part manifested no drift towards, in the famous words of Peter 
Gay, "modern paganism." In France, advances in the life sciences pushed researchers 
towards outright atheism. In Germany, on the* other hand, the crucial mediators between 
French Vital Materialism and Naturphilosophie were relatively orthodox Christians. This 
was especially true of Johann Gottfried Herder, a Protestant clergyman who—strangely 
enough—saw no conflict between vital materialism and his deeply-held Christian 
convictions. 
HERDER AND GERMAN VITAL MATERIALISM 
Herder's role in the introduction of French thought to Germany cannot be 
underestimated. Although Herder himself was a firm opponent of many aspects of 
French intellectual life—he despised Salon culture, polemicized against French neo-
classicism, and ultimately concluded that he was fundamentally a "Nordic being"— 
Herder's confrontation with Diderot was significant for his philosophy of nature, and he 
engaged with French sensationalist philosophy in his writings on the origin of language. 
Herder's vital materialism manifested itself in a dizzying variety of works. It even 
pervades his treatise on the origins of Hebrew poetry. But it is most evident in his 
masterpiece, the Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind, the reception of which 
was harmed by his former mentor Immanuel Kant, who saw it as pseudophilosophy.431 
In spite of this, Herder's scientific thought played an enormous role in the development 
of German Naturphilosophie, from Goethe all the way up to Schelling and Oken. 
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Herder's Ideas is a diverse and sweeping text, tracing out the history of mankind, 
which itself was inseparable from the history of nature. The early chapters are thus 
reminiscent of Buffon's Histoire Naturelle. Herder examines the Earth's place in the 
solar system and lays out its geographical history before describing the ways in which the 
Earth serves as "a grand manufactory, for the organization of very different beings."432 
Like Buffon, Herder asserts that life is not an aberration, but the primary purpose of 
nature, and his commitment to vital materialism shines through in the sections which 
explain the transition from inorganic to organic. Like Diderot, he has little trouble 
believing in what modern scientists call abiogenesis. All the necessities for life are latent 
in the "bowels of the earth," and Herder hypothesizes that "the first living creatures of the 
sea, shellfish," probably arose out of "calcerous earth," for "throughout all nature the 
materials appear before the organized animated structure."433 The laws of chemistry, "so 
zealously pursued in recent years," provide the foundation for an explanation of 
organized life, and like any good Leibnizian, Herder asserts that the most varied and 
complex phenomena can be traced ultimately back to simple laws.434 "Dead" matter 
actually contains the principles of life. 
If Herder saw no problem in the transition from inorganic to organic, he was 
similarly comfortable with porous boundaries between plants, animals, and humans. He 
compares the growing human to a plant and argues that animals are "the elder brethren of 
Johann Gottfried Herder, Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man, trans. T. Churchill, (New 
York: Bergman, 1803), 27. Henceforth referred to as Ideas. 
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 For a larger discussion of Leibniz's influence on Herder, see Beate Monika Dreike, Herders 
Naturaujfassung in ihrerBeeinflussungdurch Leibniz'Philosophie, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1973). 
men." For Herder, humans are simply the highest and most complex manifestation of 
the forces of nature, which are uniquely combined at every stage of development. The 
one true "principle of life," which manifests itself in the "tubes of plants, in the arteries 
and muscles of animals," and finally in the "mental faculties" of man himself, is 
electricity.436 This basic force reveals itself to us in a number of forms. It is here that 
Herder introduces the famous triad of reproduction, irritability, and sensibility, all of 
which arise from this common source but are "differently modified and distributed" in 
every type of living creature.437 In plants, the power of reproduction is so dominant that 
irritability and sensibility are all but completely extinguished. Plants seem to exist solely 
for the purpose of creating new plants, a purpose they "completely fulfill."438 In cold-
blooded animals, it is irritability which predominates. The powers of their muscles are 
so great that lizards can regenerate body parts, and tortoises continue to walk even after 
losing their heads.439 Finally, in the "higher" animals which possess more sophisticated 
brains, irritability is "subdued to the purposes of perception." But humans are not 
completely dissimilar from animals. Despite our incredibly complex organization and 
preponderance of sensibility, which allows us to create language and art, we retain 
aspects of our vegetable and animal forbearers. We do not reproduce as quickly and 
effectively as plants, nor do we have the ability to regenerate limbs. Yet we still possess 
reproductive capabilities, and our muscle fibers retain lower levels of irritability. Nature, 
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 Herder, Ideas, 29, 35. 
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437 Ibid, 53. 
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according to Herder, has given each plant, animal, and human a perfect balance of 
powers, powers which could be traced back to the electricity present in matter. 
It should be clear from the preceding statement that, in one important sense, 
Herder's vital materialism diverges drastically from Diderot's. Diderot's Lucretian 
history of nature imagined new species arising, dying out, and being replaced in turn by 
completely new species. In D 'Alembert 's Dream, nature is certainly creative and active, 
but it has no goal whatsoever. Herder's Ideas, on the other hand, advances the notion 
that Nature moves towards an endpoint: the development of mankind. Herder's 
personified "Nature" seems always to have the creation of man in mind. "Nature" put the 
earth in a perfect position in the solar system. "Nature" created an earth whose geology 
was conducive to the creation of life. "Nature" saw to it that the basic electrical force 
manifested itself in different ways and created an ever more complex series of organisms, 
leading up to human beings. Herder's faith in-a providential God, combined with a 
Spinozism which envisioned God as immanent, made this standpoint possible, and if the 
Naturphilosophen were less theological than Herder, they were certainly no less 
teleological. Schelling's early Naturphilosophie thus stands at the midpoint between 
Diderot and Herder, for he maintains both the religious unorthodoxy of the former and 
the goal-driven Nature of the latter. 
KANT, BLUMENBACH, AND KIELMEYER: REGULATIVE OR 
CONSTITUTIVE TELEOLOGY? 
If most scholars can agree that Herder's own Naturphilosophie was deeply teleological in 
the truest sense, the issue is more contentious in the cases of two famous German life 
scientists who contributed greatly to the disciplinization of German biology: Johann 
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Friedrich Blumenbach and Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer. The debate over whether their 
scientific doctrines were teleological in nature thrusts one into a different, even thornier 
controversy involving the relationship between Kant, Naturphilosophie, and German 
biology. Some scholars argue that it was Immanuel Kant who set the methodological 
agenda for German biology, and they inevitably read Blumenbach and Kielmeyer as 
careful, sober scientists who used teleological concepts only in the safe, "regulative" way 
countenanced by Kant's Critique of Judgment.440 Other scholars, including the present 
author, contend that German biologists merely paid lip service to Kant while 
simultaneously going far beyond anything his system supported.441 A closer examination 
of Blumenbach and Kielmeyer will not only shed light on the issue, but thrust us—at 
last—directly into Schelling's immediate context. But the starting point needs to be the 
biological standpoint of Kant's Critique of Judgment, the problems of which loomed 
large for almost all German life scientists at the end of the nineteenth century.442 
Kant's "Critique of Teleological Judgment" is so complex that any short summary fails to 
do it justice. Nevertheless, for the purposes of explaining his relationship to German 
biology, the important aspect of it is Kant's answer to the following question: given that 
Timothy Lenoir is the best example. In The Strategy of Life: Teleology and Mechanics in Nineteenth 
Century German Biology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), he argues that, among those who 
created German biology as a discipline, "a common core of natural philosophy does run through the works 
of these individuals; it is a philosophy of biology proposed by Immanuel Kant" (6). See also Lenoir, "The 
Gottingen School and the Development of Transcendental Naturphilosophie in the Romantic Era," Studies 
in the History of Biology 5 (1981): 111-205. Throughout Lenoir's works he violently opposes the idea that 
Romantic Naturphilosophie contributed to the foundations of German biology in any significant way. 
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 Or, in the case of Blumenbach, he almost willfully ignored his many differences with Kant. On this, see 
Robert Richards, "Kant and Blumenbach on the Bildungstrieb: a Historical Misunderstanding," Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 31 (2000): 11-32. 
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 Obviously, I am playing loose with chronology by beginning this section with the Critique of Judgment, 
which is significantly predated by Blumenbach's Uber den Bildungstrieb. Nevertheless, since Blumenbach 
would later bring his own argumentation as much in line with Kant's as possible, beginning with the 
theoretical underpinnings makes the most sense. 
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reason is incapable of knowing "Nature" as a whole, and that any attempt to do so 
involves overstepping the bounds of possible experience, how can we account for 
organisms, which seem to follow a new set of natural laws? Kant argued that the natural 
researcher is permitted to assume that nature is goal-driven for the sake of scientific 
research. However, if we go any further than this hypothetical standpoint, we violate 
Kant's cautious epistemological boundaries. 
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach made two major contributions to the formation of 
the German biological community. First, he wrote a definitive biological textbook which 
would be used for more than a quarter century in German universities.443 Second, he 
nailed shut the coffin of preformationism, offering the most extensive and widely 
accepted refutation of that doctrine in German history. In doing so, he introduced his 
own version of Buffon's moule interieur, the Bildungstrieb or formative force (nisus 
formativus), which guided embryological development and nutrition. In On the 
Bildungstrieb (1781), Blumenbach describes embryology as "the greatest of all 
physiological riddles," and gently mocks the extent to which past thinkers have struggled 
with the question. "Boerhaave's teacher, Drelincourt, alone collected 262 groundless 
hypotheses about generation from his predecessors, and nothing is more certain, than that 
his own system is the 263rd."444 Blumenbach rejects the idea of preexistent germs, 
collecting all the well known eighteenth century counterarguments and adding a few of 
The textbook itself is inseparable from Blumenbach's biological innovations. The opening sections 
recapitulate his arguments against epigenesis and portray the Bildungstrieb as established scientific fact. 
See Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, Handbuch der Naturgeschichte, 9 th edition, (Gottingen: Heinrich 
Dietrich, 1814), 16-20. 
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his own.445 He then concludes that there must be some general force, present in all 
organized matter, which not only drives development but governs the maintenance and 
nutrition of organized bodies as well. It must be: 
A force, which consequently belongs to the life forces 
(Lebenskrdften), but which is clearly different not only 
from the other forms of the life force of organized bodies 
(contractility, irritability, sensibility, etc...) but from the 
general physical forces of bodies as a whole. [This force] 
appears to be the first and most important force of all 
generation, nutrition, and reproduction...and can be called 
the Bildungstrieb (nisus formativus).446 
Like Haller and Buffon before him, Blumenbach instantly makes a comparison between 
the Bildungstrieb and Newtonian gravitation. We have no direct access to the 
Bildungstrieb, but based on our observations, we can see it working. The third section of 
the book is ostensibly supposed to be a closer examination of exactly how the 
Bildungstrieb operates, but we need not be detained with it here. It suffices to note that 
the Bildungstrieb was the most successful of the various organizing forces proposed 
during the eighteenth century. 
The story of the Bildungstrieb becomes more interesting because of the intense 
interest Immanuel Kant took in Blumenbach's work. Kant believed that Blumenbach's 
Bildungstrieb—as opposed to the strongly constitutive-teleological organic forces of 
445
 One example is Blumenbach's discussion of a woman with a mummified fetus in her fallopian tubes. A 
preformationist would have to assent to the ridiculous statement that the encasing of the fetus was actually 
pre-existent as well. (Blumenbach, Uber den Bildungstrieb, 70). 
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Herder—was a model of his own "regulative" method. Kant wrote to Blumenbach in 
1790, praising him for "[uniting] the physical-mechanistic and the sheerly teleological 
mode of explanation of organized nature."447 Blumenbach was naturally pleased to hear 
Kant sing his praises, and thus disinclined to explore any possible differences of opinion. 
This has led to a great deal of historical confusion, and many scholars simply take the 
Kant-Blumenbach alliance at face value, insisting that their methodology was one and the 
same. However, it would be a mistake to say that Blumenbach believed his cherished 
Bildungstrieb was merely a regulative construct. For Blumenbach it was a real force in 
nature, not just a useful hypothesis. Furthermore, it is hard to square Kant's philosophy 
of science, which explicitly stated that there could never be a true science of biology, with 
practicing biologists! Thus, it is more likely that Kant and Blumenbach were engaged in 
a game of mutual flattery, constantly trying to convince themselves that their beliefs were 
identical.448 
Similar arguments have broken out over Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer. Besides being 
the mentor of the French naturalist Georges Cuvier, Kielmeyer's most important 
contribution to biology was a lecture—eventually published—given at Karl Eugen's 
Karlsschule in Stuttgart. The lecture, entitled "On the relationships of the organic 
forces," fleshes out Herder's ideas about the balance of organic forces in different spheres 
of life. However, it also contains Kantian undertones which, just as in the case of 
Blumenbach, leave the text open to multiple interpretations. In Kielmeyer's text, he 
presents the familiar three organic powers (sensibility, irritability, and reproduction) but 
447
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also introduces two others (secretion, propulsion) which he unfortunately fails to discuss. 
Kielmeyer advances the same thesis as Herder, proposing as a general law that when one 
organic power increases (i.e. reproduction in plants), the other organic powers decrease in 
importance. 
What was important about this lecture was that Kielmeyer was proposing "laws" 
in a discipline which many—including Kant—believed to be simply an organized body 
of knowledge, not a true science. And although Kielmeyer implies a quite clear 
teleological ordering based on sensibility—generally speaking, the more complex the 
organism, the more sensibility is has—he also paid lip service to Kant: 
Let us grant that nature had no intention in establishing this 
artful juxtapositioning of appearance in time, that effects 
and their consequences were to form no goals that she had 
wished to achieve, let us grant, it were an empty dream 
[Traumerei] for us to to wish to detect some higher goal yet 
unbeknownst to us; nonetheless, we still must confess that 
the chain of effects and causes in most cases seems like a 
chain of means and ends to us and that we would find it 
advantageous for our reason to assume such a chain; and so 
we will at least be in a position finally to confirm that 
nature in these instances, no less than in the case of the 
heavens, is able to convince us of the truth of those 
observations with which I begin.449 
449
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How should we read this passage? Is Kielmeyer literally invoking Kant, or is he merely 
paying lip service to the most famous philosopher in Germany? An ironic reading is the 
most plausible, given some of Kielmeyer's unpublished writings in which he engages is 
some fanciful Traumerei of his own.450 Regardless of what Kielmeyer himself believed, 
it is clear from Schelling's works, especially On the World-Soul, that he read Kielmeyer 
(and Blumenbach) as true constitutive teleologists. 
SCHELLINGIAN BEGINNINGS 
This chapter is by no means intended as a comprehensive description of the eighteenth 
century life sciences. Such a task is beyond the scope of this dissertation, and has already 
been admirably executed by Reill. What this chapter has done is to establish the broader 
natural-scientific context in which the young Schelling intervened. Far too many 
Schelling scholars examine the Naturphilosophie in a vacuum, and this only strengthens 
the misconception that Schelling was a mystic or a hapless dilettante, trying to write 
about a subject he didn't truly understand. In fact, when we look at into the murky 
waters of the eighteenth century life sciences, we see a world in which the "real 
scientists" sometimes embraced doctrines—in particular, preformationism—that make 
Schelling's most extravagant beliefs seem tame. Now that I have established broad 
natural-scientific context, I will examine the more localized context in which Schelling's 
Naturphilosophie arose. 
Geschichte derMedizin 23 (1930): 247-267. Quotation from 249-250. Translation from Richard, The 




Chapter 5: The Leipzig Naturphilosophie 
THE TURN TO NATURE 
By January 1797, Schelling had already spent two semesters with the Riedesel brothers in 
Leipzig, assisting them in their study of law and somehow finding time for his own 
studies as well. During this time, he sharpened his understanding of Fichte, finally 
studying those parts of the Grundlage of which he was still ignorant when he penned On 
the las Principle of Philosophy.*51 By finally mastering what was then his mentor's 
most comprehensive exposition of the Wissenschaftslehre, Schelling finally brought 
himself up to speed with the entire post-Kantian tradition sketched out in Chapter 2 of 
this dissertation. Meanwhile, he was also devouring the natural scientific coursework 
offered in Leipzig, coming to terms with the intellectual tradition outlined in Chapter 3. 
The task which now stood before Schelling was a daunting one: the fusion of these two 
traditions. As early as February of 1797—and certainly no later than June, when he 
completed his Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature—Schelling had already assembled the 
tools necessary to undertake such a project. It would take him five years—and five 
books—to arrive at his mature system of Nature. But there can be no mistake that the 
central thrust of his Naturphilosophie was already apparent in early 1797: the fusion of 
German Idealism with the vitalism of the eighteenth-century life sciences. Unfortunately, 
One of Schelling's main reasons for closely reading the Grundlage was that he planned on writing a 
review of that work. The details of this plan will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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most accounts of Schelling's development focus disproportionately on the philosophical 
roots of his Naturphilosophie.^2 But that is still only half the story. Only by situating 
Schelling within the context of Enlightenment vitalism can we arrive at a full 
understanding of his philosophy of nature.453 And in doing so, we can finally recognize 
Schelling's achievement: a complex fusion of abstract philosophy and empirical science 
never seen since. 
I must stress, however, that we are not abandoning philosophy for natural science 
at this point. Despite his exhaustive examination of the latest empirical scientific 
literature, Schelling still, as he said in his letter to Hegel from the beginning of 1795, 
"lived and breathed philosophy." As much as his position seems untenable today, 
Schelling did grant primacy to philosophy over empirical science, but neither did he think 
it could replace it.454 Schelling's work between 1797 and 1802 must still be understood 
Even some of the best recent work on Schelling's Naturphilosophie tends towards this privileging of the 
philosophical tradition, such as Wolfgang Bonsiepen's otherwise outstanding Die Begrilndung einer 
Naturphilosophie bei Kant, Schelling, Fries und Hegel: Mathematische versus spekulative 
Naturphilosophie, (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997). Bonsiepen correctly argues that 
Schelling's Naturphilosophie was an attempt to reconcile the "dualisms" present in Kant's system (94), and 
to expand on the small role Fichte accorded nature in the Wissenschaftslehre (142). But Bonsiepen's focus, 
despite his knowledge of the large scale trajectory of eighteenth century science, remains mostly on 
philosophy, not on natural science. "Schelling's philosophy, and in particular his Naturphilosophie, should 
be interpreted as the logical continuation of the epistemological question posed by Reinhold and Fichte 
towards the Kantian philosophy. Schelling decidedly modified Kant's critical philosophy through his 
examination of the Platonic, Leibnizian, and Spinozist philosophies...." (147) Bonsiepen is technically 
right, but he misses half the story. 
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scientific inquiry. Beyond that, I would argue that almost every scientific advancement up to Schelling's 
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laboratories in a purely empirical fashion is a fiction that should be discarded. For more on this, see J.W.N. 
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in its philosophical context: it was not the brainchild of a dilettante who suddenly became 
interested in the natural sciences, nor of a mystic intent on cloaking Swabian theosophy 
with scientific language,455 but of a serious philosopher led down this path by the aporias 
in Kant's and Fichte's Idealist systems—aporias which necessarily impinged on natural 
scientific debates and problems. In the twenty-firstCentury, philosophy and natural 
science occupy different spheres. To be sure, there are a few scholars who have a foot in 
both worlds, but for the most part, scientists and philosophers are happy to ignore each 
other. In the eighteenth century, this was utterly impossible. The path of early modern 
philosophy, from Descartes to Kant, was inextricably linked with the advancement of 
natural science.456 Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is unthinkable without Newton, 
whose mechanical philosophy Kant attempted to reconcile with human freedom. His 
Critique of Judgment, especially its treatment of "teleological judgment," cannot be 
understood apart from the innovations of Blumenbach and his forerunners, although Kant 
Watkins, "Metaphysics and the Advancement of Science," British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 26 
(1975): 91-121. 
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 Gerd BuchdahPs Metaphysics and the Philsophy of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969) 
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cannot simply be derived from them.457 Ironically, the only major thinker who seemed 
content to ignore science was Schelling's own mentor, Johann Gottlieb Fichte.458 Oddly, 
this makes Schelling's Naturphilosophie seem less like an advance away from Kant, but 
rather a move back towards him.459 Given how much importance most early modern 
philosophers placed on natural science and Fichte's neglect of it, perhaps we should not 
be asking "Why did Schelling turn to natural science?" Rather, we might ask, "How 
could Schelling not have turned to natural science?"460 
Still, I do not wish to portray the Leipzig Naturphilosophie as an abandonment of 
Fichte.461 Surely, it was a move in that direction, but Schelling—often subtly—imported 
much of Fichte's philosophical framework into the Naturphilosophie itself. For example, 
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at first glance, On the I as Principle of Philosophy seems to contain nothing of interest 
for the student of Naturphilosophie. But if we look closer, we can see the subtle 
evolution of his thought. In that text, Schelling refused to treat the / as a "thing" or as 
something conditioned, just as Fichte refused to do so in his review of Aenesidemus. 
Rather, Schelling argued that we must understand it as absolute or unconditioned. By 
1799, Schelling has fully transferred this argument over onto Nature itself: in the First 
Outline, he identifies the purpose of all Naturphilosophie as the knowledge of Nature as 
"unconditioned," in opposition to the mechanical tradition which opened the 18th century 
by treating nature merely as a "thing." This is but one example of why Schelling's early 
philosophical texts are—despite superficial appearances to the contrary—indispensable 
for an understanding of his Naturphilosophie, which began not with the Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature but in a lesser known review article he wrote in installments for 
Niethammer. 
THE GENERAL OVERVIEW AS TURNING POINT 
The General Overview of the Newest Philosophical Literature is an extremely eclectic 
text. The serial nature of its publication—which stretched from early 1797 all the way 
into 1798—allowed Schelling to jump from one subject to another, often without any 
explicit transition. He used it as an avenue to explore his rapidly changing philosophical 
viewpoints and as a vessel into which he could pour his divided energies. The General 
Overview contains reviews of what we would now call "minor" authors, as well as 
sections on Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, and even Leibniz; these sections were often the 
remnants of unfinished or unpublished texts. Thus, perhaps more than any other text, the 
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General Overview warrants Hegel's condescending quip that "Schelling carried out his 
philosophical education in public."462 
Perhaps in an attempt to unify its disparate threads, Schelling modified and 
renamed this text in the 1809 edition of his works, and for the most part, scholars have 
followed his lead and referred to it as the Philosophical Discourses on the Explication of 
the Idealism of the Wissenschaftslehre. However, since this dissertation breaks off well 
before 1809, and since we are focusing not on the older Schelling but the young one, I 
will continue to refer to this text as the General Overview.463 Additionally, his 
elaboration of the Wisssenschaftslehre is less interesting in the context of this dissertation 
than the sections in which he sketches out ideas that will reappear in his writings on 
natural science. Another benefit of reading this text is that it gives historians a clue as to 
Schelling's development in Leipzig. Horst Furhmans laments that we have very few 
sources for Schelling's Leipzig years, but we do know when Schelling completed each 
piece of the General Overview, since he always sent them to Niethammer along with a 
letter. Thus, for example, we can locate Schelling's turn to the topic of Naturphilosophie 
as somewhere between December 1796 and February 1797, since those mark the 
completion of the first and second installments of the General Overview, respectively. 
Of course, this method is not bulletproof, but in light of the paucity of sources during his 
stay in Leipzig, any clues are welcome. 
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The General Overview marks the beginning of a new phase in Schelling's 
thought.464 For the first time, he devotes serious attention to the real, objective world. 
Not only does he begin to explore the relationship between the ideal and the real, but he 
goes so far as to give us a cursory construction of matter and a deduction of organism. 
He relentlessly deploys the anti-mechanical language of Enlightenment vitalism, 
continually associating the "mechanical" with the "lifeless" thoughts of philosophers 
whose heads are too caught up in abstract speculation. And he grants nature a dignity not 
found in Fichte's system, where it is simply the playground for moral action: in 
Schelling's General Overview, the objective world is actually brought forth by the 
"original activities of spirit." It is born of the same dynamism that animates the human 
mind. . 
Many Schelling scholars agree with this. Wilhelm Metzger makes the General Overview the first step in 
a new "epoch" of Schelling's philosophy, claiming that in this text, Schelling finally makes the explanation 
of experience (Erfahrung) a "serious task," one which involved both a turn towards reality (Wirklichkeit) 
and the unification of philosophy and physics. {Die Epochen der Schellingschen Philosophie, 46). Joseph 
Esposito sees the General Overview as "Schelling's earliest formulation of the 'better system' toward 
which his thought had been pointing for the past three years," going so far as to say that "From this point 
on, Schelling has moved completely beyond the limitations of the Fichtean self." {Schelling's Idealism and 
Philosophy of Nature, 44-45). Esposito thus makes the text into a breaking point which convinced 
Schelling that "nothing less than a complete overturning of the Fichtean starting-point was necessary." (47) 
More recently, Motokiyo Fukaya lists no fewer than thirteen instances in which the General Overview was 
a "turning point" in which "Schelling opened the path to his Naturphilosophie and 
Tranzendentalphilosophie." (Anschauung des Absoluten 86-88. Quotation from 88). One notable 
exception to this dominant interpretation is Frederick Beiser. In his German Idealism: The Struggle 
Against Subjectivism 1781-1801, he argues that the General Overview is "the most Fichtean of all his early 
writings and the furthest removed from his later position," noting the "distance of the Abhandlungen from 
the later Naturphilosophie." In fact, Beiser claims that this text "virtually forbade the possibility of 
Naturphilosophie" (484). While this interpretation fits neatly into Beiser's narrative of a gradual 
movement away from "subjectivism," it misses a critical point. Indeed, the Naturphilosophie of 1801-02 is 
far removed from that of the Leipzig period, because it grants primacy to Naturphilosophie over 
Transzendentalphilosophie. But why is the Naturphilosophie of 1802 the only authentic version of 
Schelling's thought? The insights of the General Overview and the Ideas might not be wholly in line with 
that of the On the True Concept of Naturphilosophie (1802), but they are still Naturphilosophie, if a more 
subjective and Fichtean version of it. 
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THE GENESIS OF THE GENERAL OVER VIEW 
Like the Philosophical Letters, Schelling's General Overview was published by 
Niethammer in separate issues of his PhilosophicalJournal, for which he had found a 
new publisher late in 1796. The revamped journal also featured a new co-editor: none 
other than Fichte himself. Niethammer announced in the Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung 
that the journal would still contain philosophical discourses (philosophische 
Abhandlungen) and reviews. But it would also feature something new: "An overview of 
the present situation of philosophical literature, which, running continuously in the 
individual issues, will communicate news from that area."465 Schelling formally took on 
this project in November of 1796, writing to Niethammer that "With great pleasure I'm 
taking on the continuing article on the newest philosophical literature."466 Not 
surprisingly, the precocious young Swabian would quickly deviate from the stated 
purpose of the article, using it not only to develop his own philosophical positions, but to 
publish fragments of various incomplete or unpublished projects.467 One of these was the 
polemic against Nicolai, which I discussed in the previous chapter and with which 
Schelling was obsessed for much of his stay in Leipzig. The General Overview indeed 
contains a few barbs aimed at the famous Berlin publisher. But it also united four other, 
more philosophically interesting projects. 
Schelling had announced the first of these projects to Niethammer in the very 
letter where he accepted the task of the General Overview. "Bit by bit I will give a short 
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overview of the history of philosophy from Kant to the present. But I can't promise you 
the beginning of it for the first issue. However, I will give news of the products of the 
latest book fair, and at the same time introduce the whole project."468 A month later, 
Schelling updated Niethammer on the intended structure of this work but apologized for 
not having enough time to begin it.469 By January of 1797, Schelling began referring to 
the project as a "pragmatic history of the Kantian philosophy," which he intended to 
follow up through Reinhold.470 Schelling's inability to follow through on all these plans 
perhaps shows us something about his personality, although one must remember that he 
was still serving as Hofmeister for his students in Leipzig, a task which occupied an 
enormous chunk of his time. 
Ultimately, Schelling seemed more concerned with an even older project: a 
formal review of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre which he had promised Niethammer all the 
way back at the beginning of 1796.471 At that time, he was familiar only with the 
theoretical portions of Fichte's Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre.472 Thus, 
his intended review was partly motivation to study Fichte more closely. As in the case of 
the "History of the Kantian philosophy," Schelling repeatedly delayed work on the Fichte 
review. Between March and August of 1796, no less than three letters to Niethammer 
contain explanations of why the Fichte review wasn't progressing as fast as Schelling had 
468
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hoped. Finally, at the outset of 1797, he seemed to abandon the format of a review and 
instead promised his own reworking of the Wissenschaftslehre. 
I ask you to assure Fichte that I will never undertake a 
presentation of his system, unless I am certain of finding 
the meaning of it and, through my own reworking 
(Bearbeitung) of it, giving it a unique form. A mere 
restatement of his writings would do a service to no one, 
and the constant repetition of the same things with the same 
words under the same recurring form won't bring anything 
new into fashion.473 
The fact that Schelling later changed the title of the General Overview to Philosophical 
Discourses on the Clarification of the Idealism of the Wissenschaftslehre indicates that he 
believed—or at least wanted to believe—that he had accomplished this original 
"reworking" of Fichte's system. 
Two more projects appear much less often in Schelling's correspondence with 
Niethammer, but traces of both appear in the General Overview. The first of these 
projects reveals that, at some point in 1797, Schelling developed a newfound appreciation 
for the philosophy of Leibniz, whose ideas he believed could be used to solve some of the 
most pressing contemporary philosophical problems. In August of 1797 he indicated to 
Niethammer that he planned to publish a book called "Philosophical Parallels," the first 
part of which would deal with Leibniz and which he hoped "would be insightful for the 
Schelling to Niethammer (16 January 1797) BuD, I: 99. 
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present situation of philosophy."474 In both the General Overview and the Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature, Schelling argued passionately for a revival of the Leibnizian 
philosophy, albeit one which separated the "spirit" of Leibniz from the "letter." The role 
of Leibniz in Schelling's Naturphilosophie will be a major theme of the remainder of this 
dissertation, and I will therefore examine these passages in detail. Besides his book on 
Leibniz, Schelling also planned to write a "Philosophy of the History of Mankind," a 
project he announced to Niethammer when Schelling was still in Stuttgart.475 In that 
letter from January of 1796, he claimed that the introduction was already written, and 
perhaps he transplanted it into the General Overview, the final section of which discussed 
the possibility of a philosophy of history, which he presented as a necessary companion 
to a philosophy of nature. 
Now that we understand the genesis of the General Overview, we can proceed to 
a close reading of some of its most important points, especially those that seem to be 
seeds of Schelling's Naturphilosophie. Although it would be a mistake to overemphasize 
this minor text, especially in relation to the other products of the Leipzig period, the Ideas 
and On the World-Soul, I intend to give the reader at least a general sense of its 
naturphilosophische underpinnings. Since it has never been translated, and since even 
the best English books on Schelling devote only a few paragraphs to it, such a sketch is 
long overdue.476 However, I will apologize at the outset for my cursory remarks about 
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some sections, particularly those which contain lengthy discussions of Kant and 
Reinhold's respective definitions of human free will. Those sections, while important, 
are nonetheless of secondary interest in a dissertation focusing on the Naturphilosophie. 
THE GENERAL OVERVIEW AND THE REJECTION OF THE MECHANISTIC 
PARADIGM 
As I have already mentioned, the actual text of the General Overview is not always 
consistent with its stated purposes, which Schelling sketches out in the first installment. 
He directs his opening salvos at the German philosophical public, with which his 
frustration is obvious. The General Overview, he asserts, is not intended for the "petty 
men" who do philosophy only for the sake of "praise and nourishment," men who are 
easily "bribed with sweet words" and for whom "the truth itself is a lie, because light 
itself is darkened in them, and forward becomes backward (das Gerade verkehrt wird), 
like their souls."477 Rather, the General Overview is for those "who want truth above 
all," those who will neither succumb to error nor misuse the truth.478 Schelling makes it 
clear that his project will be more than just an assembly of reviews, or a mere excerpting 
of current philosophical literature. His project "will be occupied much more with 
characterizing the dominant Spirit of philosophy and its related sciences."479 For that 
reason, he promises to include a "short history of the whole Kantian epoch," an 
unfulfilled promise also found in his correspondence with Niethammer.480 Shortly after, 
4771,4: 59. All translations from the General Overview are my own, unless otherwise noted. 
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Schelling begins reviewing recent books, skewering Karl Heinrich Heydenreich, a 
professor of philosophy at Leipzig, and then gleefully reviewing a satirical attack piece 
on none other than Nicolai.481 
However, as he sent the installments along to Niethammer during 1797, the book 
reviews became ever scarcer, and the General Overview gradually morphed into a 
companion-piece to the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature. The similarities are numerous: 
the General Overview is indeed his first philosophical text which emphasizes the 
importance of the empirical knowledge. He attempts to explain the creation of the 
objective world through "original activities" of spirit.482 The scientific training he 
received in Leipzig rears its head when he begins to deploy a sharply anti-mechanical 
vocabulary. Finally, just as he will later do in the Introduction to the Ideas, Schelling 
Schelling met Heydenreich and was unimpressed, telling Niethammer than Heydenreich was "as they 
say, an imbecile." (Schelling to Niethammer (10 August 1796), BuD I: 86.) Later in the Allgemeine 
Literatur Zeitung, Heydenreich complained that Schelling's review was "shallow babble." (ALZ'Ni. 45 (12 
April 1797), 383). Schelling later responded in the PhilosophicalJournal: "That your letters on atheism 
are in the hands of many readers proves nothing exceptthat there are still many people who read bad 
books." (AA 1,4: 199) The attack piece on Nicolai was Johann Berger's Letters on the Newest Prophetic 
Peepshow-Philosophy of the Wandering Jew. Not surprisingly, Schelling praises the author, but he says 
little beyond that. 
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heaps praise on the philosophy of Leibniz, identifying the great rationalist as a crucial 
resource for those grappling with contemporary philosophical problems. Considering 
that in On the I, Schelling praised Leibniz only as a "consistent dogmatist," this is an 
important change in perspective. 
In the first installment of the General Overview, Schelling hints at a turn to 
Nature. In fact, he goes as far as to say that, since reason has renounced any further 
inquiries into the supernatural, the "areas of nature and humanity (Menschheit)" are "the 
only [areas] in which our investigations can still proceed with success."483 This statement 
seems remarkably similar to his comment at the end of the Philosophical Letters, wherein 
he declared that the resolution of idealistic problems makes a turn to Nature possible. It 
is in this spirit that he breaks new ground in the second installment of the General 
Overview, which he sent to Niethammer in February of 1797. Here, he begins by 
examining the terminology of Kantianism but veers quickly towards a discussion of the 
relationship between the real and ideal in human knowledge. Schelling argues strongly 
that true philosophy must incorporate both empirical knowledge and abstract speculation. 
What exactly is the relationship between the two? Naturally, anyone who looks at this 
question with "sense and understanding" must perceive within himself two opposed 
tendencies: one which gravitates towards reality, and another which tends to raises itself 
"above" reality (uber das Wirkliche sich zu erheben). The first lacks the capability for 
speculation, while the second lacks receptivity for reality. Unfortunately, most 
philosophers are overwhelmed by the second tendency, and thus they don't ask this 
question at all. They are so busy analyzing "dead and abstract concepts" that for them, 
4831,4:60. 
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"there is nothing real."484 Their philosophy is deadened by "mental mechanism, dead 
speculation, or societal corruption."485 According to Schelling, true philosophy requires a 
twin receptivity for speculation and reality. In fact, this combination of empirical 
research and abstract thought is at the center of Schelling's entire Naturphilosophie and 
should be noted by those who mistakenly assert that Schelling wished to discard 
empirical science. If Schelling really believed that abstract reason could replace natural 
science, then his attack on these orthodox philosophers would make little sense. 
At first glance, Schelling's comment about the "opposed tendencies" in all of us 
seems non-controversial. Few would deny that most thinkers gravitate towards one pole 
or the other: some people become scientists and others become philosophers, but only a 
few of rare talent—such as Schelling himself—dare to attempt both. However, 
Schelling's explanation of the interconnection of the real and ideal is much more 
interesting. What exactly are objects, and how are they related to us? He argues that the 
real, objective world is not "out there" beyond our reach, but rather intimately related to 
and created by activities of our spirit. It is at this point that he attempts a construction of 
matter, much like the one Kant had offered in his Metaphysical First Principles of 
Natural Science.486 But whereas Kant had constructed matter out of the opposed forces 
4 8 4 I , 4 : 7 1 
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of attraction and repulsion, Schelling instead uses space and time. Space and time, 
which Kant had called "pure forms of intuition,"488 are for Schelling original "activities 
of the mind in the state of intuition" (die Handlungsweise des Gemuths im Zustand der 
Anschauung).489 Space and time, which even Kant had admitted were aspects of the 
mind and not of external reality, give the world extension and limitation. The 
consequences of this are enormous: not only is the thing-in-itself banished, since objects 
are actually created by "inner spiritual activity (geistigen Selbsttatigkeit)," but Nature or 
the objective world is now infused with activity—the same type of activity that Fichte 
had identified in the mind—making mechanical explanations nonsensical. If objects are 
not really "things," but rather the products of inner activities, then a drastically new 
scientific worldview is needed, one divorced from the mechanical philosophy of Isaac 
Newton. 
Schelling violated Newtonian principles by infusing the objective world with its 
own inherent powers and activities. If the external world, or Nature, is created by 
spiritual activities, then it is not dead and powerless but in fact vibrantly alive. 
Schelling's definition of Nature in the General Overview could not be further removed 
from Newton's: 
Kant clearly emphasized that the laws of nature are 
activities of our spirit, conditions under which our intuition 
first becomes possible: but he added, Nature is not different 
487
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from these laws, [nature] is itself only an ongoing action 
(Handlung) of the infinite spirit, in which it comes to self-
consciousness for the first time, and through which it gives 
that self-consciousness extension, duration, continuity and 
necessity.490 
This stunning passage, which infuses all of nature with the properties of spirit, is 
obviously yet another "creative misreading" of Kant, but it accurately displays how, for 
Schelling, nature is not a realm of lifeless objects but rather teeming with activity. Given 
this, and given the political uses to which mechanism had been put, it should come as no 
surprise that Schelling, still an ardent supporter of the ideals of the French Revolution, 
would reject the mechanistic outlook,491 and that the General Overview would be full of 
derogatory references to mechanism as resulting only in "dead concepts" and 
philosophical bankruptcy. For the duration of his philosophical career, Schelling would 
reject mechanistic explanations of both nature and the mind, and thus the General 
Overview is the starting point of that tendency. 
Besides leading to an outright rejection of mechanism, Schelling's belief that the 
objective world is generated at the level of intuition has another important consequence: 
the imagination (Einbildungskraff) becomes more important than the understanding. 
Schelling's construction of matter does not end with space and time. Rather, he argues 
4 9 0 1 : 4,79. The import of this statement is enormous. Not only does smack of Hegel's mature thought, in 
which an infinite spirit gradually comes to self-consciousness, it also hints at Schelling's mature 
Naturphilosophie, in which the mind is actually developed out of the powers of nature. Furthermore, this 
statement flatly contradicts Fichte's own views about the relationship between nature and the I. Fichte 
believed that it was absolutely impossible for Nature to bring forth reason. See Bonsiepen, Die 
Begrundung einer Naturphilosophie, 142. 
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that "inner spiritual activity" creates, out of two opposed activities (space and time) a 
third activity, namely, the imagination. This is another example of how the General 
Overview points towards Schelling's mature system, since aesthetics are brought directly 
into the most fundamental questions of human experience.492 Meanwhile, the faculty 
which Kant had so exhaustively examined in the Critique of Pure Reason, now takes on a 
secondary position. Schelling describes it at best as a merely "useful" faculty, because it 
can only imitate the original activities of intuition, which alone have access to reality. It 
is a faculty of recapitulation, not of creation. This would unproblematic if some of 
Kant's followers hadn't insisted on an absolute division between sensibility on the one 
hand, and the understanding on the other. According to Schelling, these misguided 
followers devoted themselves solely to concepts, and in doing so they mentally divided 
that which, in nature, is never divided. These are the men Schelling condemned at the 
outset for being detached from reality: they fail to realize that "A concept without 
Versinnlichung through the imagination is a word without meaning, a sound without 
meaning."493 They have a talent for dividing, and they "segregate in thought what in 
Nature is everywhere connected."494 In the end, Schelling associates imagination with 
unity and life, and reflection with division and death. All this will be repeated in the 
introduction to the Ideas, and for good reason. By then, he had developed a brief history 
492
 This passage of the General Overview is obviously central to those concerned both with Schelling's 
aesthetic philosophy and his relationship to the romantic school. Leonardo Distazo makes it central to his 
interpretation of the General Overview {The Paradox of Existence, see especiall 117-131). So too does 
Heinrich Knittermeyer. "[For Schelling] the imagination is the guarantor of the original identity of nature 
and spirit, of the I and not-I.... The imagination here possesses the magical power to solve the riddle of the 
thing-in-itself." As such, this passage shows that Schelling already embraced "romantic life-certainty." 
{Schelling und die Romantische Schule, 73. 
4 9 3 1 , 4: 77. This is obvious another version of Kant's "Thoughts without concepts are empty, intuitions 
without concepts are blind" {CPuR A51/B75). 
of philosophy, one whose endpoint would be the overthrow of the philosophy of 
reflection and division. 
It is highly probably that Schelling's rejection of mechanism was deeply 
connected to his newfound appreciation for Leibniz. Leibniz, after all, was Newton's 
greatest philosophical opponent. Not only did he became embroiled in a bitter 
controversy with Newton's handlers over the discovery of the Calculus, but his 
metaphysics emphatically rejected the notion that matter and motion can fully account for 
the operations of the physical world, instead arguing that "in corporeal things there is 
something over and above extension, in fact, something prior to extension, namely, that 
force of nature implanted everywhere by the Creator."495 Leibniz forcefully rejected 
Newton's contention that nature had to be moved from without by God. Rather, he 
located movement within matter itself.496 Leibniz was a deeply Christian thinker, but 
eighteenth century materialism could easily exploit this doctrine for its own purposes. 
Schelling, standing at the end of this tradition, found in Leibniz a useful resource in the 
construction of his own deeply unorthodox Naturphilosophie. 
In the second installment of the General Overview, Schelling mentions Leibniz 
immediately after launching an attack on the thing-in-itself. According to Schelling, 
there were also things-in-themselves in Leibniz's system, but they were drastically 
different from the phantasms of Kant's followers. Leibniz's "things-in-themselves" were 
the monads, which were unknowable only insofar as they were themselves mirrors of the 
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universe, endowed with the powers of perception and knowing. 7 In other words, 
Leibniz's things-in-themselves were not dead, but infused with life and activity. 
Schelling laments: "Immortal mind, what has become of your teaching under us?.... 
Giving the power of representation to things-in-themselves? No, our halfwits were too 
enlightened for that!"498 Kant's followers are "too smart to read Leibniz" and prefer to 
hear from Kant what Leibniz supposedly said.499 Unfortunately, Schelling never 
explicitly says exactly how Leibniz ties into his own project here. We can only infer that 
he honors the great rationalist as one who did not subscribe to the "philosophy of 
division," and who granted everything in nature its own power. Later on, in the fourth 
installment, he praises Leibniz again, but this passage is less illuminating than the 
introduction to the Ideas, which had already been completed and which we will discuss 
shortly. 
There is much more Naturphilosophie to be found in the General Overview, but 
none of it predates the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, as installment two does. 
Therefore, the remaining parts of the General Overview are more useful as an explication 
of the Ideas than as clues to Schelling's development in Leipzig. We will come back to 
this text during the examination of the Ideas, but there can be no doubt that the 
Naturphilosophie presented there is infinitely more robust than the sketches offered by 
Schelling early in the General Overview. For one, he will greatly refine his construction 
of matter. But he will also unleash a barrage of empirical scientific references 
completely absent from the General Overview. Chapter 3 already presented much of the 
4971,4: 76. 
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scientific context for those references, but we must also familiarize ourselves with the 
scientific training he received from the faculty at the University of Leipzig, some of 
whom were intimately familiar with the anti-mechanical traditions of the late eighteenth-
century. 
IDEAS FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE 
The General Overview was a turning point in Schelling's intellectual development: for 
the first time, he attempted to give balance to idealism by turning his attention to 
empirical reality. In the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, Schelling continues along this 
path, this time intertwining his philosophical arguments with a mountain of empirical 
scientific evidence. Of all Schelling's writings on Naturphilosophie, the Ideas is 
certainly the most empirical: at times, he spends more time summarizing the experiments 
of others than putting forward his own philosophy. But it would be a mistake to dismiss 
the "empirical" parts of the Ideas as unphilosophical.500 Unfortunately, the vast majority 
of commentators do exactly this, devoting most, if not all, of their attention to the book's 
lengthy introduction.501 Furthermore, they compare the Ideas unfavorably to his more 
systematic works of Naturphilosophie.502 Both of these tendencies in Schelling 
500
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scholarship are short sighted, because they blind the reader to the systematic vision of the 
other sections, some of which hint at the "objective" Idealism he will develop in his 
mature Naturphilosophie.503 Schelling grants autonomy to nature, allowing the 
possibility that spirit or mind is simply the highest manifestation of the opposed forces 
out of which the entire natural world is constructed. This is the beginning of Schelling's 
"system," albeit not explicitly stated until his later works. Since I want to stress the 
systematic aspects of the Ideas, my reading of this book will mirror its order of 
composition: I will begin with a discussion of the main body of the text, and then proceed 
to a treatment of the introduction. 
IDEAS, BOOK I 
Any exposition of Book I is fraught with peril: a straightforward reading could leave the 
reader bogged down in scientific debates long since resolved, or even worse, in 
Schelling's sometimes incorrect speculation about topics as diverse as the origin of the 
sun and the true nature of light. At the same time, one should not follow the path of most 
philosophical commentators and ignore the empirical content altogether. Book I—if one 
knows where to look—contains its own philosophical insights.504 It is not simply a 
preparation for the "real" philosophy which comes in Book II. Schelling makes this clear 
503
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in his preface, where he abjures any attempt to "apply philosophy to natural science," 
instead preferring "to allow natural science to arise philosophically."505 What unites the 
disparate threads of Book I—which contains sections on combustion, light, air, 
electricity, and magnetism—is Schelling's relentless search for unity in multiplicity, a 
drive which stretches at least back to the Renaissance, and which arises again in the 
philosophy of Leibniz, not to mention in the German Romantic tradition.506 Schelling 
wants to explain a variety of phenomena as parsimoniously as possible, and for that 
reason he swiftly disposes of the countless imponderable fluids introduced as explanatory 
grounds for forces in the late eighteenth century, instead linking everything to the 
dynamic polarity of nature. The other striking feature of Book I is its emphasis on the 
organicity of the physical world. At several junctures in the text, Schelling revels in the 
harmonious interaction of different inorganic forces. Clearly, the fundamental idea of On 
the World-Soul—the primacy of the organic even in the inorganic world—-is already 
nascent in the Ideas. 
In most of the chapters of Book I, Schelling constantly repeats one complaint: 
empirical science often succeeds only in discovering the laws of the phenomenal world, 
while simultaneously failing to penetrate to the "true nature" of the forces under 
investigation. In his chapter on light, he notes that "natural science seems as yet to have 
been more fortunate in investigating the laws according to which this wonderful element 
505
 AA, I, 5: 64. All translations from the Ideas, unless otherwise noted, come from Schelling, Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature, trans. Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1988) 
506 . . j ^ Schellingian conception [of matter] touches on that [tradition] which Leibniz had begun to 
appropriate: namely the logical unification of the standpoint of Aristotelian physics and the pre-socratic 
problem of unity in multiplicity as a whole; in other words, world as world." Rainer E. Zimmermann, Die 
Rekonstruktion von Raum, Zeit, undMaterie: Moderne Implikationen Schellinger Naturphilosophie , 42-43. 
202 
moves than in discovering its nature," a discovery which would no doubt "widen the 
horizon of mankind."507 He makes a similar comment about electricity. Perhaps no other 
phenomenon, Schelling says, "has been observed with such precision," and yet scientists 
still cannot say exactly what the "true nature and constitution" of electricity is.508 What 
made existing attempts to reach the "true nature" of heat, light, electricity, and magnetism 
so utterly unsatisfying was the introduction of so-called "imponderable fluids" as a fix-all 
solution. 
This approach was extremely popular in the cases of heat and electricity. In 1783 
Lavoisier not only launched his attack on phlogiston, but also attempted to explain heat 
itself by postulating a "subtle fluid" known as "caloric."509 This fluid, which Lavoisier 
presumed to be weightless and invisible, and which could squeeze in and out of solids 
and liquids, naturally flowed from hot to cold bodies. Schelling rejects this theory for 
two reasons. On the one hand, it raises as many questions as it answers: exactly how, 
Schelling asks, can a weightless, invisible fluid communicate heat to real, tangible 
matter? Furthermore, Lavoisier's theory simply begs the question: "to postulate a heat-
matter as the cause of heat is not to explain the situation, but to pay oneself with 
words."510 Ironically, in his caloric theory, Lavoisier commits the same error that Stahl 
had when he developed phlogiston theory: he "explained" something by postulating a 
special kind of matter or stuff, and in doing so got no closer to a real explanation of the 
507
 AA, 1,5:118-119. 
508
 ^ , 1 , 5 : 1 4 5 . 
509
 Schelling's attack on caloric was by no means successful. In fact, caloric theory remained almost 
unchallenged for another twenty years. Only in 1815 did some French scientists begin to revolt. See 




phenomenon.511 Benjamin Franklin had postulated a similar fluid to account for 
electricity. This electrical fluid, made up of tiny particles, permeated all bodies, because 
these particles were naturally attracted to matter (although they repelled each other). 
Positive and negative charges were explained by a surplus or a deficit of these particles, 
respectively, and electrical conduction was simply the result of their movement from one 
body to another. For Schelling, this is yet another example of: 
a lazy Philosophy of Nature, which believes it has 
explained everything if it postulates the causes of 
phenomena as basic materials in bodies, from which they 
then emerge (tamquam Deus ex machina) only when 
needed to explain some phenomenon in the shortest and 
, 512 
most convenient way. 
Schelling's criticism of imponderable fluids reveals an ingenious critique of 
eighteenth century mechanism, which will also appear in Book II. Both Franklin's theory 
of electrical fluid and Lavoisier's caloric theory responded to the very real demands of 
eighteenth century physics, where mechanical causes were de rigeur for any respectable 
scientist. Both Franklin and Lavoisier were therefore forced to literally "invent" tiny, 
weightless, invisible particles to explain forces which were seemingly incompatible with 
the mechanistic paradigm. It is understandable, though ironic, that Schelling—a 
speculative thinker par excellence—repeatedly accuses mechanistic physics of being too 
"speculative!" Instead of discarding the assumptions of mechanistic physics, scientists 
511
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like Franklin and Lavoisier "hamper" themselves with "unknown elements, the makeshift 
of a defective physics," and literally begin to "conjure up forces.. .as substances in 
bodies."513 Many historians of science smugly dismiss Schelling's "speculative physics" 
and contrast it with the supposedly sober, empirical work carried out by the "real" 
scientists of his day. But perhaps Schelling has a point: eighteenth century mechanical 
physics, despite its pretensions to the contrary, relied on an elaborate metaphysics which 
necessitated questionable assumptions about the nature of matter and force.514 
Schelling clearly believes that his own dynamic construction of matter, which 
posits an original duality of attraction and repulsion in nature, helps him achieve the 
parsimony so lacking in mechanical theories of force. Because he can trace everything 
back to active forces instead of to inert matter, he has no need to invoke such fictions as 
heat-matter, light-matter, or an electrical fluid. Instead, he can boldly assert that "Nature 
is able to achieve the entire manifold of her phenomena, on the small scale as well as on 
the large, by means of opposing forces of attraction and repulsion."515 The forces which 
had perplexed eighteenth century scientists are simply different manifestations of that 
original duality. Schelling continuously tries to link the different phenomena together as 
closely as possible, and thus he asserts, for example, that heat is a modification of 
light,516 which in turn is a modification of matter itself.517 He easily likens the polarity 
inherent in both electricity and magnetism to the fundamental attractive and repulsive 
513
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forces that give rise to nature. To be sure, he sometimes stumbles in his desperate 
attempts to connect everything: when he asserts that oxygen is an integral part of 
electricity, it seems downright bizarre.518 But it is perfectly consistent with his search for 
unity in multiplicity, and it should come as no surprise that he begins echoing Leibniz in 
his chapter on electricity: "[Our mind] believes that it sees Nature only where it discovers 
the greatest simplicity of laws amid the greatest variety of phenomena, and the most 
stringent parsimony of means in the highest prodigality of effects."519 But Schelling has 
another, perhaps equally Leibnizian aim in mind in Book I: at several points in the text, 
he describes the harmonious—dare we say organic—interaction between seemingly 
inorganic forces. 
Nowhere is Schelling's belief in the organicity of the natural world more evident 
than in his chapter on air, where "nature" is almost always personified. According to 
Schelling, nature sustains life on earth by continually recycling the atmosphere, keeping 
the composition of the air constant, and fueling the processes of life and death. Plants 
"enrich" the "raw material" from the atmosphere and "exhale vital air." And when they 
wither, they "give back to their great provider what they once derived from her."520 Thus 
there arises a continual cycle, one evident even in the seasons, in which "one side of the 
earth is robbed of all its beauty, the other displays all the glory of spring."521 Like any 
organism, the earth is both cause and effect of itself, simultaneously being and becoming: 
Ibid., 164. 
Ibid., 162-163. 
Ibid., I, 5: 139. 
Ibid., 139. 
This is the great artifice of Nature, by which alone she 
ensures the perpetual cycle in which she endures, and 
therewith her own eternity. Nothing that is or becomes can 
be or become unless another concurrently is and becomes, 
and even the perishing of a natural product is nothing but 
the payment of a debt it has incurred to the whole of the 
rest of Nature; hence there is nothing original, nothing 
absolute, nothing self-subsistent within Nature.522 
Schelling returns to this imagery in the concluding chapter of Book I, again stressing the 
interconnection between all parts of nature. "Nature, in order to make possible the 
greatest multiplicity of phenomena," has set up duality, polarity, conflict.523 It is this 
strife that drives the natural world. "But in order that unity should prevail in that 
multiplicity, and harmony in this conflict," nature dictates that its heterogeneous parts 
combine with one another, "and only in this combination become a whole."524 
Ultimately, Schelling's search for unity in multiplicity—a search which leads him 
to the polarity at the heart of all nature —goes hand in hand with his concept of organism. 
Although he articulates these ideas elsewhere in much greater detail, this short exposition 
of Book I of the Ideas should have demonstrated that even Schelling's most empirically-
oriented work contains philosophical insights of its own. Book I reveals that by early 
1797, Schelling had already developed a sophisticated and relatively consistent 
methodology for investigating natural phenomena. He will deploy that methodology 
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again in On the World-Soul, although in an even more systematic form. At this point, 
however, we must turn to the more philosophically-oriented sections of the Ideas: first, 
Book II, and finally the Introduction, which he wrote after he had completed the main 
text. 
IDEAS, BOOK II 
Schelling pursues two projects in the second book of the Ideas. First, he develops a more 
sophisticated construction of matter than the one found in the General Overview, using 
the mechanical physics of Georges-Louis Le Sage as a foil for his own ideas. 
Throughout Book II, Schelling repeats a criticism already introduced in Book I: that 
mechanical physics, despite its pretensions to cold objectivity, is rife with hidden 
metaphysical assumptions.525 Even worse, just like Lavoisier's "caloric" and Franklin's 
electrical fluid, it often assumes what it purports to explain. After laying out his own 
dynamic construction of matter, Schelling concludes Book II by returning to the subject 
of chemistry, attempting to show—contra Kant—that chemistry can exist not merely as a 
collection of empirical facts, but as a true science, and that his dynamic physics offers the 
most plausible foundation of such a chemistry. 
Kant had made a similar point. "Hence all natural philosophers who have wished to proceed 
mathematically in their occupation have always, and must have always, made use of metaphysical 
principles (albeit unconsciously), even if they themselves solemnly guarded against all claims of 
metaphysics upon their science." AA 4: 472. All translations from this text are from "Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science," in Kant, Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, ed. Henry Allison, Peter 
Heath, et. al., trans.. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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 By 1797, Kant himself had changed his mind about the status of chemistry. Lavoisier's revolution and 
its reception in Germany had, in Kant's view, given chemistry the mathematical basis necessarily to qualify 
it as a true science. However, for Schelling's generation, Kant's change of heart remained hidden in the 
Opus Posthumum. 
Throughout Book II, Schelling relies heavily on Kant's Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science (1786). That work had many aims, but the one most 
relevant here is contained in the second chapter, the "Metaphysical foundations of 
dynamics." Here, Kant identifies two "essential fundamental force[s] of matter," 
repulsive force and attractive force.527 For Kant, it makes no sense for philosophy to 
begin with the presupposition of indivisible, impenetrable atoms of matter, and then to 
explain forces afterwards. Rather, he argues the opposite: it is forces that must be 
presupposed in order to make sense of matter. Kant begins with repulsive force, showing 
that impenetrability is not an accidental property but rather a manifestation of "the 
expansive power of matter."528 Thus, what we experience as "hardness" or 
impenetrability is actually a second-order product of an original force. Once Kant 
establishes the repulsive force, he sees attraction as a consequence, using an argument 
Schelling will later appropriate. Without attractive force, there would be no matter 
whatsoever, because: 
.. .matter, by its repulsive force" (containing the ground of 
impenetrability), would, [through itself] alone and if no 
other moving force counteracted it, be confined within no 
limit of extension; that is, it would disperse itself to 
infinity, and no specified quantity of matter would be found 
in any specified space.529 
Kant, AA, 4:508 
Kant reminds us that the converse is also true: if attraction existed without repulsion, all 
matter would "coalesce into a mathematical point" or singularity, "and space would be 
empty, and thus without any matter."530 In the end, repulsive and attractive forces are 
twin conditions for the possibility of matter. Neither is sufficient by itself. 
Kant's construction of matter in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 
has important epistemological implications. Although we can deduce them from 
evidence of the senses, the "fundamental forces" of attraction and repulsion are 
ultimately inaccessible to human understanding. Indeed, we cannot even be certain that 
such forces are possible, even though we do have a right to assume them based on the 
"fundamental" concept of matter: namely thatwhich fills up space and whose repulsive 
force must be balanced by an attractive force.531 Natural philosophers thus arrive at 
original forces only through "the reduction of given, apparently different forces to a 
smaller number of forces and powers that explain the actions of the former, although this 
reduction proceeds only up to fundamental forces, beyond which reason cannot go."532 
The very fact that, in Kant's "metaphysical-dynamical" explanation of matter, we cannot 
truly comprehend the most fundamental forces of nature makes the opposing 
"mathematical-mechanical mode of explanation" much more attractive, at least on the 
surface. Physicists who explain the variety of matter by postulating differently shaped 
atoms—which, of course, reside in a void—appeal to the common understanding, since 
"both the shapes and empty interstices can be verified with mathematical evidence."533 It 
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is not surprising, then, that "atomism or the corpuscular philosophy [has] always retained 
its authority and influence on the principles of natural science, with few changes from 
Democritus of old, up to Descartes, and even to our time."534 However, Kant refuses to 
take the easy road, claiming that "a merely mathematical physics pays double for this 
advantage."535 Not only must it set out from the "empty concept" of absolute 
impenetrability, it must also strip matter of its inherent forces and find new, fantastic 
ways of explaining them. Ironically, the "mathematical-mechanical" physicists—those 
who supposedly reject metaphysical explanations—must use too much "imagination" in 
constructing their system, and in Kant's view, this is inconsistent with the 
epistemological "caution" of the critical philosophy.536 
Although Schelling will closely follow Kant's argument, he will proceed in a 
slightly different way. In addition, Schelling is willing—as always—to push beyond 
Kant's cautious epistemology. Schelling's own construction of matter begins—like 
Kant's—with a criticism of mechanical physics. Any system of physics which views 
matter as impenetrable and inert starts to break down as soon as philosophers and 
scientists demand an explanation offorce. Clearly, Schelling says, there are two basic 
forces at play in the world: attraction and repulsion. These forces manifest themselves to 
any observer: in gravitation, chemical affinities, magnetism, electricity, and even 
mechanical impact, and therefore they must be explained. According to Schelling, only 





First, they can simply superimpose force onto matter. But how can we explain this? 
How can a non-corporeal force be "implanted into" a hard and powerless piece of matter? 
The forces must be simply postulated as "hidden qualities, which are not allowed to 
figure in any reputable natural science."538 The second option is to assert that attraction 
is an illusion, and that it is actually the action of a "more rarified matter" that drives 
things towards each other. This approach ends in a thoroughly atomistic physics, one 
in which atoms with special properties explain the "forces" operative on "normal atoms." 
According to Schelling, the latter explanation is simply "the expedient of a lazy 
philosophy," which escapes its predicament by "cut[ting] off all inquiry in advance, by a 
dictatorial fiat."540 
Here, Schelling has in mind the system of Georges-Louis Le Sage, a Genevan 
physicist whose most important contribution to eighteenth century physics was a 
completely mechanistic account of universal gravitation. In 1748, Le Sage first proposed 
his theory of gravitation to the Paris Academie des Sciences in an unpublished Essay on 
the Origin of Dead Forces. He continued to write, finally gaining acclaim through the 
popular exposition in his Lucrece Newtonien (1784). As the title aptly demonstrates, Le 
One must remember that an important strain of eighteenth century thought focused on the problem of 
something else being "superimposed" onto matter: namely, thought. John Locke famously left open the 
possibility that God himself could in fact do so. "Or, who on the other side, finding not Cogitation within 
the natural powers of Matter, examined over and over again, by the utmost Intention of Mind, have the 
confidence to conclude, that Omnipotency itself, cannot give Perception and Thought to a Substance, which 
has the Modification of Solidity." (Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1975), Book IV, Chapter 3, §6, 542. Although Locke's statement had 
"dangerous" implications and was picked up by the radical Enlightenment, the mechanical physicists who 
suggested that God must implant matter with force had the most orthodox intentions, retaining a prominent 






Sage attempts to trace his ideas back to "the first Epicureans.. .[who] very likely 
discovered, without effort, the laws of universal gravitation and its mechanical cause."541 
Le Sage presents his ideas as though he were "teaching" the Epicureans the true 
implications of their doctrines, finally arriving at his unique contribution, the "gravific 
particles" which supposedly cause gravitation. Le Sage is the perfect example of a 
physicist who suggests that attraction is illusory. To illustrate Le Sage's theory, let us 
picture two large, spherical bodies. Around them is a sea of "supramundane" gravific 
particles, which exist everywhere in the universe. "These tiny bodies, moving 
(randomly) in every direction," get "intercepted" or shielded off by large bodies. This 
results in a deficit of particles between bodies, which are unable to "counterbalance" the 
particles on the opposite sides.542 Because the density of particles is greater on the 
opposite sides, the tiny particles push the large bodies towards one another, just like a 
sandblaster would push even a very heavy ball: not through attraction, but through 
impact. Attraction is nothing more than an illusion. 
541
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Although Le Sage is largely forgotten today, no less a scientist than Georg 
Christoph Lichtenberg took his theory seriously. Commenting on LeSage's Lucrece 
Newtonien, Lichtenberg declared in 1790, "If it is a dream, then it is the greatest and most 
sublime dream ever dreamt, with which we can fill a great gap in our knowledge (eine 
Lucke in unseren Buchern ausfullen konnen)—a gap which can only be filled by a 
dream."543 Lichtenberg would later change his mind and adopt a dynamic, Kantian 
account of gravitation, but the fact that he temporarily embraced Le Sage's theory is 
evidence that scientists saw it as a viable option in late eighteenth century Germany. 
Schelling is even complimentary of its ingenuity and explanatory power, closely echoing 
Kant, who claimed that mechanical physics was based on "empty concepts" but 
nonetheless appealed very well to sensory intuition: 
G.C. Lichtenberg, "Aufzeichnungen iiber die Theorie der Schwere von G.L. Le Sage," Nachrichten der 
Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Gottingen, II. Mathematisch-physikalische Klasses (no.l), ed. H. Zehe 
and W. Hinrichs. 
This, then is the greatest advantage of all mechanical 
physics, that it can render intuitable to the senses that 
which can never be presented in sensory intuition by a 
dynamical physics.. .Thus, considered within its limits, the 
mechanical physics can itself become a masterpiece of 
cleverness and mathematical precision, even though it is 
utterly groundless in its principles.544 
Despite Schelling's admiration for Le Sage's ingenuity, he refutes—sometimes 
even mockingly—three crucial, but in Schelling's mind, unjustified postulates of Le 
Sage's account of gravitation.545 In each case, the main problem is that Le Sage's atoms 
are "intuitable to the senses," and therefore—unlike dynamic forces—demand empirical 
confirmation. The three unjustified postulates are as follows: 
1. ".. .an infinite number of hard, very small and well-nigh identical particles are 
uniformly distributed in an empty space."546 
2. "Now these particles move in a straight, undeviating line, but in the most varied 
directions; their motion is so much alike in velocity that every point in space can 
be taken, for a moment at least, as the centre."547 
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3. "at any given point in space in which the atoms are moving, there is a spherical 
body much larger than the primary particles."548 
Schelling's criticism of these three points is as follows: first, Le Sage's greatest 
advantage—the fact that differently shaped, indivisible atoms can be "presented in 
sensory intuition"—is at the same time his greatest disadvantage. Rather than leading us 
to sober empirical inquiry, the idea of an "absolutely small" and "absolutely hard" 
particle "allows completely free play to the imagination from the very outset."549 Exactly 
how small and how hard are they? We can never know, because despite the apparent 
advantage of Le Sage's system—that we can picture tiny, differently shaped atoms—he 
in fact takes us beyond any empirical inquiry. We will never be able to confirm the 
existence of an "absolutely small" particle. 
Schelling's criticism of the second is more straightforward, and is as old as 
Aristotle himself. Le Sage and other mechanical physicists desperately try to explain all 
motion by impact. But Le Sage himself has told us that the universe is full of tiny 
particles moving quickly in every direction. Exactly how, Schelling asks, did those 
particles get set into motion? Schelling's dynamical system would have no such 
problem, since matter itself is derived from original forces which are the true building 
blocks of the universe. But Le Sage is at a loss to explain how things got put into motion 
in the first place. Having dismissed the first two postulates, Schelling turns to the third, 
which seemingly exasperates him. Le Sage has already—almost out of thin air— 
presupposed not only matter itself, but an enormous number of invisible, moving 
548
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particles. Now, he presupposes the existence of "large spherical bodies" as well! This is 
the aspect of Le Sage's system that prompts Schelling to call it a "lazy philosophy of 
Nature," and he comments bitterly: 
If it is permissible simply to presuppose solid bodies, which 
are furthermore different from one another in mass, and on 
top of that a fluid which moves itself and strikes upon the 
larger bodies, there is no understanding how a man of 
Newton's genius would want to go back to forces in matter 
itself, in order to explain the possibility of a material 
world.550 
Schelling admits that "these are all metaphysical objections.. .but they are perfectly in 
order against a hyperphysical physics."551 Le Sage's system makes no attempt to give a 
real explanation of motion or force, and it postulates hard, indivisible bodies "which 
cannot be realized by any experience, and which it treats nonetheless according to laws of 
experience."552 In fact, 
The mechanical physics is a. purely ratiocinatory system. It 
does not ask what is, and what can be determined from 
experience, but makes assumptions of its own, and then 
asks: if this or that were the case, as I take it to be, what 
would follow from that?553 
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Schelling closes the book on Le Sage by once again reiterating that mechanism's greatest 
advantage is also its undoing: a physics based on primary particles demands empirical 
confirmation, and Le Sage fails miserably on this count. The dynamic system, however, 
has no such burden, and Schelling will sketch his own system out in the following two 
chapters. But he never takes his eye off Le Sage, whose theories "at least serve the 
purpose of alerting natural science.. .[that it] must seek its credentials elsewhere, in a 
higher science."554 That "higher science" is, of course, philosophy. 
Schelling's own construction of matter need not detain us for long, because it 
largely follows Kant's own argumentation. In fact, at one point Schelling admits that he 
is simply taking "extracts from Kant," since the derivation of the basic laws of dynamics 
"has been performed with such lucidity and completelbness, in Kant's Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science, that nothing further requires to be done at this point."555 
But Schelling goes far beyond anything Kant himself would countenance. He argues that 
there is a profound connection between the repulsive and attractive forces in nature and 
the activities of spirit, and as such the former can be derived not only empirically, but 
from a priori from the latter. "The basic forces of matter are thus nothing else but the 
expression of those original activities for the understanding, for reflection; not the true 
in-itself, which exists only in intuition."556 According to Schelling, the repulsive force 
can be derived from the original, unlimited activity of the spirit. And just as 
consciousness is impossible without something to limit that activity, so too is attraction 
necessary to counteract the repulsive force in matter, which, as Kant already told us, 
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would otherwise be dispersed out to infinity. It is tempting to read this as a ringing 
endorsement of some kind of subjective Idealism. If the basic forces of matter are merely 
derivations of mental activity, then the mind really is "creating" the external world. But 
this would be a gross oversimplification of Schelling's position, and it contradicts other 
passages in both the General Overview and the Ideas.557 In the former, he described both 
the external world and the finite mind as aspects of the coming-to-consciousness of an 
infinite spirit. In this sense, the mental and physical are suffused with the same basic 
activities, which manifest themselves in different ways. Neither comes "before" the 
other: in fact, consciousness is impossible without an object. 
Moreover, Schelling seems to believe that the upward development of nature— 
which begins with the "basic forces" of matter—culminates in self-consciousness. Thus, 
the finite mind is not the origin of the natural world but the endpoint of its trajectory, a 
trajectory propelled by an infinite spirit coming to self-consciousness. This process starts 
on the ground level. Matter, Schelling says, has a desire to "escape from the equilibrium" 
in which it is trapped. "Dead matter" can, with the help of "external influences," move to 
a "higher level," in which the free play of forces leads upwards to a "work of Nature," 
which finds "continuance in this very conflict itself." 
Thus already in the chemical properties of matter there are 
actually lying the first seeds, albeit still quite undeveloped, 
of a future system of nature, which in its most diversified 
forms and structures can evolve up to a point at which 
557
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creative Nature seems to return back into herself, [a point at 
which] the necessary and the contingent, the mechanical 
and the free, part company. 
There can be little doubt that the mechanical and the free "part company" when 
consciousness arises; he says so explicitly in Chapter 5. When we grant independence to 
an object, "subjective and objective worlds divide," and the object "appears as something 
that exists quite independently of our freedom."559 
THE "INTRODUCTION" TO THE IDEAS 
The "Introduction" to the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature is perhaps the most easily 
digestible and concise presentation of Schelling's early Naturphilosophie. Unlike Books 
I and II, it has been studied in great detail, both in German and in English.560 For that 
reason, I will focus on an underappreciated aspect of the introduction, rather than 
repeating what has already been said elsewhere. I have already hinted at the fact that 
Schelling's appropriation of the philosophy of Leibniz will be a major theme in this 
dissertation. There is no better place to broach this subject extensively than here. The 
AA, I: 5, 190. This whole passage convincingly demonstrates that the ideas of the World Soul are 
already nascent here. Schelling's belief in the "connection between the living and the non-living," which is 
"presented in his theory of matter," implies that "They are the same principles that operate in the organic 
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introduction contains a glowing appraisal of the great German rationalist. Even Fichte 
described Schelling's introduction as an excellent summary of Leibniz's philosophy.561 
Most scholars focus disproportionately on Schelling's debt to Spinoza, and there is good 
reason for this.562 As we have seen, his early Idealistic texts reference Spinoza 
constantly, and he will later call Naturphilosophie the "Spinozism of Physics" and write 
his Identdtsphilosophie in geometrical format. But in 1797 it was Leibniz who more 
significantly inspired Schelling's Philosophy of Nature. Spinoza's rejection of teleology, 
his determinism, and his belief in a solely linear causality certainly cannot be reconciled 
with Schelling's Naturphilosophie, which emphasized the creativity, dynamism, and even 
freedom of the natural world. Furthermore, that which most captivated Schelling—the 
organic, whose causality is circular, not linear^-must be coaxed out of Spinoza, if it is 
present at all.563 On the other hand, Leibniz's doctrines in these spheres overlap 
significantly with Schelling's. Leibniz's rejection of matter as primary and his 
simultaneous emphasis on living force made his metaphysics attractive to Schelling, who 
throughout his Naturphilosophie struggled to Understand phenomena (electricity, 
magnetism, chemical processes, and ultimately life itself) for which mechanical 
explanations were hopelessly inadequate. Leibniz's Monadology also seemed to offer a 
Fichte, Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre) with the First and Second Introductions, ed. and 
trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (New York: Meredith, 1970), 83. 
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method of rescuing individuality from the threat of mere identity. Given this, it should 
not be surprising that Schelling explicitly called for the revival of the Leibnizian system 
in 1797. This is not to say that Spinoza was unimportant for Schelling. Rather, it reveals 
Schelling as an heir of a century-long tradition of reading Spinoza through Leibnizian 
lenses. Discussions of the two are never far apart in his early works. When he discusses 
Leibniz, he usually also discusses Spinoza. However, while he probably became 
acquainted with Leibniz very early in his life, it took him quite a while to develop a 
positive view of the latter's contributions to philosophy. 
EVIDENCE FOR SCHELLING'S ACQUAINTANCE WITH LEIBNIZ 
Schelling is notorious for borrowing ideas from other authors without citing them.565 
Unfortunately, such a tendency makes it easy for scholars to read whatever influences 
they desire into Schelling, usually on the basis of mere analogies or similarities in 
doctrine.566 In order to avoid such a pitfall, it is necessary to demonstrate that Schelling 
was more than just vaguely familiar with Leibniz. This is especially important because 
Leibniz published no comprehensive summary of his philosophy during his lifetime, and 
his works were largely unknown—even in Germany—until the publication of his New 
Essays in the 1760s. Fortunately, Schelling's biography and his correspondence reveal 
564
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that he was not only familiar with but—at least by 1797—enthusiastic about the author of 
the Monadology. 
It is very likely that Schelling first learned about Leibniz from his own father, 
who taught his son in Bebenhausen. Although Joseph Schelling's most important 
intellectual work dealt with so-called oriental languages, in his youth, he studied under a 
famous Leibnizian logician, Gottfried Ploucquet. In fact, he wrote an ontological treatise 
as his Magisterarbeit in 1758 which closely followed Ploucquet's own doctrines.567 
Undoubtedly, the precocious young Schelling would have learned at least something of 
the Leibnizian philosophy from his father and teacher before he entered the Tubingen 
Stift at the tender age of 15. In Chapter 1 I showed that his teachers lectured on 
Leibniz.568 Abel in particular was greatly inspired by his encounter with the Leibnizian 
philosophy, and though his thought was extremely "eclectic," he was very popular with 
the students at the Stift.569 
This evidence is sufficient to show that, by the age of 17, Schelling had already 
had a good degree of informal and formal schooling on the Leibnizian philosophy. His 
correspondence also testifies to his interest in Leibniz. In early 1796, he expresses a 
largely negative view in a letter to J.H. Obereit, in which he faults Leibniz for making 
God too transcendent: "I believe that with Leibniz the middle ages of philosophy really 
began (although the scholastics had already paved the way to it), where people made the 
absolute into a mere being of abstraction, and treated God not as the being of all being, 
567
 Michael Franz, "Joseph Friedrich Schelling, Klosterprofesspr in Bebenhausen," 141. On Ploucquet and 
his intellectual work see Karl Aner, Gottfried Ploucquets Leben undLehren. 
568
 BuD, 1,20. 
BuD, I, 10. 
but rather (in the popular sense) as the being outside of all being."570 This cool appraisal 
of Leibniz (with its implicit argument for Spinoza's superiority) mirrored the attitude of 
On the I and the Philosophical Letters. Nevertheless, Schelling completely reversed his 
opinion in the following year. As we have already seen, one of the various projects 
which Schelling planned during his Leipzig period was a book on Leibniz, the 
Philosophical Parallels.511 Seven months later, he would refer to his Leibniz project 
again, this time shortly after the completion of The World Soul): "I can't send you a 
treatise on Leibniz, as I had hoped, because I want to work it out better and I don't have 
the time."572 Unfortunately, as is the case with a number of Schelling's intended projects 
in these early years, no remnants of this text have survived. However, it would almost 
certainly prove that Schelling's Naturphilosophie ran parallel to his increasing 
appreciation of Leibniz's own philosophy of nature.573 One can only understand this 
"philosophical parallel" by contrasting it to Schelling's earlier dismissive attitudes 
towards Leibniz. 
In addition to the startling letter to Obereit, we have evidence from On the I. 
There, Schelling categorizes him variously as a "consistent dogmatist," an "empirical 
idealist," and a "transcendental realist."574 Transcendental realism he defines as a 
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philosophy in which "the not-I is posited as quite independent of the I."575 Its necessary 
companion is empirical idealism. I take Schelling to be arguing that the mature Leibniz, 
insofar as he ascribed all reality, all unity, all being to the monads, was thus a 
transcendental realist. And insofar as transcendental realism = empirical idealism, he is 
the latter as well. This is a justified categorization, for Leibniz believed that our 
experience is made up only of phenomena (though admittedly well-founded phenomena); 
thus he was most certainly an empirical idealist. What we perceive in the object is 
explained "as existing only in the sense image of the object."576 Since this doctrine leads 
to the familiar contradictions of dogmatism, Schelling dismisses pre-established harmony 
as only a device by which Leibniz attempts "to save the identity and immutability of 
things."577 Curiously, Schelling describes Leibniz in much the same terms as he 
describes his fellow dogmatist Spinoza: "For Leibniz everything that exists is not-I, even 
God" and all phenomena are "just so many limitations of the infinite reality of the not-
I."578 This adds some gloss to his comment to Obereit; the fact that Leibniz makes God 
transcendent is symptomatic of his tendency to make everything transcendent. All this 
betrays a deferential yet critical attitude towards Leibniz. Schelling praises him insofar 
as he was consistent in his errors, but nowhere does he advocate a revival of the 
Leibnizian system. 
575
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THE IDEAS AND SCHELLING'S REVIVAL OF LEIBNIZ 
By the time Schelling writes the introduction to the Ideas, his portrayal of Leibniz is 
radically different. Schelling's introduction to the Ideas begins by identifying the task a 
Philosophy of Nature must undertake, namely "to deduce the possibility of Nature, that is 
of the all-inclusive world of experience, from first principles."579 In mankind's 
philosophical infancy, such a task was unnecessary, for he "was still at one with himself 
and the world about him."580 Philosophy as such began only when this oneness was 
shattered, leading eventually to the tyranny of "mere speculation," which, by treating the 
world as a thing-in-itself, "makes the separation between man and the world 
permanent."581 Schelling argues that even the greatest philosophers accepted this division 
between "spirit and matter" until Spinoza arrived and, "with complete clarity, saw mind 
and matter as one, thought and extension simply as modifications of the same principle." 
However, in doing so, Spinoza made what for Schelling was a mistake: he "conceived the 
COT 
finite immediately in the idea of the infinite." Leibniz did the opposite, and in a 
stunning conclusion to this line of thought, Schelling claims that "The time has come 
when [Leibniz's] philosophy can be re-established." 
What exactly does Schelling see as Leibniz's philosophy? For one, he 
approvingly cites Leibniz's denial of the ability of external causes to affect the mind, 
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seeming to agree that "all alterations, all change of perceptions and presentations in a 
mind, could proceed only from an inner principle."584 And he returns to this point later 
on in the introduction, again touting the superiority of Leibniz to Spinoza. According to 
Schelling, what philosophy requires is the derivation of experience (and Nature) from 
within the mind itself, thus unifying our ideas with things outside us (i.e. making them 
identical). Spinoza stumbled because, although he indeed united them, he united them in 
an infinite outside us, thus making man only a thought of God. As such, Spinoza's 
system "is the most unintelligible that ever existed."585 Instead of recognizing that the 
union of the "absolutely active" and the "absolutely passive" exists "within me originally 
without my cooperation," Spinoza attributed the unity to "an infinite Substance outside 
* V , 0 » 5 8 6 
me. 
Schelling explicitly praises Leibniz for admitting this union of active and passive 
within us. 
.. .here is the point where he diverges from Spinoza and 
connects with him. It is impossible to understand Leibniz 
without having stationed oneself at this point. Jacobi has 
shown that his whole system sets out from the concept of 
individuality and reverts to it. In the concept of 
individuality alone, there is an original union of what all 
584 Ibid., 77, 
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other philosophy separates, the positive and the negative, 
the active and the passive in our nature.587 
The text to which Schelling refers here is Jacobi's On the Doctrine of Spinoza, where he 
cites the principium individuationis as the critical "point of difference" between Leibniz 
and Spinoza.588 However, we must ask: what specifically about Leibniz's concept of 
individuality is so attractive to Schelling, and how is it related to the problem of transition 
from the infinite to the finite? The answer to this is not clear, although importing an 
explanation from his later First Outline may be helpful here. There, Schelling makes it 
clear that Naturphilosophie should not sacrifice multiplicity for the sake of unity, and 
thus the individual must not be swallowed up in an identity, but preserved and made into 
the fundamental building block of Nature. Furthermore, the individual forces of nature 
should somehow express Nature's infinite productivity589 The individual is also crucial 
because, if it did not limit this infinite productivity, there would be no Nature at all. 
Thus, this multiplicity of individuals simultaneously "mirrors the infinite" and negates it, 
i.e. makes it into a finite product. Using this framework, we can begin to understand why 
Schelling contends that "the finite and infinite are originally united, and this original 
union exists nowhere except in the essence of an individual nature."590 Schelling's 
"individual nature" is thus a virtual equivalent to the monad, which, though only an 
"imitation" of God591 is yet the product of the "continual fulgurations of the divinity from 
™lbid. 
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moment to moment."592 They are, in some sense, both infinite and finite, and they form 
the building blocks of Nature. 
Although this connection may be tenuous, Schelling's next appropriation of 
Leibniz is more straightforward. Philosophy must, especially with an eye to natural 
science, explain the succession of ideas within us and render them necessary.593 "That 
this succession is necessary follows, in Leibniz's philosophy, from the fact that the things 
together with the ideas arise by virtue of the mere laws of our nature, according to an 
inner principle in us, as in a world of its own."5 4 This most likely refers to Monadology 
§11, which explains that "the monad's natural changes come from an internal principle, 
since no external cause can influence it internally."595 But then we must explain why "all 
beings like ourselves" perceive things in the same way.'596 
Leibniz's answer, of course, is pre-established harmony, but "to explain this 
agreement of our nature.. .by a pre-established harmony is not to explain it."597 Schelling 
rejects the version of pre-established harmony handed down by Leibniz's followers, 
instead proposing that the logic of Leibniz's own argumentation leaves us with an 
immanent pre-established harmony, not one ordained by "a superior hand." It is "implicit 
in Leibniz's system" that the harmony must proceed "from the essence of finite natures," 
and therefore Leibniz "could not have associated with the pre-established harmony the 
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idea that one usually couples with it." To prove this Schelling cites the Leibnizian 
doctrine "that no mind could have come to be; that is, the concepts of cause and effect are 
altogether inapplicable to mind."599 And though Schelling does not express it in these 
terms, he has, by reinterpreting harmony as immanent instead of ordained from above, 
given birth to a new monadology, but a monadology with the head cut off. At this point, 
the introduction to the Ideas moves on to the concept of the organic, which Schelling 
never treats in detail until his On the World Soul, but not before denouncing dogmatism 
in philosophy. 
Curiously enough, Leibniz's name does not appear in this following section on 
dogmatism. Thus, Schelling's Ideas has completely recast the "consistent dogmatist" of 
On the I into a prophet of Schelling's idealism. Nowhere in the Ideas is Leibniz called a 
dogmatist. Instead, he is the philosopher who advanced upon Spinoza and united the 
infinite and the finite within the individual. Not only that, but Schelling's representation 
of Leibniz betrays a major shift in his own thinking. In On the I, Schelling adopted 
Spinoza's definition of substance and agreed with him that everything is one substance, 
i.e. the absolute I. "If substance is the same as the unconditional, then the I is the only 
substance. If there were several substances there would be an I outside the I, which 
makes no sense.. ..If the I is the only substance, then everything that is, is merely a 
quality (Accidens) of the I."600 In the Ideas, however, the absolute I seemingly 
598
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disappears from Schelling's vocabulary. If we search for any "ultimate principle of 
reality" in the introduction to the Ideas, it is the "individual nature" whose essence unites 
the active and passive, the infinite and the finite. These "individual natures" are very 
similar to the perceptual beings of Leibniz's system, the monads, and Schelling has 
seemingly become a substance pluralist instead of a monist. 
Why did Schelling change his opinion in the "Introduction"? The editors of the 
newest edition of Schelling's works suggest that "It is possible that Schelling, in between 
the drafting of the two sections, more thoroughly studied Leibniz and revised his 
judgment of him."601 Although this may be true, I believe Schelling's newfound 
attraction to Leibniz has less to do with a fresh reading than with his immersion in the 
scientific tradition outlined in Chapter 4. The full details of this process will come out in 
the next section, but we have already seen textual evidence, in both Book I and Book II, 
that Schelling was beginning to view the entire world—including the inorganic—as 
containing the seeds of life. It would be difficult to imagine a more attractive forerunner 
than Leibniz, who declared in §69 of the Monadology, 
Thus there is nothing fallow, sterile, or dead in the 
universe, no chaos and no confusion except in appearance, 
almost as it looks in a pond at a distance, where we might 
see the confused and, so to speak, teeming motion of the 
fish in the pond, without discerning the fish themselves.602 
Let's turn to Schelling's scientific education to understand this shift in his thinking. 
601
 "Editorischer Bericht," to Schelling, Ideen zu einer Philosophic der Natur, in Historisch-Kritische 
Ausgabe, 1, 5: 15-16. 
602
 Monadology, 222. 
231 
SCHELLING'S SCIENTIFIC TRAINING IN LEIPZIG 
There can be little doubt that Schelling threw himself almost maniacally into an intense 
study of the natural sciences while in Leipzig. A cursory look at Book I of his Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature, with its detailed discussions of—and proposed solutions to—many 
of the far-reaching problems in eighteenth century physics, should be proof enough of 
that. But, as already noted, the Leipzig period is impossible to reconstruct with 
certainty. This leaves us with a number of unanswered questions about Schelling's 
scientific training: which professors were most important in shaping his outlook? Did he 
follow the normal pattern of medical training in eighteenth century Germany, or did he 
use his free-roving status—remember, Schelling was not enrolled at the University of 
Leipzig—to pursue his own interests in whichever order he saw fit? Finally, at what 
point did he "discover" the concept of organism, which would take on a central position 
in his mature Naturphilosophiel This last question is extremely important in explaining 
the transition from the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, whose empirical-scientific 
passages are devoted almost exclusively to physics and chemistry, to On the World-Soul, 
which advances the concept of organism as the basis for all Naturphilosophie. Using 
contextual information, it is possible to speculatively—yet reasonably—answer these 
questions, despite the murkiness of primary sources.603 
One near-certainty of Schelling's scientific training in Leipzig is that it was 
heavily influenced by Carl Friedrich Hindenburg, a mathematician of the first rank who 
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also took an interest in the "dynamic physics which every incarnation of Schelhng's 
Naturphilosophie celebrated.604 Schelling became personally acquainted with 
Hindenburg shortly after his arrival, and his letters display a genuine affection towards 
the distinguished professor. In April 1796 Schelling told his parents that Hindenburg had 
"something very boyish in his face, although after further consideration, he is certainly no 
boy; he is simply an innovator."605 Only a month later, Schelling would note how much 
he enjoyed "Professor Hindenburg's house and the society over which his brilliant wife 
presides."606 The young Swabian also had every opportunity to develop a scholarly 
relationship with this "innovator," since Hindenburg offered a number of courses during 
Schelling's stay in Leipzig. In the Summer semester of 1796, he taught Johann Polykarp 
Erxleben's Anfangsgrunde der Naturlehre, one of the most important physics textbook in 
late eighteenth century Germany.607 He followed this up with a course based on Jan 
Henrik Swinden's positiones physicae and a course on theoretical physics. 
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Hindenburg also played a leading role in the Jablonowskyschen Gesellschaft, a 
scientific society founded by a Polish prince. The society solicited answers to prize 
essays, two of which bear an immediate relation to major issues in Schelling's Ideas. In 
1797, the prize essay called for "A comparative presentation of the two systems of 
natural science, the atomistic and the dynamic; applied towards shedding light on 
different natural phenomena, with the thereupon derived foundations for and against each 
of these two points of view."609 One would not be taking liberties by reading Book II, 
Chapter 3 of Schelling's Ideas, in which he compares the mechanical and atomistic 
physics of LeSage with the dynamical system which Schelling advocates, as a direct 
response to this prize essay question.610 As Schelling defined the terms, atomistic 
physics presupposes individual particles of matter as the building blocks of nature, while 
his own dynamic system gives primacy to forces, out of which matter itself is 
constructed.611 In the Ideas, Schelling repeatedly accused atomistic physics of 
presupposing what it intended to explain, often calling it a "hyperphysical physics" for 
this exact reason.612 This should already be evident from a close reading of the Ideas, but 
at this point, one more prize essay topic of the Jablonowskyschen Gesellschaft should be 
mentioned. 
The prize essay topic from 1798 is no less relevant to the Ideas for a Philosophy 
of Nature, the closing sections of which deal with the philosophy of chemistry. The prize 
609
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essay question was as follows: "What advantages has the recent application of 
mathematical knowledge to chemistry given us? And what should be generally expected 
from the close contact between mathematics and chemistry?"613 For years, German 
chemists were forced to grapple with the problematic legacy of Immanuel Kant, who 
declared that chemistry "can be nothing more than a systematic art or experimental 
doctrine, but never a proper science, for [its principles] are not receptive to the 
application of mathematics."614 One of Kant's own students, Jeremias Richter—certainly 
no Naturphilosoph—so desperately wanted to prove Kant wrong that he invented the 
techniques of stoichiometry.615 In the Ideas, Schelling refuses to take Kant's bait and 
follow the path of Richter. Rather, Schelling rejects Kant's demand altogether, insisting 
that chemistry is indeed a science, but a qualitative—not quantitative—science which 
"teaches us how a free play of dynamic forces may be possible."616 Schelling most likely 
learned about chemistry from other professors in Leipzig, especially Christian Gotthold 
Eschenbach, who not only lectured on experimental chemistry, but also translated a 
number of chemical treatises into German.617 Regardless of the influences, Schelling's 
knowledge of chemistry most likely predated the composition of the Ideas: in fact, in the 
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second installment of the General Overview, he obliquely mentions Lavoisier's 
innovations in chemistry and his German followers.618 
If we can say for certain that Schelling was thoroughly acquainted with physics 
and chemistry by the end of 1796, his training in the life sciences is a bit more uncertain. 
In his famous edition of Schelling's letters, Plitt observed that "if mathematics, physics, 
and chemistry were his main areas of study during the first year of his stay in Leipzig, in 
his second it was physiology."619 This is certainly consistent with medical training in the 
eighteenth century German universities, especially at one of the larger medical faculties 
like Leipzig. Custom dictated that students learn mathematics and experimental physics 
before beginning their proper medical training with courses on anatomy and 
physiology.620 This system reflected the prejudices of the eighteenth century—prejudices 
we have not completely abandoned in the twenty-first—which privileged physics above 
all other "subordinate" disciplines.621 However, Schelling could easily have jumped 
straight into medical coursework, since he had already learned mathematics and physics 
from Pfleiderer in Tubingen. Schelling was no ordinary undergraduate, as he already 
possessed a theological degree and was largely following his own interests whenever he 
"The pride of the new chemistry is its nomenclature. In France, where it arose, an assembly of the 
greatest chemists came together in order to agree on [its nomenclature]. In Germany, several men, some 
very celebrated, have sought to do us a great service with their translation [of these terms]." (AA 1,4: 70). 
Schelling is referring not only to the 1787 publication of the Methode de Nomenclature chimique by 
Lavoisier and other French chemists, but to a whole series of attempts to do something similar for Germany 
in the early 1790s. 
619
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was able to escape from his duties as a tutor. An account of Schelling's life, found in his 
estate and dating from 1833, indicates that after Hindenburg, the most important 
professor in his scientific development was Christian Friedrich Ludwig, who occupied 
positions in both the medical faculty (where he was Ordinarius for Pathology), and in the 
philosophy department (where he was professor of natural history).622 Ludwig, who was 
personally acquainted with some of the most important life scientists of the eighteenth 
century, including Buffon and Blumenbach, continually taught Blumenbach's famous 
Handbook of Natural History from the summer of 1796 until the winter semester of 
1797-1798, giving Schelling plenty of opportunity to sit in on his course.623 Schelling 
most likely supplemented Ludwig's courses with the lectures of two other professors in 
the medical faculty: Ernst Platner and Johann Hedwig.624 But neither of them were as 
important as Ludwig, at least according to the document from 1833. However, we must 
ask: is there any reason to believe that Ludwig influenced Schelling prior to the 
completion of the Ideas, which he announced to Niethammer in June of 1797 ?625 
Schelling certainly mentions Buffon a great deal, and this could be evidence of Ludwig's 
influence. But Schelling's references to Buffon are always in the context of physics, 
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indicating that he could have gotten this information from Hindenburg. Even more 
damning towards the case of Ludwig's influence on the Ideas is the fact that Blumenbach 
is never mentioned. Could Schelling have been completely ignorant of the life sciences 
when he wrote the Ideas? 
Schelling himself contradicts this idea in the preface to On the World-Soul. 
There, he warned readers that the World-Soul "is not to be seen as a continuation of my 
Ideas. I will not continue [the Ideas] until I am in a position to conclude it with a 
scientific physiology, which alone can give it completeness." That the Ideas was an 
incomplete work is corroborated by a letter to his parents from February of 1797, in 
which he indicated that the forthcoming work was only the "first part" of the Ideas.627 
Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that, by February 1797, Schelling was planning to 
write about the life sciences, and that he had probably begun his training in those areas of 
study. Why, then, did Schelling abandon the project altogether, in favor of a new one 
(The World-Soutp. Robert Richards hypothesizes that, at some point during the 
composition of the Ideas, Schelling suddenly hit upon a new formulation of his 
Naturphilosophie which would make the concept of "organism" its lynchpin. Richards 
points to a passage in the General Overview, in which "organism" is suddenly introduced 
out of the blue, and argues that this indicates the point at which Schelling broke off work 
on the Ideas and turned to the World-Soul instead.628 However, Richards makes a simple 
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 The passage Richards refers to declares: "Insofar as the soul produces its own representations, insofar as 
it is mutually the cause and effect of itself, it therefore intuits itself as an object which is mutually cause 
and effect of itself, or, what amounts to the same thing, as a self-organizing Nature... .Because there is an 
infinite striving in the human spirit towards self-organization, a general tendency towards organization 
must also manifest itself in the external world." (AA, 1,4: 113). 
historical error that effectively torpedoes his entire explanation, for this passage was 
actually completed after the Ideas had already been published.629 
Perhaps, then, we must resort to an explanation based on Schelling's own 
personality. The General Overview is a notoriously eclectic work, and it might be 
tempting to say that Schelling's sudden change of mindset between the Ideas and On the 
World-Soul was simply the result of his notoriously protean intellect. But this type of 
explanation seems almost insulting to such a brilliant thinker. Instead of taking this last 
resort, I will cut the Gordian knot and suggest that Schelling's sudden interest in 
organism was not rooted in his scientific education at all, but rather appeared as a result 
of his dramatic reappraisal of one of the first philosophers to formulate a definition of 
"organism": none other than Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.630 Let us construct a final, yet 
speculative account of Schelling's scientific study in Leipzig, which incorporates the 
changes between the Ideas and On the World-Soul. 
In our speculative reconstruction, Schelling arrives in Leipzig in March of 1796. 
He had already hinted at his desire to turn towards empirical research, both in the Oldest 
System-program and in the Philosophical Letters. In Leipzig, this path becomes even 
It is often difficult to make heads or tails of the organization of the General Overview, and thus 
Richards' mistake is understandable. The Historisch-kritische Ausgabe does the scholar no favors, as it 
gives us no explicit breaks between the individual installments (Hefte) of the book, instead simply 
identifying the different volumes ifiande) at the top of each page. Richards says that the passage above 
comes from the third installment of the General Overview, which we know Schelling sent to Niethammer 
in April of 1797. If this were true, Richards' hypothesis would be excellent: Schelling had probably 
completed the bulk of the Ideas by the end of April, and it is easy to picture him tying up the loose ends 
and moving onto his next project, which would give primacy of place to the concept of organism. 
However, the passage Richards cites is actually from the fifth installment, which Schelling did not send to 
Niethammer until August 26. The passage was thus probably composed long after the Ideas had gone to 
press. That I am correct about the dating of these passages can be seen not only from the section on the 
"Entstehungsgeschichte des Textes" in the Historisch-kritische Ausgabe (1,4: 26-29) but also by a cursory 
look at Motokiyo Fukaya's detailed examination of the General Overview (Anschaaung desAbsoluten in 
Schellingsfruher Philosophic (1794-1800), 59-103, especially footnote 129 on page 60). 
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more attractive when he meets Hindenburg, to whom he is immediately drawn. Schelling 
takes his course on Erxleben's Anfangsgriinde in the Summer of 1796, and is introduced 
to the conflict between atomistic and dynamic physics, particularly with reference to the 
system of George-Louis LeSage. In late 1796, Schelling takes on the project which will 
become the General Overview, the second installment of which (finished in February 
1797) mentions Lavoisier, indicating that Schelling might have already heard 
Eschenbach's lectures on chemistry. Schelling began work on the Ideas in early 1797, 
but his letter to his parents from February indicates that it will be a two-part work: thus, 
he was already planning to write a section on the "scientific physiology" he mentions in 
the preface to the World-Soul. Therefore, it is' likely that he had already begun taking 
courses with the medical faculty, most likely Ludwig's course on Blumenbach, whom 
Schelling does not mention in the Ideas simply because he had no reason to do so until 
the never-completed part two. During this time, Schelling continues to develop his own 
philosophy in the General Overview, and in reviewing the history of German philosophy, 
develops a newfound appreciation for the philosophy of Leibniz. This fact is registered 
immediately in the introduction to the Ideas—which was composed after Books I and II 
were completed—and in later installments of the General Overview. By now, Schelling 
has become extremely interested in the organic and, as Karl Schelling and Gustav Plitt 
tell us, devotes the bulk of his scientific study to physiology, delving deeper into medical 
coursework. Thus, he scraps the second part of the Ideas and writes On the World-Soul, 
which stands as a testament to his increasing familiarity with the life sciences. 
Chapter 6: From Leipzig to Jena 
INTO JENA'S ORBIT 
This chapter will examine Schilling's Naturphilosophie in the years 1798-1799, both of 
which have a special relationship to the University of Jena. Although the Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature was a remarkable achievement, it was his next book, On the World 
Soul, which earned him the esteem of Goethe and allowed him to obtain a full 
professorship there. The First Outline, written as a companion piece to Schelling's Jena 
lectures, and accompanied shortly thereafter by an Introduction to the Outline, is the first 
full systematic presentation Of his Naturphilosophie. However, the Introduction to the 
Outline was the first text on Naturphilosophie composed in Jena. Thus, I will argue for 
the most part that Schelling arrived at his systematic Naturphilosophie while still in 
Leipzig! 
There are significant differences of opinion regarding the periodization of 
Schelling's three large monographs on Naturphilosophie. By all accounts, a large gulf 
separates the highly inductive Ideas of 1797 from the highly deductive First Outline of 
1799. The former started with empirical science and worked its way up to tentative 
conclusions, while the latter begins with a statement of methodology and immediately 
explains the first principles of nature. There is far less consensus regarding On the World 
Soul, written in 1797 and published in 1798, while Schelling was still tutoring the 
Riedesels in Leipzig. Some scholars, because of its chronological proximity to the Ideas, 
and because of its abundance of empirical content, classify On the World Soul as 
inductive.631 Others see elements of Schelling's mature system appearing in it, and 
classify it alongside the First Outline. 
Although I have already argued that even the Ideas began to lay the groundwork 
for the mature Naturphilosophie, I side with the latter group of scholars. On the World 
Soul differs significantly from the Ideas: Schelling finally fleshes out the cursory 
sketches of organism he had offered in the General Overview and the Introduction to the 
Ideas. And in doing so, he finally brought himself into the intellectual orbit of Jena, 
where German Romanticism was about to bloom. On the World Soul reveals an affinity 
between Schelling, Goethe, and the emerging Jena Circle, all of whom shared a passion 
for the idea of a living, organic nature. This is not to say, however, that the origins of 
Schelling's Naturphilosophie lie in Romanticism itself.632 Tempting though this 
hypothesis may be, and as important as the Romantics may have been for the 
advancement of Schelling's ideas about aesthetics, most of the architectonic of 
Schelling's philosophy of nature was already in place before he ever met the Schlegels or 
Wilhelm Metzger's Die Epochen des Schellingschen Philosophic groups The World Soul alongside the 
General Overview and the Ideas in Schelling's "second period." He hardly discusses it at all, focusing on 
Schelling's unification of mechanism and organism and the "Aether" which Schelling identifies as the 
World Soul. "Schelling does not really use this aether—or, metaphorically, this "World Soul"—as a 
deductive starting point in 1798. He rather leads himself to it moreso inductively." (74). However, 
Metzger says that the "World Soul" concept" embodies the "comsic vitalism" that characterizes Schelling's 
next period. (75). Kurt Schilling claims that "In the development of Schellings concepts of nature and 
truth, [The World Soul's] importance lies more in the program expressed in its title than in its actual 
execution. This program would first be realized in Schelling's next book, the First Outline." (98) 
6321 am unwilling to go as far as Manfred Frank, who claims that Schelling was not a Romantic at all! 
Frank, in his attempt to highlight the philosophical contributions of early Romanticism, sharply 
distinguishes between the more cautious approaches of Holderlin, Novalis, and Friedrich Schlegel on the 
one hand, and "speculative idealism" on the other. Schelling, Frank says, was really a "wayward son of the 
Romantic generation," and despite sharing some of the "realism" of Novalis and Schlegel, "nevertheless 
remained tied to Grundsatzphilosophie and its deductive program." See Frank, Unendliche Annaherung, 
662. Frank thus differs with Beiser, who argues that the philosophy of Romanticism is inseparable from 
"absolute idealism." 
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Novalis. This dissertation focuses on the genesis of his Naturphilosophie and thus places 
surprisingly little emphasis on the other Romantics.633 Goethe—whose scientific works 
were well known by the time Schelling reached intellectual maturity—is the exception, 
although once again, even he played no direct role in Schelling's thought until 1798. The 
twin engines behind Schelling's Naturphilosophie were still his encounter with the 
natural sciences and his desire to expand the scope of Idealism beyond the subject-
centered limitations of Kant and Fichte. Unfortunately, Schelling was still a tutor in 
1797, and he could not complete his project while simultaneously preparing the Riedesels 
for their law exams. 
THE AMBITIOUS HOFMEISTER 
With the publication of Schelling's Ideas va. mid-1797, he began a new phase in his 
career. His philosophical progress hampered by his duties as a tutor, Schelling—despite 
his deep reservations about the constraints of a professorial position—decided to pursue 
an academic career.634 Two major options presented themselves at this time, and they 
could not have been more different. First, Schelling's friends began an attempt to install 
him as a professor in Jena. Niethammer was the prime mover in this process, but the 
formal recommendation was made by H.E.G. Paulus, who had helped Schelling publish 
Of course, another reason to eschew a detailed discussion of Schelling's relationship with the Jena circle 
is that Robert Richards' The Romantic Conception of Life sketches out Schelling's personal and 
biographical relationship with the other Romantics that there is little else to add. 
634
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his ambivalence. 
his dissertation in 1793. In a letter to Voigt, Paulus recommended Schelling, 
emphasizing the "liveliness" of his writing, as well as the fact that he was "not simply a 
speculative philosopher." He cites the Ideas, which "united physics and metaphysics" as 
evidence of Schelling's versatility.636 Given Schelling's reputation as a disciple of 
Fichte, who was still chair of philosophy in Jena, this plan was by no means unrealistic, 
and Schelling himself fully expected to receive a professorship.637 However, Joseph 
Schelling devised his own scheme to place Schelling on the long road to a professorship 
at—of all places—Tubingen. The younger Schelling initially shrugged off his father's 
idea, as he was revolted by the idea of becoming a "repentant" again. But despite his 
hatred for the professoriate in Tubingen, Schelling warmed up to a new and bolder plan. 
Bok's chair in moral philosophy at the Stift would be open at the end of the 1797-98 
winter semester. If Schelling could get a job in Jena—as an associate professor—he 
could then quickly jump to Tubingen, which he could tolerate as a full professor, the 
following semester. In the end, the whole scheme would collapse, not because Jena was 
unwilling to take Schelling in, but because of his own staggering ambition. 
Ultimately, Schelling remained a tutor because he demanded something almost 
unheard of at the time: a free pass through the normal channels of advancement in the 
German university. Unlike his friend Niethammer, he refused to begin as a Privatdozent 
and work his way up to the rank of professor. But the situation in Jena was not 
635
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completely hopeless, as there was one man who could help the young philosopher 
leapfrog past the thankless life of a private lecturer: that man was none other than the 
king of German letters, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. His job as first minister of state in 
Sachsen-Weimar granted him immense power over the University of Jena. Almost ten 
years earlier, Goethe had installed another young, radical Wurttemberger, Friedrich 
Schiller, as a professor of history in Jena. Schiller and Goethe would become friends five 
years later and form the powerful alliance that produced the cultural movement of 
"Weimar classicism." They were not always of the same mind: Schiller was far more 
philosophically inclined than Goethe and an avid reader of Kant. Goethe, whom Schiller 
envied for his almost effortless poetic talents, preferred to study not the subjective mind, 
but objective nature. As such, Goethe revered the "holy Spinoza" and read Kant only 
with great difficulty. And although Goethe was responsible for Fichte's hiring, Fichte's 
thought repelled him in a number of ways. Not only was Fichte a poor writer, but his 
system was an abstract subjective philosophy which deprivileged nature. Goethe and 
Schiller both enjoyed poking fun at Fichte's ideas. 
Imagine, then, Goethe's reaction when Schiller took up the cause of a young 
Swabian author named Friedrich Schelling. To date, Schelling had penned only a series 
of Fichtean works, with the exception of the Ideas, a work which barely discussed 
Goethe's favorite topic: the life sciences. Goethe's reaction was tepid, and he read the 
Ideas exactly as Rudolf Haym did almost 75 years later: he saw (correctly) that Schelling 
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took the original activities of the I and projected them onto nature.640 In a letter to 
Schiller, Goethe begins by agreeing with Schelling on one point: "It is not nature that we 
know, rather it is that which is taken up by certain forms and abilities of our spirit."641 
But Goethe complains that transcendental Idealism does not give an adequate place to the 
purposiveness of nature, instead attempting to explain it away. No matter how much the 
idealists try to get rid of the thing-in-itself, they still have to recognize the existence of a 
nature outside the human mind. Thus, Goethe's criticism of the Ideas is, quite 
appropriately, very similar to his criticism of Fichte. In addition to Goethe's cool 
reception of Schelling's early works, there was another reason he was reluctant to invite 
him to the university. Fichte's political radicalism, as well as the suspicions of atheism 
which would finally explode in 1799, never endeared him to the politically conservative 
Goethe. Schelling, too, had acquired a reputation as a radical, and Goethe was afraid to 
add another subversive professor to the faculty. Thus, for both philosophical and 
political reasons, Goethe rebuffed Schiller's requests to hire Schelling. 
With Jena out of the question, the possibility of a full professorship at Tubingen 
was also eliminated. Of course, Schelling could become a Privatdozent in Jena, where he 
desperately wanted to live. But this idea repulsed him, and he wrote to Niethammer, "At 
this point, becoming a Privatdozent in Jena would just be pissing on the philosophical 
wall, to use the noble expression."642 Schelling was thus stuck as a Hofmeister, but his 
fortunes would soon shift dramatically. For by the time he was rejected for the position 
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in Jena, he had already written yet another book on Naturphilosophie. In this new work, 
On the World Soul-A hypothesis of higher Physics for the Clarification of the Universal 
Organism, Schelling finally delved into what he had ignored in the Ideas: physiology and 
organic nature. This shift in focus would endear him to Goethe and jumpstart his 
academic career. 
THE GENESIS OF ON THE WORLD SOUL 
Unfortunately, the composition of On the World Soul is almost as mysterious as the 
composition of the Ideas. In September of 1797, he announced to Niethammer that he 
was abandoning his work on the Philosophical Parallels—his treatise on Leibniz—and 
focusing on The World Soul instead.643 In preparation, he threw himself into an 
exhaustive study of physiology, the subject supposed to be examined in the non-existent 
third book of the Ideas.MA However, his work on the new project coincided with a severe 
illness. His tutoring duties already made it difficult to write, so when he fell ill for two 
weeks in October of 1797, Schelling was dejected. In a letter to Niethammer, he 
complained that his physician had forbid him from thinking and philosophizing, going so 
far as to take his books away!645 Nevertheless, he felt refreshed after his recovery, and 
his work became more focused: he resolved to concentrate solely on the World Soul and 
abandon his other "completely heterogeneous projects."646 Staying true to his word, he 
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continued to study physiology, and repeatedly asked his parents to send him treatises on 
irritability. By winter, other German intellectuals knew that Schelling was working on 
something new. Some, like Novalis, believed that he was composing a second 
installment of the Ideas: "I met Schelling. I freely explained my misgivings about his 
Ideas to him, and he was in agreement; he believes that in the second part, he has 
ascended to a higher level."647 Others recognized it as an independent work and even 
knew of the title: Jacobi wrote to Franz Baader in January of 1798, saying that the new 
book, On the World Soul, would be published at Easter. Nevertheless, Schelling widened 
his scientific horizons even during the composition of the new book, and no one was 
more instrumental in this than Christoph Heinrich Pfaff. 
In Chapter 5, we saw that Schelling's second year of scientific study at Leipzig 
dealt largely with physiology and medicine, and this no doubt provided him with much 
inspiration and material. Another motivating force was his encounter with Pfaff.648 
Pfaff, though Danish, was a student of Kielmeyer's at the Stuttgart Karlsschule, and 
wrote a dissertation, later expanded and published, on "animal electricity."649 Pfaff s 
book emphatically rejected the idea that animal electricity is mechanical, and was also a 
primer in the history of eighteenth century science. Pfaff chronicled the advances in the 
eighteenth century life sciences, especially since Haller, whom Pfaff called the founder of 
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truly scientific physiology. His book quickly made him a respected member of the 
German scientific community. His galvanic experiments—which he repeated for 
Schelling in Leipzig in early 1798—were recognized as first rate by some of Germany's 
most important scientists.651 Pfaff was no Naiurphilosoph, and heavily favored an 
inductive scientific method, but Schelling was deeply influenced by their meeting.652 He 
wrote almost longingly to Pfaff: 
Since you have left, most beloved friend, I find myself 
completely lonely.. .The galvanic experiments you showed 
me have caused me many sleepless nights. The force 
which I witnessed there continues to amaze me, the more I 
think about it. .. .1 hope that our newly begun friendship 
[continues and that] we never become distant.653 
In addition to familiarizing Schelling with Galvani's discoveries, Pfaff most likely 
acquainted him with the theories of Kielmeyer.654 In On Animal Electricity, Pfaffs 
Lebenskraften, which he claims are possibly different "manifestations of a single 
650
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Lebenskraft" are identical to Kielmeyer's: irritability, sensation, reproduction, secretion, 
and "fluid movement" or Saftbetwegung, clearly a variation of Kielmeyer's 
Propulsionskraft.655 Despite Pfaff s cautious empiricism, he shared with Schelling one of 
the fundamental beliefs of Naturphilosophie—that the diverse phenomena of the physical 
world can be traced back to a common source. Pfaff—along with Schelling's physiology 
professors in Leipzig—provided a human link to the wider scientific community which 
supplemented the results of Schelling's textual research. 
ON THE WORLD SOUL - THE UNIVERSAL ORGANISM 
In the opening chapters of this dissertation, I discussed one of the fundamental features of 
post-Kantian Idealism: the relentless drive to overcome philosophical division by 
revealing the unifying roots behind different aspects of the mind. Kant separated intellect 
and sensibility but cryptically left open the possibility that they spring from an 
unknowable "common trunk." Fichte, Holderlin, and Schelling each tried to bridge this 
gap in different ways. But it was only Schelling who attempted to carry over this 
"unification project" into nature, and the World Soul is an excellent example of this 
tendency. In the Ideas, Schelling had already hinted at the concept of a universal, 
organically linked, living nature. He marveled, like Herder, at the balance of forces 
which, through eternal conflict, create and preserve life. But Schelling scattered those 
ideas around in the empirical sections, and only briefly followed up on them in the 
Introduction. Moreover, in Book II, Schelling "constructed" the physical world 
philosophically from attraction and repulsion. But, like Kant, he refrained from digging 
655
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deeper, and attraction and repulsion remained separated as independent forces. In the 
World Soul, he is bolder: Schelling searches for—and claims to find—a common 
principle at the root of attraction and repulsion, and thus at the root of the entire 
phenomenal world. Thus, while many of the empirical insights of the Ideas are 
recapitulated in the World Soul, his theoretical standpoint changed significantly, moving 
him towards a monism which traced all natural phenomena back to a single first 
principle. 
In the World Soul, Schelling largely abandons the Kantian focus on attraction and 
repulsion. Now, he now seeks to overcome another division: that between mechanism 
and organism.656 This is the unmistakable main point of the World Soul. Schelling 
announces immediately that his purpose is nothing less than a search for "a common 
principle that fluctuates between inorganic and organic nature," which at the same time is 
"the first cause of all changes in the former and all activity in the latter."657 This 
organizing first principle is what the ancients referred to as the "World Soul" and which 
Schelling now seeks to revive. This "World Soul" is the tendency of nature to organize 
itself, which manifests itself in all of its individual products. Finding this first principle 
enables the natural scientist to ascend to a new standpoint, one which allows him to see 
nature as a unified whole, a nature in which the difference between mechanism and 
organism vanishes. Crucially, it is vital materialism which cuts the Gordian knot: 
Schelling dismisses "the old delusion that organization and life are unexplainable from 
Kurt Schilling stresses not only the centrality of this-argument but its necessity for the unity-obsessed 
Schelling. "Inorganic processes had to be given an organic form.. .it naturally would be meaningless, if 
two principally different types of natural processes stood next to one another." (Natur und Wahrheit, 104). 
AA, I, 6: 67. 
natural principles." He argues that organic nature can be explained by physical laws, 
and that he will demonstrate how all organic beings follow a Stufenfolge in their 
development upwards from "one and the same original organization."659 Stripped of its 
metaphysical language, this statement in no way differs from Herder's theory of 
abiogenesis. Schelling is simply asserting that life springs from the same organizing 
processes which manifest themselves in stars, planets, and even in our own 
atmosphere.660 
To be sure, Schelling does not simply contend that there is no difference between 
life and non-life. He makes the more curious claim that there is no difference between 
mechanism and organism, something without nearly as much historical precedent. The 
solution which appears in the World-Soul will recur in his later works on 
Naturphilosophie and is elegant, although hard to grasp at first. First of all, Schelling 
states that mechanism is simply the "negative" of organism, just like "darkness [is the 
negative] of light, coldness [the negative] of warmth.661 Put differently: mechanism can 
be simply described as the absence of organism.662 His proof of this is that a purely 
mechanical universe is impossible: it would "destroy itself by dispersing everything out 
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into infinity.663 Since mechanical forces, which operate in straight lines, are infinite, they 
must be countered and conditioned (bedingt) by an equally infinite, universal organism, 
which makes causality not linear but circular.664 Organism is "the broken stream 
(aufgehaltene Strom) of [mechanical] causes and effects. Only where Nature has not 
limited (gehemmt) this stream does it travel outwards in straight lines."665 Schelling's 
argument here echoes Book II of the Ideas, but there is a crucial difference. In the Ideas, 
he closely followed Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, asserting 
simply that repulsive forces must be countered by attractive forces. In the World Soul, he 
follows a different path. 
It is striking how quickly Schelling deviates from Book II of the Ideas; he devotes 
the first half of the World Soul to an exploration of "The first force of nature." 
Repulsion, the "positive power" of all movement, is counteracted by a "negative power" 
which "leads movement back to its source."666 This all sounds familiar, but Schelling's 
new system now identifies the former with light. Light is "the positive cause of all 
movement" and is responsible for the filling up of space. It is the "Proteus of Nature" 
which "in every system streams out from the center to the periphery." It moves "with 
such power and speed" that some even doubt its materiality. In other words, the World 
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 AA, I, 6: 77. Schelling also makes the stronger epistemological claim that attraction actually gives us 
"experiences of the world" (Erscheinungen in der Welt). 
667
 AA, I, 6: 90. 
668
 AA, I, 6: 78. 
Soul attributes all the properties of Kant's "repulsive force" to light. But Schelling 
deviates radically from the "construction of matter" found in the Ideas. In fact, he barely 
mentions the opposite component—attraction—at all.669 Schelling now insists that the 
"original duplicity" of nature can only be understood as originating within the first 
principle itself. Therefore, repulsion and attraction are not separate forces, each with 
their own independent existence. Newton was only partially right in assuming that 
attraction is "the negative principle of all movement in the world (Prinzip der 
allgemeinen Weltbewegung)."670 He erred in giving it a separate, positive existence 
outside of the repulsive force.671 Thus, the first half of the World Soul deals not with the 
interaction between repulsive force (light) and attraction, but rather the duplicity within 
light itself, out of which the entire phenomenal world unfolds. 
Therefore, the bulk of Book I of the World Soul is a lengthy treatment of many of 
the same topics covered in the Ideas: light, combustion, the atmosphere, electricity, and 
magnetism.672 But now, he attempts to connect them back to the original duality present 
in light. Schelling seems less empirically grounded than he was in the Ideas, and given 
some of the theories he defends, this is probably for the worse. Light itself, he contends, 
can be divided into positive (the aether) and negative (oxygen!) tendencies. Oxygen 
669
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itself, though it is the negative side of light, itself has a negative side (phlogiston). That 
Schelling still makes use of phlogiston in his system, despite the fact that the German 
chemical community had overwhelmingly converted to Lavoisier's views in the early 
1790s, is puzzling.673 But it points to one of Schelling's tendencies: the perpetual desire 
to reconcile opposing viewpoints in natural science, at all cost. At various points he 
attempts to reconcile Newton and Euler on light, Franklin and Symmer on electricity, and 
Stahl and Lavoisier on combustion.674 The weaknesses of these chapters are obvious, 
but, as always, we must be careful not to dismiss the larger project of Schellingian 
Naturphilosophie because of its isolated aspects. 
Although Schelling revisits familiar material in the first part of the World Soul, 
one new feature is his growing obsession with polarity, or as he sometimes calls it, 
"duplicity" in nature. To be sure, polarity appeared in the Ideas, but here it ascends to the 
status of a guiding principle.675 He flatly states at one point that "It is the first principle 
of a philosophical doctrine of nature (Naturlehre) to begin with polarity and duality in the 
Lavoisier's theory of combustion initially encountered an enormous amount of resistance on the part of 
German chemists. Karl Hufbauer, following the methodology of Thomas Kuhn, argues that it was only the 
intervention of outsiders, unassociated with the German chemical community, that enabled a "paradigm 
shift" in Germany itself by 1795. See Hufbauer's narrative in the final chapters of The Formation of the 
German Chemical Community 1720-1795 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). 
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whole of nature." The earth itself is a product of eternal conflict, the struggle between 
positive forces and their corresponding limitations. 
All variety in the world first arises within the various 
limits, within which the positive [force] acts....Wherever a 
natural force finds opposition, it forms for itself its own 
sphere [of activity]... The positive force first awakes the 
negative.. ..Everything which belongs to the Earth has a 
common property, [a property] which is opposed to the 
positive principle streaming towards us from the Sun. The 
seeds of all universal world-organization lie in this original 
antithesis.677 
This is but one example of Schelling's emphasis on polarity. He repeats it again and 
again throughout the work, making it clear that conflict is the norm in nature. The 
absence of conflict is rest, and "absolute rest in the World is a non-thing (Unding). All 
rest in the world is only apparent (scheinbar)."678 We also see how Schelling has unified 
the principles which stood independently of one another in the Ideas. Nature is not 
composed of divided principles; rather, Nature is the self-division of a first principle. 
Here, we see traces of Schelling's Identitatsphilosophie. But, as he reminds the reader at 
the outset, this approach specifically emphasizes the multiplicity of nature. "I hate 
nothing more than that spiritually empty attempt (geistlose Bestreben) to extinguish the 
AA,\,6: 151. 
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multiplicity of natural causes through imagined identities."67 In the World Soul, nature 
is full of variety and life, not a "night in which all cows are black." 
If the empirical content of the first sections of the World Soul leaves something to 
be desired, the second half of the work, "On the origin of the universal organism," 
touches on all the most important issues discussed in Chapter 4, and, although 
speculative, is explicitly grounded by the latest developments in the life sciences. As 
such, it is much easier to summarize, although the interpreter must still sift through a 
barrage of empirical digressions. The most remarkable section—which points directly 
back to the main argument of the World Soul, and can thus be used as a starting point for 
the second half of the work—contains Schelling's remarks on the Bildungstrieb. He 
introduces the subject by stating that Naturphilosophie needs a way to reconcile the 
"unfreedom" of mechanical causality with the "freedom" so apparent in organisms.680 
"For this unification of freedom and lawfulness we have no other concept than the 
concept of a drive (Trieb)."m Insofar as Schelling recognizes a Bildungstrieb "operative 
in organic material.. .which [causes it] to take on, preserve, and restore a specific form," 
he agrees with Blumenbach.682 However, Schelling denies that the Bildungstrieb is the 
"explanatory principle {Erkldrungsgrundy of organism. The Bildungstrieb explains how 
organic material operates, but it does not explain how organic material originated in the 
first place. Indeed, were one to assume that the Bildungstrieb explains organic material, 
679
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it would be a "barrier to rational inquiry (ein Schlagbaum fur die forschende Vernunft), or 
the outer layer (das Polster) of an occult quality" which serves only to frustrate reason.683 
Schelling argues that there must be a higher drive operative in nature, a drive 
towards organization in general, which enables the Bildungstrieb to do its work: 
This concept [of the Bildungstrieb] presupposes organic 
material, for that drive can and should only be operative in 
organic material. This principle cannot, therefore, be a 
cause of organization; it would be better to say that this 
concept of the Bildungstrieb presupposes a higher cause of 
organization. Insofar as one deploys this concept, one also 
postulates this higher cause, because this drive is 
unthinkable without [this higher cause] and without organic 
material.684 
This is simply another way of saying what Schelling said at the outset of the World Soul: 
that organism is implicit in the structure of the world as a whole. There is a natural drive 
towards organization, even in the inorganic world, and assuming a barrier between the 
two—as Kant and Blumenbach did—serves only to hinder scientific and philosophical 
inquiry. For Kant and Blumenbach, the Bildungstrieb was the end of inquiry. For 
Schelling, it is "a reminder to the natural researcher that a first cause of organization.. .is 
to be found beyond it."685 And in a footnote, he offers a remarkable and direct refutation 




 AA, 1,6:217. 
Bildungstrieb, we can at best answer, that we have gone beyond it." In other words, 
the late eighteenth century life sciences—i.e. their concrete discoveries—blatantly refute 
Kant's philosophical arguments. In this case, it is Kant, not Schelling, who prefers a 
priori philosophy to sober empirical science! Indeed, the rapid disciplinization of the 
German biological community invalidates Kant's argument that biology cannot be a 
science. 
In other parts of the World Soul, Schelling shows how the original organizing 
principle—a principle higher than Blumenbach's Bildungstrieb—manifests itself on the 
individual level in thousands of different ways. Like Leibniz, Herder, and Goethe, 
Schelling emphasizes unity in multiplicity. As such, like Buffon, Maupertuis, and 
Diderot, he demolishes the barriers between plant and animal, animal and man. After all, 
if all the individual products of nature are simply different manifestations of an original 
unity, there can be no firm boundary lines. Schelling only devotes a few pages to plants, 
showing how Nature uses them to create a "circle of life."687 Plants consume carbon 
dioxide and produce oxygen, while animals consume the latter, and produce the former. 
As always, Schelling finds polarity lurking around every corner: plants, he says, are the 
"negative" of the "life-process," and are not actually alive (!). Plants have only "the 
appearance of life" in their role as negative of the life process.688 Later in the text, he 
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discusses plants again, this time in order to show that the products of nature are 
ACQ 
characterized by an increasing individualization of basic structures. Such an argument 
would have been music to Goethe's ears, especially since Schelling directly cites 
Goethe's Metamorphosis of Plants (1790), which had argued that all the structures of a 
plant are different manifestations of the leaf. Nevertheless, Schelling is far more 
interested in animals than in plants, which leads him to weigh in on the issues raised in 
Pfaff s own work on animal electricity. 
Schelling begins his section on animal life by trying to answer a basic question: at 
issue is whether "life" resides inside or outside of "animal matter (theirische Materie)." 
Schelling dismisses the latter option quickly, but goes into more detail regarding the first, 
which he says refutes itself.690 First of all, the idea that organisms can be explained 
mechanically is, by now, so discredited that he barely offers any refutation.691 But there 
are still those who insist that life is a property of matter, a position he describes as "the 
height of anti-philosophy (Unphilosophie)." For Schelling, life cannot be a property of 
matter any more than repulsivity and attraction can be. In the World Soul, he stays true to 
his Ideas, and reminds us that "matter itself is simply a product of opposed forces," not a 
substrate onto which properties can be added. Matter and mechanism are not primary. 
Forces and organism are primary. 
689
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[The formation of animal matter], where it happens, already 
presupposes life itself.. ..Life is not a property or product of 
animal matter, rather, conversely, matter is & product of 
life....Organism is not the property of certain natural 
things, but rather, conversely, these certain natural things 
are the many limitations (Beschrdnkungen) or various 
points of view (Anschauungsweisen) of the universal 
694 
organism. 
One would be hard pressed to find a more concise expression of Romanticism. But it is 
also interesting to note the veiled reference to Leibniz's monadology. In light of 
Schelling's desire to revive the philosophy of Leibniz in the Ideas, and also considering 
that he moved directly from a project on Leibniz, the Philosophical Parallels, to the 
World Soul, it is surprising that Leibniz is hardly mentioned in this work. Nevertheless, 
given Schelling's continued resistance to the idea of "dead" matter in this passage, as 
well as the similarities between this passage and Leibniz's "city metaphor," it seems 
highly probably that Leibniz was still on his mind during the composition of the World 
Soul. 
If life resides neither inside nor outside of animal matter, where does it reside? 
That Schelling's answer involves polarity should not surprise us. He tells us that the 
basis of life lies both outside (positively) and inside (negatively) animal matter. The 
positive principle of "life" stretches beyond individual animals, but in its negation, in its 
individualization, it does in fact lie within animal matter. He fleshes out this opaque 
AA, 1,6: 189. 
explanation with a brief historical sketch. Haller, though he "could not completely break 
away from the mechanical philosophy," was the first to show that life could not be 
explained mechanically, and he did so scientifically, without resorting to the 
"hyperphysical fictions" of Stahl.695 Had Haller tried to philosophically construct the 
concept of irritability, he would have conveniently arrived at the system of Pfaff, which 
unites the positive and negative principles of life.696 
Schelling's observations about irritability and sensibility—two of the three 
Lebenskraften which figured so prominently in Kielmeyer's works—are empirically 
derivative. Like Kielmeyer, he stresses the inverse relationship between sensibility and 
irritability, and once again, he makes some mistakes: for example, he argues that 
irritability is directly proportional to the quantity of oxygen in animal matter.697 
However, this was by no means a preposterous statement at the time; in fact, Christoph 
Girtanner, one of the most important German chemists of the late eighteenth century, 
argued precisely the same thing, and Schelling duly cites him. This is yet another 
example of a Schellingian position which, when taken out of context, looks ridiculous, 
but when read against the backdrop of science at the time, gains historical plausibility. 
This aside, it is more important to understand the larger point Schelling makes in his 
discussion of irritability and sensibility. . 
It is no accident that, leading up to this discussion, he explores Galvanism at 
length—complete with references to Volta, Wells, Humboldt, Braunstein, and Pfaff.698 
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Galvanism provides the natural scientist with the ultimate clue as to the natural-physical 
origin of life. Irritability, the Lebenskraft active in galvanic phenomena, becomes "the 
middle point around which all organic forces are collected" thus gives us the ability "to 
unveil the secret of life and to disperse the fog of nature (den Schleyer der Natur 
aufheben)."699 In Schelling's system, sensibility becomes the negative of irritability, and 
the two combine to produce the concept of instinct. It is instinct-—that which unites the 
unfreedom of involuntary movement with a conscious drive to move—which 
characterizes animal life. But once again, this interplay is only the result of a higher 
principle, manifesting itself on the organic level. And it is at this point that Schelling can 
finally explain the Stufenfolge, or stages of natural development, with which he concludes 
The World Soul. According to Schelling, it was Kielmeyer's speech at the Karlsschule 
which announced "the epoch of a completely new natural history,"700 and which hinted at 
the fact that the organic powers "are branches of one and the same power," and that, just 
as all inorganic phenomena can be traced back to light, all organic phenomena can be 
traced back to a first principle which causes all life.701 
AA, I,6: 248. As Jorg Jantzen puts it, "Irritability therefore has a central role: it is the place where the 
boundary between the dead laws of chemistry are crossed—in both directions" ("Die Philosophic der 
Natur," in Hans Jorg Sandkiihler, ed., F. W.J. Schelling (WeimanMetzler, 1988), 82-108. Quotation from 
99. 
700
 AA, I, 6: 253. Thomas Bach comments that this particular passage is somewhat of a misreading of 
Kielmeyer. See his "Kielmeyer als ' Vater der Naturphilosophie'? Anmerkungen zu seiner Rezeption im 
deutschen Idealismus," in Philosophic der Organischen in der Goethezeit, 232-251. Bach's discussion of 
the appropriation of Kielmeyer in the World Soul mid the First Outline can be found on 241-246. Jardine 
uses this quotation as the starting point for the above cited essay "On the Realization of Questions." Iain 
Hamilton Grant also takes Kielmeyer to be absolutely central to Schelling's Naturphilosophie, explicitly 
saying that Schelling's idea of "higher physics" is derived from Kielmeyer's Rede. See Grant, 
'"Philosophy become Genetic': The Physics of the World Soul," in Judith Norman and Alistair Welchman, 
eds., The New Schelling (New York: Continuum, 2004), 128-150. See especially 133. 
AA, I, 6: 252. 
Here, the concept of the Bildungstrieb returns, this time in a new form. The 
"principle of all organization," which the natural sciences force us to presuppose, is not 
Blumenbach's Bildungstrieb but rather a "universal Bildungstrieb" which is not to be 
mistaken for a Bildungskraft, which is only able to generate "dead products."702 This 
Bildungskraft is obviously important: it creates matter and "rules over the inorganic 
world."'1" But once again, Schelling asserts that the organic Trieb must be primary. He 
emphatically denies that there are Lebenskrdften in the true sense: a Lebenskraft is "a 
completely empty concept," for it carries along with it the assumption that there is a 
special force operative in organic matter which is absent from the rest of the Nature.704 
"The essence (Wesen) of life does not lie in a force, but in & free play of 
forces.. ..Therefore, the forces which are at play in life are not special [forces], unique to 
organic Nature."705 Organic forces are, in fact, latent even in the inorganic world, and 
they spring from that "universal Bildungstrieb" which manifests itself in individual living 
things and thus unites them all: 
The principle of life does not come into organic material 
(for example, through infusion, which is a stupid but 
popular concept), but conversely, this principle reveals 
itself in organic material (dieses Princip hat sich die 
organische Materie angebildet).. ..Therefore, we should not 
talk as if this principle raises (aufhebe) the dead powers of 
702






matter up into living bodies. Rather, 1. [this principle] 
gives direction to these dead forces which, left to 
themselves, would not [form life] and 2. this principle 
arouses and continuously sustains the conflict between 
these dead forces, which otherwise would quickly result in 
equilibrium and rest.706 
Once again, organism and life imply perpetual conflict. Mechanism and death are simply 
the suspension of it. And the "universal Bildunsgtrieb" which animates the world is the 
"World Soul." It unites the entire natural world in an immense circle of life: 
Therefore, this principle sustains the continuity between the 
inorganic and the organic world, and links together all of 
nature in a universal organism. In it, we recognize anew 
that Being (Wesen) that the most ancient philosophy 
dreamingly greeted {ahnend begrufite) as the joint soul of 
nature, and which the physicists of that epoch identified 
7ft7 
with the formative and creative Aether.... 
Schelling's World Soul is thus a spectacularly metaphysical vision of unity in 
multiplicity. It is a portrait of a world so teeming with life that even "death" is simply 
organism at rest. In the context of German Idealism, the World Soul represents a radical 
overcoming of Kant's Third Critique. Schelling contends that there are real purposes in 
nature, and that the most recent empirical sciences prove this fact. Rather than seeing 
AA, I, 6: 257. 
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teleology as a useful, hypothetical tool, scientists must accept nature's teleological 
aspects and use them to investigate nature as a universal, living organism characterized 
by the very "hylozoism" that Kant dreaded. Furthermore, one can clearly see Schelling 
breaking away from Fichte in this text. Unlike the Ideas, there is no residue of 
transcendental philosophy here. If nature is a universal organism, and humans are simply 
one manifestation of the "first force of nature," then Fichte's I needs to be radically 
reshaped. The World Soul clearly implies that the human mind does not stand outside of 
nature; the mind is a. part of nature, albeit the only part capable of reconstructing its own 
development. True, the Introduction to the Ideas had declared that "Nature is visible 
spirit, spirit invisible nature." But the World Soul gives nature a real, ontologically 
independent existence, and lays the seeds of the "Absolute Idealism" of the 
Identitatsphilosophie and Hegel's system. 
Furthermore, just like the other "Spinozists" of the eighteenth century, Schelling 
now explicitly combines Spinoza's obsession with the unity of nature with Leibniz's 
vitalist tendencies. It is difficult to miss the pantheistic tendencies of the World Soul. In 
his next work on Naturphilosophie, the First Outline, this combination will become even 
more explicit. But the World Soul was already more than enough to win over Goethe, 
who read Spinoza as if he were a divinely inspired prophet. The publication of the World 
Soul was thus Schelling's ticket to Jena, which was entering its annus mirabilis. 
SCHELLING, GOETHE, AND NATURPHILOSOPHIE 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe was central to the development of Naturphilosophie; he 
approved of and inspired Schelling's work during the latter's time in Jena. For Goethe 
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scholars who accept the erroneous thesis that Schelling wished to do away with empirical 
science, and that Schelling's Naturphilosophie is simply disguised mysticism, this is an 
embarrassment. As such, they go to great lengths to sweep the relationship under the rug, 
often distorting Goethe's own words and completely ignoring the close collaboration 
between Schelling and Goethe from 1798-1800.708 In fact, Goethe is commonly called an 
enemy of Naturphiloophie.709 While I do not dispute that there were real differences in 
the respective approaches of Goethe and Schelling, I will show that any attempt to 
construct a barrier between the two is misguided.710 Rather than viewing any association 
with Schelling as poisonous, Goethe scholars should discard the notion that association 
One example of this distortion comes from R.H. Stephenson. Arguing that Goethe was an outright 
enemy of Schelling, he cites a conversation with Miiller from 1823, in which Goethe refers to Schelling's 
"forked tongue." This supposedly proves Goethe's "rejection of Schelling's attempts at uniting opposites 
by mere verbal identities in conciliatory synthesis." {Goethe's Conception of Knowledge and Science 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995), 29). There are two major problems with this. First, we 
have already seen that, in the World Soul, Schelling explicitly warned against ignoring the multiplicity of 
nature in favor of empty identities. Second, Stephenson takes Goethe's remark completely out of context. 
Goethe's word Zweiziingelnd is no allusion to the Identitatsphilosophie but a very clear pejorative referring 
to the mystical-religious path which Schelling embraced after 1809. The entire passage reads: "Goethe 
spoke about the philosophical systems of Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling, and remarked that, through 
the latter's fork-tongued expressions on religious things great confusion has arisen, and rational meology 
has been set back by half a century." WA Anhang: 4. Clearly mis is an indictment of Schelling's religious 
philosophy, not his Naturphilosophie. Unfortunately, this type of distortion is typical of those who try to 
sever Goethe from Naturphilosophie. 
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with any Naturphilosoph is akin to drinking from a poisoned well. Certainly they cannot 
deny Goethe's change of heart about Schelling which followed his reading of the World 
Soul.111 
The most powerful evidence of this conversion is Goethe's letter to Voigt from 
June 1798, shortly after he met Schelling for the first time. Goethe notes that "Schelling's 
short visit was very pleasing to me" and says how beneficial it will be to remove 
Schelling from the isolation of Leipzig and place him in the "active and industrious 
society" of Jena, so that Schelling could better apply his "beautiful spiritual talents."712 
As for Schelling's newest book, Goethe's approval could not be more apparent: the 
World Soul "contains very beautiful insights and vividly excites the wish that the writer 
will become more and more familiar with the details of experience." However, despite 
this somewhat ambivalent comment about Schelling's commitment to empiricism, 
Goethe is already impressed with the depth of Schelling's scientific knowledge. He notes 
that the method of this "thinking young man" will have much to contribute to the 
disciplines of physics and chemistry. 
That the World Soul would have pleased Goethe should not surprise us, for he 
shared Schelling's belief in the duality and polarity of nature. The following passage 
from Goethe could be put into the World Soul and pass as Schelling's words: 
711
 Robert Richards emphasizes the difference between the Ideas and the World Soul as a means of 
explaining Goethe's conversion. In the Ideen, Schelling approached the problem of a priori demonstration 
not from the perspective of nature—which a reader might have expected—but from that of the ego itself. 
He began with the kinds of deductively derived ego structures that originated with Fichte an then moved to 
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True observers of nature.. .will agree with one another that 
everything that appears, everything that confronts us as 
phenomenon, must hint at either an original division for 
which a unification is possible or an original identity from 
which a division can be reached, and in such a manner 
present itself. To divide the united, to unite the divided, is 
the life of nature; this is the eternal systole and diastole, the 
eternal synkrisis and diakrisis, the inhaling and exhaling of 
the world in which we live, breathe, and exist.714 
Schelling's belief that the development of nature is the process of "individualization" of 
an original, self-divided unity is thus recapitulated almost verbatim by Goethe. Goethe 
reinforced this idea in a little piece entitled "Polarity." In the examination of natural 
appearances, "the particular leads to the general, the general to the particular."715 This is 
precisely the method of the world soul: scientists must synthesize empirical observations 
and follow them back to their origin, while simultaneously explaining how those origins 
created the individual products of nature. Like Schelling, Goethe believes that all the 
diversity in the world arises from "a few foundational maxims."716 
Finally, we should not ignore an amazing passage from Goethe in which he 
explains how basic forces of nature can "intensify (steigern)" and ascend to new levels of 
organization. It reminds one of Schelling's assertion that the unified "universal 
Bildungstrieb" raises up heterogeneous "dead forces" in order to direct them towards 
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organism. Goethe states that the principle of life "contains the possibility of diversifying 
the simplest beginnings of appearances through intensification (Steigerung)." If the 
opposed forces balance each other out, nothing happens. Like Schelling, Goethe 
identifies equilibrium with mechanism and death. "The unification can, however, happen 
in a higher sense, in which the divided first intensifies, and through the unification of the 
intensified, a third, new, higher, unexpected thing is brought forward."717 Goethe's 
account of nature's development is thus very similar to the outlines of Schelling's 
Stufenfolge, which will reappear in the First Outline. This passage seems very 
metaphysical for the supposedly "empirical" Goethe, but he uses the methodology 
contained in it in his actual scientific works. Indeed, he sees the growth of a plant as a 
series of alternating expansions and contractions.718 Goethe, like Schelling, believed that 
the opposed forces of nature were capable, when teleologically directed, of bringing 
about the "higher" phenomena of organism and life. 
Upon reading the World Soul—Goethe did not need to wait for its publication, 
because Schelling sent him a copy immediately-—the poet sprang into action and used his 
power to install Schelling as a full professor in Jena. Voigt dashed off a letter to Duke 




 "By repeating here a remark made earlier, that styles and stamens represent the same stage of 
development, we can further clarify the cause of this alternate expansion and contraction. From the seed to 
fullest development of stem leaves we noted first an expansion; thereupon we saw the calyx developing 
through contraction, the petals through expansion, and the sexual organs again through contraction; and 
soon we shall become aware of the maximum expansion in the first and the maximum contraction in the 
seed. In these six steps nature ceaselessly carries on her eternal work of reproducing the plants by means of 
the two sexes" (WA II, 6: 62-63). Translation from Myles W. Jackson, "On Natural and Artificial Budgets: 
Accounting for Goethe's Economy of Nature," Science in Context 7 (1994): 409-431. Passages quoted on 
418. 
necessary to bring Schelling to Jena would be money well spent. The Duke, in turn, 
notified the local nobility of Schelling's appointment, repeating Goethe's words of praise 
and insisting that "the entire academy in Jena will be provided with a useful 
colleague."720 At the end of July, the University wrote Schelling, formally offering him 
the position.721 Needless to say, Schelling happily accepted, writing to Karl August and 
to the University on August 12. "All my efforts will be directed towards the wonderful 
task of becoming a member of your University, and being worthy of the favor you have 
shown me." 
Schelling, of course, knew of his appointment before the official correspondence 
arrived. Niethammer lived in Jena and kept him up to date on University politics. Since 
Schelling's duties as professor would not begin until the start of the winter semester, he 
had some free time, and continued to talk about new projects, including a review of a 
book on Zoononmie and a treatise on Theodicy. Neither would ever appear, but Schelling 
did stick to one of his plans: he told Niethammer he would go to Dresden at the end of 
the summer.723 This would be a fateful journey, because he would be introduced to the 
Romantic circle for the first time.724 Schelling arrived in Dresden on the 18 August, and 
although he was able to spend very little time with Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, both 
of whom left at the end of August, A.W. Schlegel and his wife Caroline-who would 
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eventually become Schilling's own wife—stayed until Schilling's departure in 
October.725 Caroline seemed instantly fascinated by Schelling, writing to Friedrich 
Schlegel in October that Schelling was more interesting than Friedrich had let on, and 
that Schelling was like "granite," a man meant to "break through walls."726 
However, despite Schelling's eventual love for Caroline, he was not similarly 
infatuated, at least not at first. Rather, in the initial stages of his stay in Jena—the time 
when he was composing the First Outline and the Introduction to the Outline—his main 
influences were Goethe, Schiller, and Fichte.727 The Romantics no doubt played an 
enormous role in Schelling's intellectual development: for instance, they helped push him 
back to aesthetics in the System of Transcendental Idealism and his Philosophy of Art. 
Furthermore, there was certainly an elective affinity between Schelling's conception of 
nature and that of Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel. But to say that the Romantics played 
an important role in the genesis of his Naturphilosophie misses the mark. By and large, 
this aspect of his early thought was driven along by the desire to overcome the problems 
of subjective Idealism by harvesting the contributions of the empirical sciences. 
Upon arriving in Jena, Schelling began lecturing on Naturphilosophie. Starting in 
mid-October, he offered public lectures "On the concept and the essence of 
Naturphilosophie," and he also stated that, starting at the end of October, his lectures 
would follow "my own outline." In fact, in early November, Schelling would send the 
n5BuDl: 156. 
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manuscript of the First Outline to Goethe, although it would not be published until Easter 
of 1799.728 The implications of this are clear: the First Outline was actually a product of 
the Leipzig period!729 How else could he have completed it so soon after beginning his 
lectures in Jena? Furthermore, if we know little about the composition of the Ideas or the 
World Soul, we can say almost nothing about the origins of the First Outline. This makes 
Schelling's achievement all the more remarkable: his first fully systematic presentation of 
Naturphilosophie was completed even before he had the chance to interact with the 
intellectual culture of Jena. It was, like the other two works of Naturphilosophie, the fruit 
of intense private study of philosophy and empirical science. 
THE FIRST OUTLINE: THE SYSTEM ESTABLISHED 
The First Outline, along with its Introduction, is the most comprehensive exposition of 
the methodology and conclusions of Schellingian Naturphilosophie, and thus stands at 
the endpoint of this dissertation. It is true that traces of Schelling's mature system 
already appeared in the Ideas, and even moreso in the World Soul, but those works— 
which often drifted back and forth between mountains of empirical detail and wider 
philosophical insights—lack the cohesiveness of the First Outline. Schelling by no 
means stops referring to the natural sciences in his new text, but he now places most of 
his references in footnotes, allowing him to lay out his own philosophy without 
interruption. Much of the content of the First Outline should come as no surprise to 
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anyone familiar with the Ideas and the World Soul, but Schelling once again makes some 
subtle, though important, modifications to his ideas. There are two main aspects of the 
text on which I will focus. First, Schelling provides, for the first time, a detailed account 
of his own methodology. A quick reading of the opening pages instantly dispels the myth 
of Schelling's supposed rejection of empiricism, and sheds light on what Schelling 
himself believes his Naturphilosophie can accomplish. Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, the First Outline offers a grand synthesis of Spinozism and Leibnizianism 
nowhere found in his earlier works. The World Soul was fundamentally Spinozist insofar 
as it embraced nature as a totality, as a universal organism. This idea persists into the 
First Outline, and I will not repeat material found earlier in the chapter. Instead, I will 
focus on the unspoken but constant references to Leibniz found in the First Outline. 
Schelling's Leibnizian tendencies are strong enough in the text that it is fair to call his 
Naturphilosophie a physical monadology. 
Schelling begins the First Outline by telling us exactly what Naturphilosophie 
should and should not be. In doing so, he reaches back to the methodology of his early 
Idealism. In On the Possibility of a Form of Philosophy, he accepted Fichte's "self-
positing I" as the Grundsatz of philosophy and maintained that all sciences—including 
philosophy—must have an unconditioned starting point. The same is true for 
Naturphilosophie. The starting point for the Naturphilosoph is a particular view of 
nature: he must see nature not as a collection of individual things, but as an 
unconditioned totality. The philosopher cannot even say that nature "is," for nature is 
something higher: it is being itself. Furthermore, the Naturphilosoph must understand 
this totality not as an inert, powerless substance, but as "a continually operative natural 
activity." In fact, Schelling argues that we can only "know" nature as active. We cannot 
know it as "product." This is consistent with his arguments in the World Soul. Conflict 
in nature is the norm, and this is why the mechanical philosophers of the seventeenth 
century failed: they began with the presupposition that nature is fundamentally dead and 
powerless, and then were left with the thankless task of explaining life from that 
standpoint. Schelling reverses this order: nature is fundamentally alive and active, and 
mechanism is simply the absence of activity. This explains Schelling's contention that 
we can only know nature as active. 
Schelling has now elucidated the basic task of Naturphilosophie: the 
understanding of nature as an unconditioned, active totality. Does this mean that 
empirical investigation in unnecessary? Schelling does distinguish sharply between 
empirical science and Naturphilosophie. The former concerns itself with "individual 
beings," while Naturphilosophie investigates being itself. Schelling seems to de-
emphasize the importance of individual things, which are the subject of empirical 
research. "Being itself," i.e. the subject of Naturphilosophie, "does not exhibit itself 
entirely in any finite product, and every individual is, as it were, a particular expression 
of it." He also goes on to say that individual things are simply "the color of the 
unconditioned."730 Taken on their own, these passages might lead the reader to conclude 
that Schelling does indeed wish to dispose of empirical science. 
However, on closer inspection, we find that Schelling says just the opposite. 
Naturphilosophie must begin with empirical research, because simply identifying 
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absolute activity is insufficient. Rather, the Naturphilosoph must explain how an infinite, 
absolute activity "will present itself empirically, i.e. in the finite."731 
—Possibility of the exhibition of the infinite in the finite—is 
the highest problem of all systematic science. The 
subordinate sciences solve this problem in particular cases. 
Transcendental philosophy has to solve the problem in its 
greatest universality. 
Schelling said the same thing in the World Soul, although in slightly different language. 
There, he attempted to show how nature unfolds as an individualization of a universal 
drive to organization. The raw data of empirical science provides us with a starting point; 
we must then trace the various activities of nature back to a common source. But the 
message is the same. Naturphilosophie is not ignorance of empirical science, but the 
attempt to philosophically synthesize the data provided by those sciences. In order to 
show how nature operates on a universal scale, we must first see how it operates in the 
concrete and tangible world. 
Critics of Schelling might still object, and point to passages in which Schelling 
says we must deduce nature a priori. These are not difficult to find: at one point 
Schelling states that we must "determine the various organic functions and their various 
possible proportions apriori."m But Schelling's method is much more sophisticated 
than this. He sees abstract (a priori) philosophy and empirical science {a posteriori) as 
mutual participants in Naturphilosophie. Abstract thought directs empirical investigation 
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by identifying the "intermediate links" which "still [lie] hidden in the depths of Nature." 
Deciding what needs to be investigated is the task of philosophy. "It is, therefore, 
conceivable, that speculative physics (the soul of true experimentation) has, throughout 
all time, been the mother of all great discoveries in Nature."734 But "empirical research" 
also plays an important role. Finding out the "intermediate links" is the job of the 
particular natural sciences, which then throw new dilemmas back to philosophy. Quite 
often, new discoveries answer old questions but beget new ones. "Since every new 
discovery throws us back upon a new ignorance, and while one knot is being loosed a 
new one is being tied."735 Naturphilosophie is, quite simply, the back-and-forth 
cooperation between philosophy and science. During the twentieth century, historians of 
science gradually dismissed the positivist fiction that metaphysics and science are and 
should be separate projects, and thus this particular passage seems remarkably modern. 
Furthermore, the meaning of a priori for Schelling is different than it was for 
Kant (or for Schelling's critics). Schelling believes that empirical a posteriori knowledge 
can actually be transformed into a priori truths! "A judgment of experience.. .becomes, 
notwithstanding, an a priori principle as soon as I arrive, whether directly or indirectly, at 
insight into its internal necessity." For instance, our a posteriori knowledge of 
irritability and electricity becomes a priori as soon as we are able to trace them back to 
the activity of the universal organism. In the same section of the text, he seems to foresee 
the criticisms of his positivist critics, and one wonders if those who dismiss 
Naturphilosophie have ever read this section, which I do not hesitate to quote at length: 
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The assertion that natural science must be able to deduce all 
its principles a priori is in a sense understood to mean that 
natural science must dispense with all experience, and, 
without any intervention of experience, be able to spin all 
its principles out of itself; an affirmation so absurd that the 
very objections to it deserve pity.—Not only do we know 
this or that through experience, but we originally know 
nothing at all except through experience, and by means of 
experience, and in this sense the whole of our knowledge 
consists of judgments of experience. These judgments 
become a priori principles when we become conscious of 
them as necessary.... 
Schelling thus refutes his positivist critics ahead of time. The method of 
Naturphilosophie is not the abandonment of empirical research, but the recognition of the 
reciprocal labor of philosophy and the natural sciences. 
Now Schelling's methodology is clear, we can move to an examination of the 
monadological aspects of the First Outline. Although Schelling completely banishes any 
mention of Leibniz from the text, it is almost impossible to miss his influence. In the 
preface to the book, Schelling states that his intention is to construct a system of 
"dynamic atomism," one which does for the dynamic philosophy what LeSage had done 
for its mechanical counterpart.737 To be sure, Schelling believed he had already refuted 
LeSage in the Ideas, but he had only offered hints of his own system. In the First 
AA, I, 7: 65. 
Outline, this dynamic atomism finally appears in a robust form. The productivity and 
development of nature is, for Schelling, rooted in what he calls "individual actants" or 
"natural monads."738 Schelling's "individual actants" are even closer to Leibniz's 
monads than Wolffs or Kant's. For whereas these reformed monadists attempted to 
reconcile Newtonian gravitation with Leibniz's doctrines by declaring the monads to be 
physical things, Schelling relegates them to the level of pure activity, completely prior to 
all matter.739 Schelling uses these "natural monads" to fuse Leibnizianism with 
Spinozism in the First Outline: he began with the desire to investigate nature as 
unconditioned, and he will later describe this standpoint as the "Spinozism of Physics."740 
But the process by which the absolute productivity of nature reveals itself and guides 
itself along its stages of development is thoroughly Leibnizian—it is the activities of the 
"natural monads" that drive nature along this path. 
Schelling's insistence that we cannot know Nature as product, only as activity, 
predisposes him towards Leibniz's philosophy. Already in the World Soul, Schelling laid 
out the relationship between the universal organizing principle—i.e. the World Soul— 
and the individual products of nature, which express that principle. In the First Outline, 
however, he asserts something new: not only is conflict pervasive in the natural world, 
but there is also a conflict between the world-organism and its individual products. No 
matter how successfully the individual resists, each product in nature—which is only a 
738
 Ibid., 86. 
739
 Kant's own opinions on this matter changed during the transition between his pre-critical and mature 
phases. In the Physical Monadology, he still aimed at a compromise between Newton and Leibniz. By the 
time he wrote the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,, Kant dismissed the ideas of the 
"monadists" as misguided and concentrated much more on laying out a foundation for Newtonian physics. 
For a brief discussion of this change, see Wolfgang Bonsiepen, "Die Ausbildung einer dynamischen 
Atomistik," 10-12. 
740
 SWWl, 273. • 
"color of the unconditioned"—contains the seeds of its own dissolution, which are 
simultaneously the seeds of a future "infinite development."741 In more concrete terms, 
look at the phenomenon of life. All living things involve a conflict of forces and a 
limitation of mechanism, but eventually, all living things return to equilibrium and death. 
Nevertheless, even a dead organism helps beget new organisms: the plant dies and 
decomposes, but in doing so fertilizes the soil, helping to produce other plants. A dead 
animal provides nourishment for worms and flies. This is a crude analogy, but it makes 
sense. This is what Schelling means when he says that nature herself always seeks to 
abolish individuality. Infinite nature can only manifest itself in the finite: nature must 
limit itself to produce anything determinate and thus all natural products are caught "in 
between" a negation and affirmation of the infinite productivity. However, Schelling 
now asks the question: what is it that prevents the universal-organism from winning out? 
What is it which ensures that new individuals continue to exist? The answer is the 
"individual actants of nature," or what Schelling at one point calls "natural monads."742 
They are the self-limitation of Nature, and therefore they lay at the heart of the possibility 
of Nature in general. 
The "individual actant" or natural monad serves as the solution to two problems: 
first, the concept of the individual actant allows Schelling to solve an epistemological 
riddle: how can humans experience an infinite activity in finite "external intuition"? By 
setting up the individual actants as the negations or self-limitations of an infinitely 
741
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Schelling, First Outline, 244. 
productive nature, Schelling makes them the means by which we experience the infinite. 
This is because actants are the source of all quality. Second, the concept of the individual 
actant or natural monad allows Schelling to deliver on his promised dynamic atomism. 
As we cautioned before, his atomism is not a physical monadology like that of the pre-
critical Kant—Schelling is quite clear that the actants of nature do not exist per se, but 
rather are ideal grounds of explanation. They are similar in purpose, yet radically 
different, from the mechanical atoms of philosophers like LeSage. Or, in other words, 
they are Leibnizian monads stripped of substantiality. They axe pure force. 
Schelling begins his discussion of original actants with a desire to explain the 
products of nature. As noted above, all products for Schelling must only be "apparent 
products." They appear to us fixed, but in reality are only temporarily so. Schelling 
reasons that, if all products are only apparent products, they must be capable of further 
"infinite development." Schelling views the organism as the paradigmatic case of this 
capacity, for though the organism appears as a fixed whole at any given moment, its 
possession of circular causality allows for the possibility that it will become something 
different.743 In extreme cases, like that of the caterpillar and the butterfly, an organism 
bears the capability to transform itself radically. But the capacity for infinite 
development, "cannot occur in [the product], however, without there originally being an 
infinite multiplicity of unified tendencies in it."744 What is this "infinite multiplicity of 
unified tendencies" and how does this multiplicity manifest itself to us? Recall that the 
unconditioned, i.e the absolutely productive, can only present itself to us in its own 
743
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limitation, and that it can never "be" but only appear to us as infinite becoming. Where, 
Schelling asks, is the location of all our experience of things external? The answer is that 
"every external being is a being in space."745 Therefore, "something has to come to the 
fore in experience which, although itself not in space, is yet principle of all occupation of 
space."746 This is precisely the individual actant or natural monad, and it corresponds to 
repulsive force in the Ideas and light in the World Soul. It is the vehicle by which an 
infinitely productive nature appears on the ground level of experience. These actants are 
not only the "principle of the occupation of space" but they are precisely those "unified 
tendencies" which give each product the capacity for "infinite development." These 
actants bear some similarity to the atoms of corpuscular philosophers. Nevertheless, 
there is an important difference: 
The atomist is mistaken only in that he assumes mechanical 
atoms, i.e., the finitude of mechanical divisibility.. ..The 
original actants, however, ARE not themselves in space; 
they cannot be viewed as parts of matter. Accordingly, our 
claim can be called the principle of dynamic atomism. For 
us, every original actant is just like the atom for the 
corpuscular philosopher; truly singular, each is in itself 
whole and sealed-off, and represents, as it were, a natural 
monad.1 7 
AA, 1,7, 84. 
AA, 1,7, 84-85. 
AA, 1,7, 86. 
In the World Soul, we already saw Schelhng moving away from Kant's 
construction of matter. He recognized that attraction and repulsion cannot stand apart 
from one another as two separate, independent forces. Rather, they must be originally 
united. In the Introduction to the Outline, it seems that Schelling is worried his readers 
will mistake his position for Kant's, and as such he makes it clear that "That the notions 
of dynamical physics popularized until now are very different from, and partially at 
variance with, those which the author lays down.. ..I speak of the modes of representation 
which have been put into philosophic heads by Kant" who believed that "all dynamic 
(qualitative) changes [are] only mere changes in the relation of the repulsive and 
attractive forces."748 Kant's construction is no longer sufficient for Schelling, because it 
is difficult to see how attraction and repulsion can account for all the diversity of nature. 
Schelling now accuses Kant of reductionism: 
We do not indeed deny that these phenomena at the 
extreme limit of their manifestation are changes in the 
relation of the principles themselves; we only deny that 
these changes are nothing more. On the contrary, we are 
convinced that this so-called dynamical principle is too 
superficial and defective a basis of explanation for all 
Nature's phenomena in order to reach the real depth and 
manifoldness of natural phenomena, since by means of it, 
SW, 111,281. 
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in fact, no qualitative change of matter as such is 
constructible. ..749 
Why does Schelling insist that attraction and repulsion are insufficient as an explanation 
of nature's diversity? This question is difficult to answer for certain, but it likely has to 
do with the primacy of organism. At the end of the World Soul, Schelling insisted that, at 
times, the "universal Bildungstrieb " could "raise up" dead forces in order to create 
something new, i.e. living things. Left to themselves, repulsion and attraction could not 
possibly generate life. It is impossible that these forces, which operate in straight lines, 
could somehow transform themselves into the circular causality of the organism. They 
must be guided by a higher principle from which they are both derived. 
Since we now understand both the wider scope of Schelling's First Outline and 
the particular role the "individual actant" plays in his system, we can move on to a 
detailed examination of these "natural monads" which highlights Schelling's debt to 
Leibniz. I will focus on three main areas of similarity between the Leibnizian monad and 
Schelling's "individual actant." Some of these are relatively straightforward, while 
others are more complex, especially the cases that deal with Schelling's explanation of 
"composite actants" and their interplay. 
First, Schelling's "individual actants" are the principle of the occupation of space, 
i.e. extension or matter, and they are therefore not material, nor parts of material. 
Schelling acknowledges that atomism is not wholly misguided: "The atomist is mistaken 
only in that he assumes mechanical atoms, i.e., the finitude of mechanical 
divisibility.. ..what is in space is in space by means of a continually active filling-up of 
S*r, m,28l. 
space; therefore, in every part of space there is moving force." Thus, for Schelling 
matter is not mere extension, not "dead" and inert stuff, but the result of an active force. 
"Accordingly, our claim can be called the principle of dynamic atomism."751 Leibniz, 
too, objected to the Cartesian-Newtonian characterization of matter, and would agree 
with Schelling on this point (although Leibniz still uses the vocabulary of substance, 
which Schelling had discarded). This is a core Leibnizian doctrine, and expressions of it 
are not difficult to find. In his Specimen Dynamicum Leibniz insisted that 
in corporeal things there is something over and above 
extension, something prior to extension, namely, that force 
of nature implanted everywhere by the Creator.. ..[Force] 
constitute[s] the innermost nature of bodies, since to act is 
the mark of substances, and extension means nothing but 
the continuity or diffusion of an already presupposed 
striving and reacting (that is, resisting) substance.752 
In his quasi-autobiographical New System of Nature, Leibniz insists that "formal atoms," 
not material atoms, are the best way to explain extended matter, because they allow us to 
reintroduce the notion of force.753 And his conviction that the monads were the "true 
atoms of nature" is found in the Monadology itself.754 Thus, Schelling and Leibniz both 
™AA,I,7, 85-86. 
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agree that they have found the correct version of atomism, one whose active "true atoms" 
are prior to, or even "over and above" matter. 
Second, Schelling hints at the idea that each individual actant is "sealed" and thus 
causally independent from all other actants. Each actant, Schelling insists, "is in itself 
whole and sealed-off, and represents, as it were, a natural monad."755 Schelling hardly 
traces out the full implications of this statement, although he mentions later that each 
actant undergoes "a development according to its own nature."156 It is difficult to tell 
whether Schelling is denying causal interaction of actants here, but a tentative case can 
definitely made for this interpretation. He talks about the "universal prehension by every 
actant of the others," but at the same time implies that actants can reach into each other's 
"spheres." The possibility that Schelling is denying inter-actant causality is bolstered by 
his positive mention of Monadology §7 in the introduction to the Ideen.757 This is the 
famous "no windows" passage, which argues that "There is also no way of explaining 
how a monad can be altered or changed internally by some other creature.. ..The monads 
have no windows through which something can enter or leave."758 That one of 
Schelling's few direct citations is to this passage is striking, and Leibniz's declaration in 
Monadology §11 that "the monad's natural changes come from an internal principle"159 
seems similar enough to Schelling's insistence that each actant behaves according to its 
AA, 1,7, 86. 
AA, I, 7, 100. 
AA, I, 5, 77. 
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nature. If Schelling is indeed arguing for the lack of a real causal relationship between 
actants, it will only be comprehensible in light of his theory of their combinations. 
Third and finally, Schelling offers a complex description of how the "individual 
actants" interact with each other to create a unified "Nature." This is where he most 
thoroughly blends Spinoza with Leibniz. Nature as productivity (or as he will call it in 
the Einleitung, natura naturans) "uses" the individual actants to guide Nature along its 
stages of development, towards an "absolute organism." Schelling, like Leibniz, argues 
that the whole is "mirrored" in every single individual actant and thus, one can draw a 
parallel between Leibniz's "God" and Schelling's extremely heterodox "absolute 
productivity." In addition, Schelling emphasizes that the individual should not be 
swallowed up into the whole, for he, like Leibniz, saw nature as a unity in multiplicity; 
sacrificing the individual means sacrificing multiplicity. This lines up perfectly with his 
insistence that all natural products are "in between" the absolute and its negation. 
As we saw before, actants have an innate drive towards combination, through 
their "prehension" and "receptivity" for one another. This makes them capable of being 
"used" by a creative Nature in the formation of an all-encompassing product. Again, this 
product is only apparent—it is always changing. "The whole of Nature, not just apart of 
it, should be equivalent to an ever-becoming product. Nature as a whole must be 
conceived in constant formation, and everything must engage in that universal process of 
formation."760 Therefore, the actants themselves "should together represent only one 
absolute product."761 In order for this to happen, "Nature must combine them," but this is 
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not a problem, since "a universal compulsion toward combination must occur throughout 
the whole of Nature."762 All this certainly explains the unity of nature—every actant, in a 
way, moves towards the creation of one, giant natural product. But what about 
multiplicity? Schelling seems clear enough when he states that "All multiplicity in 
Nature is to be sought in the elementary actants alone."763 But this does not explain why 
there are singular products in nature. Why are there individual organisms, and not just 
one universal organism? Schelling answers that "Individual products.. .can only be seen 
as misbegotten attempts" to achieve a total unity.764 Thus, in a sense, individual products 
are "mirrors" of the all-encompassing product or absolute organism that "creative 
Nature" seeks. This explains why Schelling can confidently assert that "the intuition of 
the whole universe is contained in every individual."765 
Schelling's representation of individual products as only "misbegotten attempts" 
to achieve an absolute product seems at odds with his reverence for the individual 
organism. The individual organism is for him the most striking example of the power of 
the actants, and it is worth quoting him at length: 
Each organism is itself nothing other than the collective 
expression for a multiplicity of actants, which mutually 
limit themselves to a determinate sphere. This sphere is 
something perennially enduring—not something merely 
fading into the background as appearance—for it is that 
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which originates in the conflict of actants, the monument, 
as it were, of those activities prehending one another; its is 
the concept of that change itself, which is the only enduring 
thing in change. In all the lawlessness of the actants 
continuously jostling one another, there yet remains the 
lawful aspect of the product itself, which they (and no 
others) are constrained among themselves to produce; as a 
result, the perception of the organism as a product, in which 
what it is it is through itself—which is simultaneously 
cause and effect of itself, means and end—will be justified 
as in accordance with Nature.766 
Thus, if we can temporarily rid our minds of Schelling's comment about individual 
organisms being "misbegotten attempts," we see traces of Reill's description of 
"Enlightenment Vitalism," for which the organism is a "constituent assembly of forces," 
and which focused on the "synergy" of the organism and explained its harmony "by 
emphasizing the centrality of interconnection..." between different relations. Schelling, 
like other vitalists, believed that, "In the world of living nature, each constituent part of 
an organized body was both cause and effect of the other parts. All forces were 
symbiotically linked," and pushed onwards by a teleological cause of development (in 
Schelling's case, the infinite productivity of Nature).767 
'
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Leibniz's work is filled with descriptions of the harmonious interplay offerees or 
monads, and like Schelling, he links these descriptions to the issue of multiplicity. 
Schelling guarantees multiplicity in Nature by implying that each "attempt" to represent 
the absolute will "fail" in a different way, depending on the unique combinations of the 
actants, which themselves represent the entire universe. Leibniz likewise discusses the 
"interconnection or accommodation of all created things to each other," the result of 
which is that "each simple substance is a perpetual, living mirror of the universe." 
Leibniz then moves to his recurring "city analogy," in which he states that each monad 
represents the universe in a particular way, exactly as different observers would see a city 
differently from varied directions.769 It is precisely in this way that there is as much 
variety in the world as possible.770 Leibniz's insistence that the individual mirrors the 
whole is so prevalent that, when we see Schelling using similar language, it is impossible 
not to infer a direct connection. Thus, although they speak slightly different 
philosophical languages, and although the empirical science of Schelling's time ruled out 
a number of Leibniz's own assertions,771 these are kindred spirits, devoted to the idea of a 
harmoniously interconnected universe built upon simple substances or forces. 
Schelling's own monadology is now complete. His "individual actants" are the 
"dynamic atoms" out of which the world is constructed. Once this has been established, 
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Schelling concludes the First Outline by doing what he failed to do in the World Soul: 
give a robust deduction of the "stages of nature" or Stufenfolge.112 The individual actants, 
in conflict with one another, yield not only the inorganic forces of light, electricity, and 
magnetism, but the corresponding organic forces of Bildungstrieb, irritability, and 
sensibility. These are the successive stages of development of inorganic and orgnic 
nature. Schelling claims he has succeeded in showing how life arises from physical 
causes. To be sure, most "natural historians" have "in part intimated, in part actually 
asserted" the connection between life and those physical causes. But Schelling sees his 
own system as the only one which grasps the "inner necessity" of the stages of nature.774 
True to his method, Schelling argues that he has taken the a posteriori discoveries of 
eighteenth century researchers like Buffon and raised them to the status of a priori 
knowledge by grasping the necessary therein. 
At times, while demonstrating that nature proceeds to ever higher levels of 
complexity, Schelling seems to hint at the modern concept of evolution. For instance, he 
notes: 
Natural History has been, until now, really the description 
of nature, as Kant has very correctly remarked. He himself 
uses the name "natural history" for a particular branch of 
natural science, namely, the knowledge of the gradual 
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alterations which the various organisms of the Earth have 
suffered through influence of external nature, through 
migrations from one climate into the other, and so forth. 
However, if the idea set out above were put into practice, 
then the name "natural history" would get a much higher 
meaning, for then there would actually be a history of 
Nature itself.775 
But Schelling is far from accepting the historical change of species. It is true that the 
physical origin of each species is the universal organism.776 After all, there really is only 
one, giant organism which strives against all individuality. This is, however, something 
very different from the statement that all species have a common historical origin, or that 
"the origin of all organisms [is] successive."777 Schelling flatly denies historical species 
change: "The assumption that different organisms have really formed themselves from 
one another through gradual development is a misunderstanding of an idea which actually 
does lie in reason."778 In fact, Schelling says, once each species divides itself into 
different sexes, absolute species fixity results. Yet he cryptically leaves open the 
possibility of a Lucretian history of nature in the style of Diderot. Schelling comments 
that Nature must "start over" with each individual species. Therefore, if one demands an 
historical picture of nature's development from Schelling, it would perhaps involve the 





continual appearance and extinction of different species. Nevertheless, Schelling 
emphatically rejects the modern notion of historical species change. 
To conclude this chapter, one must caution against an approach which condemns 
Schelling for not being Darwin.779 There is still innovation here. Schelling's idea of the 
"evolution" of species is similar to Goethe's in that it is a Platonic unfolding of an 
original archetype. To arrive at the modern idea of evolution, all one needs to do is take 
this ideal conception of species change and temporalize it. Furthermore, Schelling went 
further than many in the eighteenth century by giving a fully articulated account of the 
relationship between physical and organic forces. He championed the idea that life is 
explainable from "natural principles," sweeping aside both mystical vitalism and soulless 
mechanism in the process. Schelling's Naturphilosophie, while sometimes striking in its 
excess, thus looks remarkably modern. In the conclusion to this dissertation, I will 
investigate some of the ways Schelling is being revived today, and provide some insight 
as to which approaches succeed and which, thought sympathetic, are dead ends. 
Ernst Mayr is a good example of this tendency. He complains of the influence of "Platonism" and 
essentially condemns every scientists prior to Lamarck for failing to recognize historical species change. 
See The Growth of Biological Thought, passim. 
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Conclusion: Schelling in the Twenty-First Century 
The misguided conception that Naturphilosophie represented a brief descent into 
philosophical lunacy—bracketed on either side by sober, empirically oriented science and 
philosophy—has long overstayed its welcome.780 The vast majority of German Schelling 
scholars have long since dismissed this idea, but the English-speaking world lags 
somewhat behind its German counterpart. Some contemporary American philosophers 
still use Naturphilosophie as an easy, catch-all insult to hurl at their opponents.781 
Ironically, they use the dreaded word "Naturphilosophie''' much as early eighteenth 
century orthodox thinkers used the word "Spinozist." In both cases, the negative effect of 
the word presupposes a reading public wholly unfamiliar with the primary sources. To a 
reader familiar with the first part of Schelling's First Outline—the text of which 
explicitly refutes the idea that Naturphilosophie is unconcerned with empirical science— 
the suggestion that Schelling wanted science to be carried out from the philosopher's 
desk will seem uninformed at best and intellectually dishonest at worst. Even Peter Hans 
The language is deliberately similar to Bertrand Russell's. Russell famously stated that Fichte "carried 
subjectivism to a point which seems almost to involve a kind of insanity." Schelling was apparently 
unworthy even of a detailed condemnation, since "philosophically, although famous in his day, he is not 
important." Both quotations are from History of Western Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2004), 650-
651. 
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 For example, see the comments of Daniel Brazeale, one of the leading Fichte scholars in America: "It is 
important to note, even if only in passing, the radical dissimilarity between Fichte's conception of a 
philosophy of nature and certain other projects that have gone by the same name. What is most striking 
about Fichte's concept of nature is how little he believed one can learn about nature from the a priori 
standpoint of philosophical reflection—which may explain why he himself showed so little interest in 
developing this branch of his system.. ..Fichte would appear to have far more in common with what we 
today call the philosophy of science than with the a priori Naturphilosophie of Schelling and Hegel." See 
Brazeale, "The Spirit of the Wissenschaftslehre," 179. 
Reill, who is thoroughly acquainted with the contextual background ofNaturphilosophie, 
engages in some sleight of hand: his dismissal of Naturphilosophie rests largely on the 
conflation of Schelling's positions with those of his later Jena colleague, Lorenz Oken 
(1779-1851).782 
Hopefully this dissertation has convinced the reader that Schelling himself refuted 
his later critics not only theoretically—in the methodological sections of the texts—but 
practically as well. If he really believed that empirical science was unnecessary, he 
would not have spent years acquainting himself with the latest discoveries in physics, 
chemistry, and the life sciences. Nor would he have bothered to demonstrate his 
command of that subject material in his philosophical writings. At times, his theories 
seem wildly implausible and smack of mysticism. But are they really anymore 
outlandish than the theory of preformationism, which an entire generation of "real 
scientists" embraced? The issue here is one of context: if we see Schelling's project not 
from our own perspective, but from his, we understand the fact that his Naturphilosophie 
was not a bizarre attempt at dressing up theosophy as science. Rather, it was a serious, 
painstaking attempt at employing natural-scientific research to answer some of the most 
pressing philosophical questions of his time. As such, I hope that my presentation of 
Schelling's early career contributes to the American Schelling revival already epitomized 
by the works of Beiser and Richards. Still, even if we dismiss the positivist caricatures of 
Naturphilosophie that have prevailed for nearly two centuries, another question remains 
to be answered. Does Schelling's Naturphilosophie, properly understood, have anything 
7821 do not wish to throw Oken under the proverbial bus in order to make Schelling appear more 
sympathetic. Were I to do so, I would be engaging in the same practice as Kant and Fichte scholars who 
dismiss Schelling. However, there is little doubt that some of Oken's Naturphilosophie—for an easy 
example, Oken's placement of snails and elephants in the same class of animals (!)—makes Schelling's 
most extravagant passages look tame. 
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to say to us today? Or is there an insurmountable boundary between his own problems 
and ours, such that the best we can do is merely to understand him? 
One way to argue for Schelling's present-day relevance is to make him out to be a 
forerunner of this or that scientific theory. This approach has many precedents. One of 
the easiest and time-honored methods of defending Naturphilosophie is to demonstrate its 
influence on physics during the nineteenth century. Johann Ritter (1776-1810), a 
Naturphilosoph in his own right, discovered ultraviolet light partly because he believed in 
the polarity of nature: since William Herschel had discovered infrared light, Ritter 
reasoned—in this case correctly—that there must be invisible light on the other end of the 
spectrum as well.783 Hans Christian Orsted (1777-1851), the Danish physicist who first 
established the unity of electricity and magnetism, is also reputed to have been led to his 
discovery by his affinity for Naturphilosophie and his belief in the unity of all the forces 
of nature.784 Likewise, some find Naturphilosophie to be a significant influence on the 
electromagnetic theories of Faraday and Maxwell. One can even find traces of 
Naturphilosophie in the work of the German mathematician Bernhard Riemann.785 One 
can even show—much to the chagrin of Ernst Mayr—that Romantic Naturphilosophie 
A brief summation of Ritter's discovery in English can be found in Walter Wetzels, "Johann Wilhelm 
Ritter: Romantic Physics in Germany," in Romanticism and the Sciences, Andrew Cunningham and 
Nicholas Jardine, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 199-212. 
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played a crucial role in moving towards a theory of species change.786 By no means am I 
denying these connections, but I believe they fail as demonstrations of Schelling's 
relevance. No positivist will be suddenly converted to Schelling's cause simply because 
one particular idea (polarity) proved fruitful. 
Given this tendency among defenders of Naturphilosophie, it should come as no 
surprise that some of the most dominant voices in the present-day Schelling revival set 
him up as a forerunner to modern self-organization theory. The work of Marie-Luise 
Heuser-KeBler is undoubtedly the driving force behind this movement. Heuser-KeBler 
sees a convergence between the ideas of Schelling and those of Ilya Prigogine, who 
extensively studied dissipative systems. Dissipative systems are, put simply, instances in 
which nature departs from equilibrium and temporarily organizes itself. One well-known 
example is a tropical storm or hurricane. A unique set offerees combine to create a well-
organized, self-perpetuating system which persists so long as the conditions for it are 
right. The formation of crystals is another easily understood example. There are, in 
addition, more complex instances of dissipative systems, such as lasers, convection 
currents, and even life itself. Dissipative systems are proof that nature has a tendency 
towards self-organization, and it is easy to find traces of this idea in Schelling's 
Naturphilosophie. In ihs World Soul, Schelling repeatedly insists that there is a 
universal, organizing principle in nature which drives it out of equilibrium and towards 
Richards' The Romantic Conception of Life is the obvious example here, although Richards lays out a 
case using Alexander von Humboldt as an intermediary between Naturphilosophie and the young Darwin. 
the "free play of forces" which results in organic life. Organism is simply the 
limitation (Hemmung) of linear forces in a way that results in a closed causal loop.788 
Prigogine drew sweeping conclusions from his study of dissipative systems, 
rejecting one of the fundamental beliefs of western science. From the ancients up to the 
twentieth century, scientists have largely been-committed to casual determinism. This 
does not imply that all scientists deny human freedom, but it does mean that they carry 
out their research in a way which presupposes the operations of nature as deterministic. 
Pierre-Simon Laplace gave the most famous expression of this belief, stating that, for 
"An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, 
and all positions of all items of which nature is composed.. .nothing would be uncertain 
and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes."789 Prigogine refers to 
this belief—that, if we fully comprehended the present, as well as all of nature's laws, we 
could deduce both the future and the past—as ""reversibility," and argues that twentieth 
century discoveries reveal it to be a false assumption: 
Classical science emphasized order and stability; now, in 
contrast, we see fluctuations, instability, multiple choices, 
and limited predictability at all levels of observation... In 
the classical view.. .laws of nature express certitudes. 
When appropriate initial conditions are given, we can 
predict with certainty the future, or "retrodict" the past. 
787
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 Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, Frederick Truscott and Frederick Emory, trans. (New 
York: Dover, 1951), 4. 
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Once instability is included, this is no longer the case, and 
the meaning of the laws of nature changes radically, for 
they now express possibilities or probabilities.790 
Prigogine thus argues that self-organization reveals a sort of freedom in nature, and this 
certainly bears some resemblance to Schelling's Naturphilosophie. In the Oldest System 
Program, Schelling pleads for a new type of physics which is reconcilable with human 
freedom, and in the First Outline, he talks about "raising nature up from dead mechanism 
and quickening it with freedom."791 
However, despite the superficial similarities between Schelling's and Prigogine's 
projects, attempting to revive the former by way of the latter is problematic. While a safe 
case can be made regarding self-organization, associating him with all of Prigogine's 
beliefs is problematic. Prigogine's commitment to "irreversibility" is by no means 
uncontroversial. In fact, the vast majority of scientists would reject his theory out of 
hand. Quantum physicists by no means accept the notion that probabilism leads to an 
"end of certainty": Laplace devoted himself to the study of probability for this exact 
reason. Therefore, this is a very tenuous means of reviving Schelling in the twenty-first 
century; it appeals only to a small cadre of scientists who are committed to irreversibility. 
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that even Prigogine's partisans would care to associate 
Ilya Prigogine, The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the New Laws of Nature, (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1997), 4. 
791
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themselves with Schelling.792 Prigogine himself seemed to accept all the common 
criticisms of Naturphilsoophie,193 and if we have learned anything from proponents of the 
"non-metaphysical Hegel," it is that sanitizing German Idealism in an attempt to make it 
more palatable fails to convince anyone already inclined to dismiss it as irrelevant.794 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, portraying Schelling as the first theorist of 
modern self-organization theory means making the same error this dissertation has 
continually sought to avoid: pulling him completely out of context. There is simply no 
reason to assume that Schelling's "universal organizing principle" is equivalent to 
modern self-organization, for the respective theories respond to dramatically different 
contexts. Schelling used his principle as a way of explaining the connection between the 
organic and inorganic world in an era where the many doubted even the possibility of 
establishing biology as a "real science," much less basing that science on the idea of 
historical species change. On the other hand, modern self-organization theory addresses 
itself to an age where biology is recognized as no less scientific than physics or 
chemistry. Although scientists still argue about the degree to which biological 
phenomena could ultimately be "reduced" to physics, almost no one believes that biology 
To be fair, Hermann Haken, the foremost authority on self-organization in lasers, has commented on 
Schelling in a sympathetic light, but he does not appear" convinced that there is any point in comparing the 
two theories. See Haken's article "Strukturentstehung und Gestalterkennung in den neueren 
Selbstorganisationtheorien," in Schelling und die Selbstorganisation, 11-26. 
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as a separate science should cease to exist. Finally, despite Heuser-KeBler's 
implication that, had Schelling possessed computer modeling (!), he would have been 
able to validate his self-organization theory empirically,7961 have serious doubts as to 
whether Schelling—who continually insisted that Naturphilosophie should explain the 
phenomena of nature from "natural principles"—would assent to "irreversibility." 
Schelling did indeed believe that we could "retrodict" the past philosophically. In fact, 
after acquiring enough empirical data and applying the methods of Naturphilosophie, we 
can actually grasp the necessity present in Nature's Stufenfolgel The teleological 
emphasis of Romantic Naturphilosophie actually makes it as committed to "reversibility" 
as the mechanism of Descartes. 
If the young Schelling cannot speak to us as a forerunner of self-organization 
theory, does he have anything to offer us at all? I believe the answer is yes, but not in the 
sense that a certain Schellingian doctrine can be transplanted directly into the present, or 
that some individual passage can provide the spark for a new scientific or philosophical 
discovery. Rather, the broad themes of Naturphilosophie speak to us more forcefully 
than any of its particular aspects. This result might not be completely satisfying, but it 
offers us the only hope of finding inspiration in Schelling without divorcing him from his 
context. Despite the many flaws found in Schelling's Naturphilosophie, from the 
General Overview to the Introduction to the Outline, a few things stand out. First, it 
offers us a model for cooperation between philosophy and science, not just in the sense 
that philosophy can guide research, but also in the sense that empirical science can help 
795
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us to answer philosophical questions. One reason Naturphilosophie is criticized so 
heavily, as opposed to earlier philosophical movements, might be that it represents the 
last full interpenetration of physics and metaphysics in the west. In an attempt to 
collectively forget the fact that, for 2,000 years, the best philosophers were sometimes 
also the best scientists, we have set Naturphilosophie up as a scapegoat. Descartes 
believed that the pineal gland somehow united the soul and the body, and he is excused 
for this. Newton was as interested in the occult as he was in mathematics, and he is 
excused for this. Schelling, on the other hand, wrote some silly things about light, and he 
is not only summarily condemned, but those isolated passages are made out to be 
paradigmatic of his entire approach to natural science. The demonization of 
Naturphilosophie is actually a testament to the rigid academic boundary between 
scientists and philosophers, a division which—perhaps with an eye on Schelling—will 
perhaps begin to disappear. 
On a related note, we would do well to return to Schelling's attempts to reconcile 
human freedom with physics, or at least to grapple with the problem. If Alan White is 
right, then Schelling's entire career, from On the I as Principle of Philosophy up to his 
lectures on the Philosophy of Revelation, was primarily oriented questions of human 
freedom. During the time he was constructing his Naturphilosophie, Schelling clearly 
saw that philosophy, working on its own, was unable to sufficiently explain human 
freedom. Kant had insisted on the mere compatibility of physical and free causes in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, while Fichte never really attempted to answer the question of 
how an absolutely free being can interject itself into a sequence of natural causes. 
Schelling turned to the life sciences for answers, and ended up building spontaneity and 
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life into nature as whole. I do not believe that this settled the question. Indeed, as I have 
already noted there, there is a tension in Schelling's system between the supposed 
"freedom" of nature and the degree to which the unfolding of the Stufenfolge was actually 
necessary. Nevertheless, one of few areas of research where philosophy and natural 
science currently come together is in the investigation of the mind, and it is no accident 
that free will is central to that project. Schelling would remind us that neither 
neurobiology nor philosophy of mind can solve the problem apart from one another. 
Perhaps it is dissatisfying to hear that what Schelling offers us today is merely a 
broad, methodological insight about the unity of metaphysics and physics, philosophy 
and natural science. However, the attempts to link him to self-organization reveal the 
dangers of doing anything more. If we must choose between being cautious and 
historically accurate On the one hand, and bold but ahistorical on the other, as an 
intellectual historian I must side with the former. I am not a philosopher of science, but if 
my historical rehabilitation of the young Schelling helps contribute to his revival in 
America, perhaps a true, presentist rehabilitation of Schelling's Naturphilosophie will 
happen after all. 
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